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MARION CRAIN*
In this Article, Marion Crain examines the recent resurgence of nostalgia
for the strictly-defined gender roles of the past. Moving beyond the frameworks
used by liberal and conservative scholars, Professor Crain analyzes this
phenomenon by evaluating various family law reform proposals as specific
responses to the perceived breakdown of ordered gender roles and the apparent
nonviability of dual-breadwinner, dual-caregiver marriages. Ultimately,
Professor Crain argues that specific employment law reforms, including
reducing the current forty-hour-per-week norm of full-time employment and
facilitating the integration ofpaid work and family life would support the dual
breadwinner/caregiver marriage rather than undermining it.
1. INTRODUCTION
"I will do the laundry, if you pay all the bills ....
I will raise the children, if you pay all the bills ....
I will do the dishes while you go have a beer.
Where is my John Wayne?
Where is my prairie son?
Where is my happy ending?
Where have all the cowboys gone?"'I
Dramatic changes have occurred in the traditional gender order over the last
twenty-five years. One of the most striking is the increased presence of women
in the waged labor market.2 This change in turn impacts upon the institution of
marriage. The traditional male breadwinner/female homemaker model that once
shaped duties and expectations in marriage is giving way to a model in which
men and women function as coequal breadwinners.3 The shift to a coequal
* Paul Eaton Professor of Law, The University of North Carolina. B.S. 1980, Cornell
University; J.D. 1983, UCLA Law School. I am grateful for the research support provided by
The University of North Carolina Law School. Holly Bryan, Matthew Duchesne, Deborah
Evans, Mary Scott Hunter, and Julie Hussey provided invaluable research assistance.
1 PAULA COLE, Where Have All the Cowboys Gone?, on THIS FIRE (Wea/Wamer Brothers
1996).
2 By 1993, 73% of women aged 25-34 and 76% of women aged 35-44 were in the
waged labor market. See Paul Osterman, Work/Family Programs and the Employment
Relationship, 40 ADMuN. SCIENCE Q. 681, 683 (1995).
3 The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that 53.4% of all married couples had two income
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breadwinner model inevitably impacts family life and parenting.4 When mothers
as well as fathers work full time, the job of homemaking-caretaking must be
added on top of the demands of the waged job, reduced, or shared. 5 Despite
some progress toward gender equity in this area, women continue to perform the
lion's share of the homemaldng and caretaking duties.6
earners in 1997. Steve Teske, Number of Dual Income Families Continues Growing, BLS
Reports, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 99, at D-3 (May 22, 1998). Other researchers place this
figure even higher. See Anne E. Winkler, Earnings of Husbands and Wives in Dual-Earner
Families, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 98, at E-1 (May 21, 1998) (estimating that 61% of all
married couples are dual-eamer couples). By 1998, only 19.2% of married couples conformed
to the male breadwinner/female homemaker model. See Family with Only Husband Working
Just 19.2 Percent of Married Households, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 101, at D-1 (May 26,
1999).
Working women contribute a significant portion of their families' incomes. One survey
found that almost half of employed married women (48%) provide at least 50% of their
household's income; 18% are their household's sole provider. See Tamar Lewin, Women Are
Becoming Equal Providers, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1995, at A27. The survey's results are
supported by earlier data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which showed that in 1993,
women who worked full time contributed a median of 41% of the household income, up from
39% in 1987. In 23% of dual-income married couple households, women outeamed men. See
id.; see also Winkler, supra, at E-1, E-5. Marriages in which the traditional arrangement is
reversed, with women functioning as the primary breadwinners for their families rather than
men, are disproportionately prevalent where the husband's income lies near the bottom of the
income scale; wives outeamed their husbands in 60% of these marriages. Id. at E-4.
4 Married mothers are twice as likely to work full time all year than their mothers were
twenty years ago. Seventy-seven percent of the mothers of school-aged children are working.
Sixty-three percent of mothers with children under two years of age were in the labor force in
1996. See id.; see also Kirstin Downey Grimsley & R.H. Melton, Full-Time Mons Earn
Respect, Poll Says, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1998, at A16.
Several explanations have been advanced for this phenomenon: changes in cultural
expectations regarding women's market roles; growth in women's income, so that mothers
contribute a significant proportion of family income; a tendency for women to marry later, give
birth later, and have fewer children; and market conditions such as inflation, high male
unemployment rates, and slow wage growth. See Howard V. Hayghe & Suzanne M. Bianchi,
Married Mothers' Work Patterns: The Job-Family Compromise, MONTHLY LAB. REV., June
1994, at 24, 26-27.
5 In 1998, both parents were employed in 64.1% of married-couple families with children
under 18 years of age. Only 28.9% of two-parent families with children under 18 years
featured an employed father and a homemaker mother. See Family With Only Husband
Working Just 19.2 Percent ofMarried Households, supra note 3, at D-1.
6 Nine out of ten women surveyed said that the responsibility for child and family
caretaking in their households fell to them. See generally Lewin, supra note 3. See also
Cynthia Starnes, Reflections on Betty Crocker, Soccer Mom and Divorce: A Message from
Detergent Manufacturers, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 285, 287, 289-90 (observing that most women
still function as primary caretakers for children whether or not they are employed in the wage
1878 [Vol. 60:1877
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While men and women generally agree that the trend toward sharing the
breadwinner role and renegotiating caretaking roles in the family sphere has
enriched both sexes, many also feel that today's gender-neutral ideal of having it
all-a happy marriage, family, and a successful career-is unattainable. Financial
pressures, time constraints, and the reality that children, domestic chores, and
family life are squeezed in the struggle to juggle work and family obligations,
leave parents and spouses feeling stressed, frustrated, and guilty. A nostalgia for
bygone days of family life has surfaced: A recent survey found that two-thirds of
men and women believed it would be best for women to stay home and care for
family and children, and forty percent of respondents wished for a return to the
settled gender roles of the past.7
Longings for 1950s-style gender roles are reflected not only in survey results
and in the lyrics of popular songs, but also in the way we interpret social
phenomena such as the divorce rate, parenting deficits, and the breakdown of
family structures. This Article explores our response to such phenomena through
family law reforms designed to move us backward in pursuit of traditional
"family values," a breadwinner/homemaker model, and marital permanence. It
suggests that a more effective strategy would move us forward by altering the
structure of employment and the values that are privileged in the market to
accommodate dual-earner couples and the new gender order.
Part I outlines the perceived crisis in the institution of marriage and the
practice of parenting, the reasons advanced for it in the popular press, and the
proposals for family law reform which it has spawned. Part II examines
alternative explanations for the destabilization of marriage-specifically the
crumbling of the old male breadwinner/female homemaker ideal associated with
the rise in women's paid employment, the challenge it poses to the gender order,
and the tensions it has produced within the family. Part MI inquires whether such
tensions are inextricably intertwined with market shifts and thus might more
effectively be addressed by dismantling the formal separation between home and
family and the market, and discusses the resistance to doing so. Part IV outlines
specific employment law reforms that would support the dual
breadwinner/caregiver marriage rather than undermining it, including reducing
the current forty hour per week norm of full-time employment, and facilitating
the integration of paid work and family life.
labor market, and citing studies documenting the division of household labor between
husbands and wives).
7 See Richard Morin & Megan Rosenfeld, With More Equity, More Sweat: Poll Shows
Sexes Agree on Pros and Cons of New Roles, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1998, at Al; see also
Grimsley & Melton, supra note 4, at A16.
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II. MARRIAGE-AN I[STITUTION IN CRISIS
Apocalyptic predictions regarding the demise of the American nuclear
family and the erosion of the institution of marriage abound in the popular
press.8 Marriage, warns commentator Maggie Gallagher, is disappearing.9 The
rising divorce rate and declining number of two-parent nuclear families have
been blamed for a variety of American social ills, including crime, poverty,
welfare dependence, homelessness, educational stagnation, and child abuse.10
Some have gone so far as to characterize marital instability as the greatest threat
to the American dream, and the major cause of downward economic mobility. 1'
In this Part, I outline the scope of the perceived crisis in the institution of
marriage, the reasons advanced for the crisis by commentators who have been
instrumental in triggering legal reform, and the legislative proposals which have
surfaced.
A. The Scope and Nature of the Crisis
Nearly all "postindustrial" nations are plagued with high divorce rates.12 The
United States is no exception: By 1989, the divorce rate was 4.8 per thousand
population, one of the highest divorce rates among postindustrial countries.13
8 See, e.g., DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR Mosr
URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM (1995); MAGGi GALLAGHER, Ti ABOLITION OF MARRIAGE: How
WE DESTROY LASTING LOVE (1996); BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE
(1997); William A. Galston, Divorce American Style, PUB. INTEREST, Summer 1996, at 12, 12-
26; Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1993 at 47,
47-84.
9 See GALLAGHER, supra note 8, at 127-28.
10 See, e.g., BLANKENHORN, supra note 8, at I ("Fatherlessness is the most harmful
demographic trend of this generation .... It is the engine driving our most urgent social
problems, from crime to adolescent pregnancy to child sexual abuse to domestic violence
against women."); GALLAGHER, supra note 8, at 3-4, 36-37 (asserting that children of single
or divorced mothers are more likely than children in intact biological families to have been
physically abused by their mothers or sexually abused by their mothers' boyfriends or second
husbands); WHITEHEAD, supra note 8, at 7-8 (blaming the rising divorce rate for economic
insecurity and disadvantage for children of divorce, fragile and unstable families, and
disinvestment of parental time and money in children).
II See GALLAGHER, supra note 8, at 31-33 (arguing that the fragility of marriage and the
rising divorce rates are "associated with persistent decline: declining health, declining fortune,
declining physical safety, declining psychological security, declining education, and declining
job attainment"); WHITEHEAD, supra note 8, at 183 (arguing that divorce is connected with
downward mobility and poverty for the middle class generally and for women in particular).
12 See W LLIAM J. GOODE, WORLD CHANGES IN DIVORCE PATIERNS 336 (1993).
13 See JOSEPH GurrmANN, DIVORCE IN PSYCHOSOCIAL PERSPECTIVE: THEORY AND
1880 [Vol. 60:1877
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This is a marked increase from the years prior to 1946, when the divorce rate was
2.0 or less; in 1946 the rate climbed to 4.3 per thousand, and then sharply
declined until 1958, when it began to increase again. Another rapid surge
occurred in the late 1960s, and divorce rates peaked in 1979 and 1981 at 5.3 per
thousand.14
The high divorce rate in the U.S. is viewed as a social crisis demanding a
legal response. First, divorce leaves women and children impoverished. Second,
divorce is associated with emotional distress for children and adults because it
interrupts and diminishes the noncustodial parent's relationship with the child,
and disrupts the child's ties to friends, neighborhoods, and educational
institutions. Finally, divorce undermines marriage, a fundamental social structure
that serves as the bedrock for our political and economic systems.
1. Impoverishment of Women and Children
Despite the fact that marriage is no longer an economic necessity for
women, most women-particularly those who retain custody of their children-
face economic hardship following divorce. 15 In 1992, 39% of all divorced
RESEARCH 4 (1993). This "crude rate" tends to understate the divorce rate because the 1000
person population figure includes children and adults who lack divorce potential. Nevertheless,
it is thought to be the best measure of divorce available because it avoids overstating the
divorce rate which occurs when using a ratio of the number of marriages to the number of
divorces in a given year (effectively comparing two different populations and implying that the
marriages ending in a given year are those contracted in that year, which is typically not the
case). See id, at 3-4.
14 see GrTITMANN, supra note 13, at4.
15 The correlation between women-headed households and poverty is undeniable, and
scholars from the left and the right agree upon it. See Linda J. Lacey, As American as
Parenthood and Apple Pie: Neutered Mothers, Breadwinning Fathers, and Welfare Rhetoric,
82 CORNELL L. REV. 79, 94 (1996) (book review) (pointing out agreement on this point
between feminist Martha Fineman and conservative fathers' rights advocate David
Blankenhom).
There exists considerable debate, however, regarding the extent of women's economic
disadvantage following divorce. Generally, women's economic well-being declines following
divorce while men's improves. Lorraine Weitzman's analysis of men and women's financial
positions one year after divorce showed that women experienced a 73% decline in their
standard of living after divorce, while men experienced a 42% improvement See LENORE J.
WErIZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLuI1ON: THE UNEXPECrED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 323 (1985); Lenore J. Weitzman,
The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and
Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1181, 1249-51 (1981). Subsequent studies have
indicated that while Weitzman was correct in her overall conclusion that women lose
economically following divorce while men gain, her findings as to the magnitude of the losses
and gains were greatly exaggerated. See generally Greg J. Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, A
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women with children lived below the poverty level. 16 Since children of divorce
are typically in their mothers' custody, they live at the standard of living of their
mothers-which means that many experience poverty. 17 The major problem of
divorce for women, particularly custodial mothers, "is not the lack of a male
presence, but a lack of a male income." 18 Many believe that marital dissolution
law plays a significant role in this, but few agree as to what that role currently is,
or should be.19
2. Psychological Trauma
For children, divorce is undeniably stressful.2 0 Above all, divorce frequently
Reconsideration of the Economic Consequences of Marital Dissolution, 22 DEMOGRAPHY 485
(1985); Saul D. Hoffrnan & Greg J. Duncan, What Are the Economic Consequences of
Divorce?, 25 DEMOGRAPHY 641 (1988) (agreeing with Weitzman's overall findings that
women suffer a post-divorce decrease in standard of living, but arguing that Weitzman's 73%
figure was too high; the actual figure is closer to a 30% decline in the first year after divorce).
Others found even smaller declines, and ultimately Weitzman herself acknowledged that her
figures were erroneous. See Women's Post-Divorce Study is All Wrong, Expert Says, FLA.
TODAY, May 17, 1996, at 8A; see also Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests on
Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 130, 135 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma
Hill Kay eds., 1990) (asserting that Weitzman's emphasis on exceptional cases where there
was significant property to divide distorted her figures).16 See DEMIE KURZ, FOR RICHER, FOR POORER: MOTHERS CONFRONT DIVORCE 23
(1995).
17 See id. at 24. Approximately 85% to 90% of divorced mothers have custody of their
children. Child support awards tend to be inadequate to meet the costs of raising children, and
enforcement has been historically weak. See id. at 27.
18 GUTrMANN, supra note 13, at 100.
19 Compare H. Elizabeth Peters, Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and
Private Contracting, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 437 (1986) (finding that women divorced in no-fault
states in 1979 received smaller alimony and child support awards than those divorced in fault
divorce states in the same time frame) with Herbert Jacob, Another Look at No-Fault Divorce
and the Post-Divorce Finances of Women, 23 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1989) (arguing that
reductions in child support, alimony, and property distribution awards to women could be the
result of other statutory changes that accompanied the shift to no-fault divorce, rather than
resulting from the no-fault provisions themselves) and Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and
Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, (1989) (arguing that divorced women were not
economically better off under a fault-based divorce law). See generally STEPHANIE COONIZ,
THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMmS AND THE NOSTALGiA TRAP 205-06 (1992)
(asserting that the negative economic effects associated with divorce are not inevitable, and
could be alleviated through enactment of more equitable exit rules for property identification
and division, support, and parenting).
2 0 See SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT, WHEN THE BOUGH BREAKS: THE COST OF NEGLECrING
OuR CHILDREN 88 (1991) (describing severe emotional and educational problems triggered by
1882 [Vol 60:1877
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entails the permanent total or partial separation of children from one parent 21
Although it can be difficult to separate the impact of factors such as marital
disharmony and the lack of economic resources which accompany divorce from
the trauma caused by the family breakup itself, most researchers have concluded
that the impact of divorce on children is due primarily to the breakdown in
family relationships: Parenting can be impaired by marital disharmony and
parent-child relationships may be damaged indirectly by the parental conflict.22
Divorced adults, too, experience psychological trauma. Divorced women
tend to suffer emotional trauma, including feelings of anger, depression, despair,
loneliness, low self-esteem, grief, guilt, and anxiety.23 Nevertheless, a significant
number of divorced women report improved psychological well-being, self-
esteem, and feelings of competency following divorce; many women experience
marriage as more restrictive than men, and therefore have less to lose than men
emotionally in divorce. 24 Divorced men seem to be at even greater risk of
psychological trauma than women: Divorced men are nine times more likely
than men from intact families to be admitted to psychiatric hospitals for the first
marital disruption and divorce, and, in particular, by father absence).
The degree to which children suffer long-term negative effects from divorce remains
controversial. Psychologists Judith Wallerstein and Sandra Blakeslee published a 1989 study
finding that almost half the children of divorced parents experience long-term anxieties and
insecurities that make it difficult for them to be successful in love and work relationships. See
JUDrrH S. WALLERSIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN AND
CHILDREN A DECADE AFrER DIVORCE 299-300, 314 (1989); see generally CLAIRE BERMAN,
ADULT CHILDREN OF DIvORCE SPEAK OUT: ABOUT GROWiNG UP WITH-AND MOVING
BEYOND-PARENTAL DIVORCE (1991). Several studies have found that children of divorced
parents are more likely to suffer marital breakdown and divorce in their own marriages than
children of intact families, in part because of a tendency towards early marriage among girls
from separated or divorced families and the concomitant higher risk of divorce associated with
early marriage and lower income families. See GUTrMANN, supra note 13, at 17, 196-97.
21 See GuIrMANN, supra note 13, at 157-58.
22 See GmmANN, supra note 13, at 200-01. Additional explanations for the negative
impact of divorce on children include the inadequate socialization to appropriate role models
that occurs in single-parent families, the economic hardship that is often associated with
divorce, and its accompanying disruptions in living arrangements, schooling, and other
activities. See id. at 200.
23 See ia at 98-99.
2 4 See KURZ, supra note 16, at 186. See generally CATHERINE KOHLER REISSMAN,
DIVORCE TALK: MEN AND WOMEN MAKE SENSE OF PERSONAL RELAnONSHIPS (1990). One-
third of the women in Kurz's sample questioned whether the institution of marriage was good
for them, expressing doubts about whether equality and independence were possible in
marriage. See KUR_, supra note 16, at 222.
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time, while the rate for divorced women is only three times more than that of
women from intact families. 25
3. Tears in the Social Fabric
Finally, a rising divorce rate threatens the social order. Americans have
historically feared divorce because it suggested a lapse from virtue.26 Since
virtuous families were seen as the foundation for a moral society--"the
foundation of national morality must be laid in private families"--"a rising
divorce rate was reason for great anxiety by politicians. '27 Whitehead writes that
"[e]ven modest levels of divorce aroused fears of a spread of promiscuous
behavior .... ,2 8 Demie Kurz explains that the nuclear family has been
considered essential in order "to hold society together, to curb people's anti-
social impulses, and to properly socialize the next generation," and because
"without it there would be social disorganization, even anarchy."29 The prospect
of single-parent families appears particularly alarming.30 In short, by
undermining family and social bonds, which historically served as a lifelong
support system for children who grew up in two-parent married households,
divorce removed a basic form of social insurance. 31
B. The Reasons for the High Divorce Rate
Despite the significant likelihood that their marriages will end in divorce
(currently fifty percent),32 Americans do not seem to have given up on marriage.
The marriage rate in the U.S. remains very high: Ninety percent of men and
women in the U.S. marry during their lifetimes, 33 and ninety-six percent say that
25 See GurrMANN, supra note 14, at 120.
26 See WHREHEAD, supra note 8, at 16.
2 7 Id. (quoting John Adams).
28Id. at 18.
29 KuRZ, supra note 16, at 232.
30 See id.
31 See WHrrEHEAD, supra note 8, at 8-9, 139. Relying on statistics that show that the
median income of two-parent families is higher than that of single parent families, Whitehead
observes that marriage is a vital economic resource in middle and working class families-
more significant than a college degree. See id. at 8.
32 See Margaret Talbot, Love, American Style, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 14, 1997, at 30, 32.
Forty percent of first marriages and sixty percent of remarriages end in divorce. See Galston,
supra note 8, at 14.
33 See Talbot, supra note 32, at 30.
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they want to marry at some point.34 Seventy-five percent of Americans believe
that "'marriage is a lifelong commitment to be ended only under extreme
circumstances.' 35 Why do so many continue to aspire to what is apparently an
unlikely goal?
Two stories explaining the demise of permanence norms in marriage have
emerged, and each has been influential in shaping legal reforms. Liberal
commentators believe that the paradox is traceable to American optimism and
high expectations for marriage: The ideal of marriage, with its trappings of
romanticism, goal of permanence, and multiple purposes-romantic love, sex,
economic partnership, parenting-is the cause of divorce.36 In this view, divorce
supports the institution of marriage, preserving the ideal of the romantic marital
union and permitting those who have failed to reach it in one marriage to try
again in another.37 Proponents of this view defend no-fault divorce, and proffer
proposals directed at reforming the economic consequences of divorce to protect
investment, expectation, and reliance interests of the partners.
Conservative commentators, on the other hand, see rising divorce rates as a
byproduct of individualism and a weak commitment to marriage and family;
when individual interest diverges from the common good of the family unit,
divorce becomes attractive.38 The cycle is self-perpetuating: Divorce begets
divorce and more female-headed families, because children of divorced parents
have more difficulty forming permanent relationships and are more vulnerable to
disruption in their future families and more likely to divorce or have children
outside marriage.39 In this explanation, women's increased participation in the
labor market is identified as a significant factor contributing to the rise of
individualism and the concomitant decreased commitment to marriage and the
tvo-parent family.40 Proponents of this view argue for legal reforms which




36 See Talbot, supra note 32, at 30. This explanation is buttressed by the fact that even
prior to the advent of no-fault divorce law, the United States had the "highest rate of divorce of
any nation of parallel culture and development in the world." Charles W. Tenney, Jr., Divorce
Without Fault: The Next Step, A Modelfor Change, 46 NEB. L. REV. 24,34 (1967).
3 7 See J. HERBIE DIFONzo, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL
CULTUREoFDIVoRCEINTwENTIEH-CENTURYAMERICA 10 (1997).
38 See KURz, supra note 16, at 14 (summarizing the arguments of conservative
commentators).
3 9 See WHrrEHEAD, supra note 8, at 11; see generally discussion, supra note 20.
40 See WHrrHEAD, supra note 8, at 11.
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1. The Liberal Story ofMarriage and Divorce
In the liberal story, the ideal marriage is a companionate marriage defined in
emotional terms and characterized by romantic love, compatibility, freedom of
choice, and equality between husband and wife.41 Ideals of affection and
companionship depend upon and further an ideology of equality between men
and women.42 Romantic-companionate marriages are inherently more unstable
than marriages forged out of duty, a desire to consolidate wealth, or a need to
form a political alliance between dynasties-a historical reasons for marriage4 3
Thus, divorce in the U.S. preserves the opportunity to forge new, more
harmonious marriages, and functions as "an expression of idealism about
marriage, not a concession of realism about it."44
In the liberal understanding of marriage, then, divorce is an individual right
and a psychological resource, an opportunity for growth and change-a chance
to remake oneself and to acquire new competencies. 45 Children's psychological
well-being is presumed to rise and fall derivatively with marital happiness, so
that divorce is actually seen as desirable for children whose parents are
incompatible, offering the opportunity for a new, more peaceful existence with
one parent or the chance for a remarriage and a more harmonious family
situation.46 In short, divorce is viewed as strengthening the institution of
marriage rather than eroding it.47
No-fault divorce laws are consistent with this vision of marriage. The ethic
of individual entitlement to divorce suggested the removal of social, legal, and
moral impediments to divorce, and its dominance in legal thought influenced the
shift to no-fault divorce laws.48 Marriage became "a voluntary (and therefore,
41 See REISSMAN, supra note 24, at 67.
42 See id
4 3 See Talbot, supra note 32, at 32.
44 Id. at 33. Talbot traces the roots of the concept of the right to divorce to the American
Revolution, explaining that the practice of divorce was justified by reference to the Declaration
of Independence and its proclamation of every individual's right to pursue happiness and
liberty. See id. at 32. The Supreme Court's recognition of the right to divorce and the right to
marry as fundamental liberties protected by the Constitution reflects this same vision of
marriage and understanding of its central place in American history. See Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,374 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
4 5 See WHriEHEAD, supra note 8, at 5.
46 See id. at 6.
47 See id
48 See id. While divorce had been permitted by law since the passage of the Married
Women's Property Acts in the 1840s, the government originally attempted to discourage
divorce through the vehicle of restrictive fault-based divorce laws. The restrictions imposed by
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MARRIA GE AND BREAD WINNING
perhaps, temporary) union of equals which either may terminate 'at-will' if it
does not satisfy their desires and needs."49 The shift to no-fault divorce "both
such laws varied from state to state, but in general divorce was available only if one party
proved that the other was at fault-guilty of adultery, desertion, or cruelty. If the wife was the
"innocent' spouse in such an analysis, she was theoretically entitled to financial protection for
life (or until she remarried) under most state alimony laws. If she was guilty of a marital sin,
however, she could be denied alimony, and, frequently, property division and child custody.
See KURz, supra note 16, at 25.
No-fault divorce originated in this country in California, which adopted no-fault divorce
laws in 1970; other states followed. See Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-
Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 291,292 (1987). Some form of no-fault divorce has been
available in all fifty states since 1985. See Linda D. Elrod & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law
in the Fifiy States, 27 FAM. L.Q. 515, 661 (1994). No-fault divorce laws require, at most, a
showing of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, incompatibility, or irreconcilable
differences, and typically permit a divorce by one party over the other's objection and without
proof of fault (although waiting periods prior to finalizing the divorce may vary depending on
whether both spouses consent). See KURZ, supra note 16, at 26.
No-fault divorce in turn inspired changes in rules governing alimony and marital property
division at divorce. When it became apparent that no-fault divorce law removed a bargaining
chip (consent to divorce) upon which wives had depended to protect their financial security
when their husbands sought a divorce, a substitute form of insuring their economic security
was necessary. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE
RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 32-33 (1991). Equitable distribution laws,
consistent with the vision of marriage as an economic and emotional partnership, were adopted
in most jurisdictions shortly thereafter. See iL at 33. Equitable distribution allowed
considerations of equity, economic need, and contribution of the marital partners to the
acquisition of marital assets to influence division of property, and minimized continuing
economic dependence of one spouse upon another. See GutrMANN, supra note 13, at 7-9.
Permanent alimony was replaced by spousal support awards of short duration, designed to
allow the economically dependent spouse to rehabilitate herself and become capable of
independent support. See KURZ, supra note 16, at 26.
Nevertheless, a significant number of states continue to consider marital fault in dividing
marital property or awarding alimony. See Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Note, Fault: A Viable Means
of Re-Injecting Responsibility in Marital Relations, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 605, 638 (1996)
(noting that twenty-four jurisdictions consider marital fault in awarding alimony). Twelve
states maintain heart balm statutes, which permit tort-based recoveries in the marital context.
North Carolina, one of nine states that continues to recognize the torts of alienation of
affections and criminal conversation, recently made legal headlines when, in the case of
Hutelmeyer v. Cox, a jury found in favor of a jilted wife who had sued another woman for
stealing her husband, awarding the now ex-wife $1 million. See Terry Carter, 'She Done Me
Wrong', A.B.A. J., Oct. 1997, at 24, 24; Cindi Andrews, Love's Legal Loss, GREENSBORO
NEWS & RECORD, Aug. 16, 1997, at Al. See generally Jennifer E. McDougal, Comment,
Legislating Morality: The Actions for Alienation of Affections and Criminal Conversation in
North Carolina, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 163 (1998) (discussing tort remedies predicated on
marital fault).
4 9 Martha Albertson Fineman, Societal Factors Affecting the Creation of Legal Rules for
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reflected and contributed to the new conception of divorce." 50 While most agree
that no-fault laws did not cause the rise in divorce rates,51 the laws certainly
solidified public tolerance of divorce.52
Although not a feminist-inspired reform, no-fault divorce was initially
heralded by most feminists as promoting gender equality, enhancing women's
autonomy and making it easier for women to leave unhappy or abusive
marriages.53 The vision of the spouses as equal economic partners in the
Distribution of Property at Divorce, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL
THEORY 265,266 (Martha Albertson Fineman &Nancy Sweet Thomadsen eds., 1991).
50 WHrrEHEAD, supra note 8, at 68; see also MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY,
DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 258 (1972) (explaining the legal shift to no-fault as a triumph of
liberalism and a conscious effort to lower the legal barriers to divorce); RODERICK PHILLIPS,
PurrING ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN SOCIETY 531, 561, 569, 615, 636
(1988) (characterizing the shift to no-fault divorce at law as part of a "general trend of
liberalization" in American culture). Others disagree. See DIFONzO, supra note 37, at 2, 167-
68 (asserting that the no-fault regime was part of a conservative effort to reverse or slow the
divorce rate by channeling troubled marriages into therapeutic family courts); accord MARY
ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 65-80 (1987); see also HERBERT
JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
13, 54, 74, 166 (1988) (asserting that no-fault legal reformers successfully cast their efforts as
routine legislation aimed at streamlining the legal process, adopting a conservative guise and
pro-family vocabulary on moral issues).
Regardless of the original intent of divorce reformers in the no-fault era, however, the
undeniable impact of no-fault was to create a system of divorce on demand, eliminating any
requirement that spouses negotiate in the shadow of the law for release from the bonds of
matrimony. Where the fault-based law had commonly required de facto mutual consent of
parties seeking divorce (the innocent spouse had to agree to sue the guilty spouse for divorce,
and the guilty spouse forewent legal defenses to divorce such as recrimination and
condonation), the no-fault laws allowed unilateral divorce. See DIFONZO, supra note 37, at
170.
51 Cherlin demonstrated that the dramatic increase in the divorce rates began in the early
1960s, prior to the liberalization of divorce law in the 1970s. See generally ANDREW J.
CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE (1981). Thus, the laws appear to be responsive
to a growing demand for divorce rather than the cause of it. Nevertheless, the debate rages on,
fueled most recently by new evidence that suggests that law played some causal role in at least
the rise in divorce which occurred between 1970 and 1975. See Robert M. Gordon, Note, The
Limits ofLimits on Divorce, 107 YALE L. 1435, 1450-53 (1998).
52 See Arland Thornton, Changing Attitudes Toward Separation and Divorce: Causes
and Consequences, 90 AM. J. SOC. 856, 869 (1985); Gerald C. Wright, Jr. & Dorothy M.
Stetson, The Impact of No-Fault Divorce Law Reform on Divorce in American States, 40 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 575, 580 (1978); see also GOODE, supra note 12, at 322 (observing that
both the rise in divorce rates and the change in laws originate from the same sources: shifting
cultural norms and values, changing economic opportunities, and images presented by the
media).
53 See DIFONZO, supra note 37, at 173. The no-fault laws were adopted with literally no
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marriage powerfully influences the law of marital dissolution, dictating
presumptions of equal division of assets and liabilities upon divorce.54 This idea
of marriage as a partnership and the application of equality standards to marital
dissolution law is also consistent with the goal of reducing sex role stereotyping
in marriage and valuing women's unpaid domestic caregiving work as a
contribution at least theoretically equal to men's wage earning work 55 However,
no-fault impacted women's post-divorce economic status in dramatic and
unforeseen ways. The confluence of women's role as post-divorce custodial
parent, labor market disadvantage stemming from discrimination, conflicts of
caretaking obligations with employer's expectations and historical investment in
husband and children rather than in their own marketability produced a markedly
lower standard of living for women post-divorce.56 Changes in laws governing
alimony and property division to make them more responsive to goals of
promoting autonomy and financial independence contributed to the situation.57
2. The Conservative Story. Marriage as Duty
The conservative understanding of marriage is based on duties forged from
moral and religious beliefs and by economic dependency rather than on a
relation predicated on romantic love.58 While persons are free to pursue their
individual interests in the market, the family is associated with duty, self-
sacrifice and commitment.59
The cultural norm of marital permanence historically attempted to ensure a
stable and strong family support network for children, while at the same time
preserving the ideal of affective marriage-marriage based upon voluntary
input from or effort on behalf of organized women's groups, but were politically packaged in
terms that would appeal to women active in the then-burgeoning feminist movement. See
JACOB, supra note 50, at 3, 23.
54 See DIFONZO, supra note 37, at 173.
55 See id. at 276.
5 6 See DAPHNE SPAIN & SUZANNE M. BlANCd1, BALANCING ACr: MOTHERHOOD,
MARRIAGE AND EMPLOYMENT AMONG AMERICAN WOMEN 31 (1996) (finding that women
suffer on average a 24% decline in family income after divorce while men suffer only a 6%
decline); see supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
57 It is debatable whether no-fault divorce laws themselves actually worsened women's
legal positions. Mechanisms to enforce the old fault-based awards were lacking, and most
women never received alimony from their ex-husbands even when it was ordered. See KURz,
supra note 16, at 25; see also Mary E. O'Connell, Alimony After No-Fault: A Practice in
Search of a Theory, 23 NEW ENG. L. REV. 437, 437 (1988) (noting that historically the
payment of alimony was even rarer than the award of alimony).
58 See Talbot, supra note 32, at 36.
59 See id
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affections rather than economic necessity or parentally arranged contracts:
Marital permanence preserved freedom of individual choice in the selection of a
marriage partner but required that this free choice could be exercised only once.
Under these cultural terms, one-time choice turned into a lifelong commitment,
with a clear set of binding duties and obligations between the spouses as well as
between the married parents and their children.
The norm of permanence helped stabilize the shaky foundation of
marriages based on affective individualism. It also created the cultural condition
for generous and long-term investments in the marriage. An assumption of
permanence encouraged spouses to invest in the relationship, without fear that
such emotional and material investments could be lost with the dissolution of the
marriage.60
Children were perceived as "stakeholders in their parents' marriage" and
parents were exhorted to "'stay[ ] together' for the sake of the children."61
The marital permanence norm proved insufficient to stabilize marriage in a
society otherwise committed to liberal notions of freedom of choice. Women
who entered the labor market hastened the family's demise by bringing market
values home with them at night. Family life became simply another domain for
the pursuit of individual happiness and self-interest, and the "divorce culture"
took root.62 As market values invaded the family realm, divorce became a form
of "psychological entrepreneurialism," an avenue toward self-expression, growth
and transformation, particularly for women.63
60 WH D, supra note 8, at 140.
61 Id. at 142. The assumption was that marital stability and child well-being were linked.
62 See id. at 5. Others agree. See GUTrMANN, supra note 13, at 22 (theorizing that as
cultural values shifted toward immediate gratification, adaptability, mobility and replacement
rather than commitment, perseverance and long-term investment, they have tended to produce
a higher divorce rate); see also GUSTAV MARIUS BRUCE, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: A
SOCIOLOGICAL AND THEOLOGICAL STUDY 127 (1930) (blaming the "philosophy of
individualism and selfishness" for the rise in the divorce rate in the early 1900s).
Communitarians have dubbed the increasing emphasis on self-fulfillment that emanated from
the 1960s and the concomitant emphasis on romantic love, hedonism and self-fulfillment in
marriage "expressive individualism." See ROBERT BELLAH Er AL., HABITS OF THE HEART:
INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMrIInwENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 333-34 (1985).
Social scientists have sought to explain the phenomenon in more value-neutral behavioral
terms: People are simply operating in their own self-interest, just as they always have; what has
changed is the market. In the past, people (especially women) made investments in family
relationships because their best opportunities for advancement lay there. As families have
become more fragile and a more attractive structure of opportunities has developed outside the
family, people have tended to invest in themselves and to pursue self-advancement outside the
family because it is likely to be more profitable in the long run. See GOODE, supra note 12, at 9.
63 See WHrnEHEAD, supra note 8, at 56. Whitehead dubs this the ideology of "expressive
1890 [Vol. 60:1877
MRRIAGE AND BREAD WINNING
Women and capitalism are blamed for the new divorce culture. Women who
compete with men for money in the market do not fit the ideal of the virtuous,
pure, and moral voice in the family.64 Wives' employment threatens the
traditional authority of husbands and frees women to leave unhappy marriages.65
In the conservative story, then, divorce is closely associated with capitalism,
consumption, and the expression of women's initiative and independence. 66
Conservatives originally supported the ideology of "expressive divorce"
since it was compatible with a deregulated environment and the celebration of
market forces, values, and reasoning.67 As the costs to children became clear,
however, conservatives abandoned expressive divorce as selfish.6 8 In a post-
divorce," and her analysis of its parallels to the American marketplace is illuminating:
[E]xpressive divorce saw one's inner resources as a block of capital, to be developed and
deployed to maximum advantage. The deeper logic of expressive divorce was the logic of
capitalism. Just as the ideology of the market called upon the owner of capital to
maximize resources, so the expressive ideology of divorce urged the proprietor of
psychological capital to do the same... In order to maximize profits, capital had to be
mobile; like financial capital, psychological capital should not be fettered or bound by
relationships that did not yield high returns.
The logic of expressive divorce also suggested that relationships themselves--
especially relationships that are binding or permanent-are risky investments. The most
reliable form of investment thus becomes the investment in the self The logic of
expressive divorce argued not only for building one's own psychological capital,
therefore, but also for keeping it liquid. A self not tied down by permanent bonds and
obligations was a self that could take advantage of new opportunities as they came along.
Marketplace values of choice, unfettered freedom, contingency, and dynamic change
were the values of expressive divorce.
Id. at 76-77.
64 See id. at 53.
65 See id. at 21-23.
66 See id at 53-54. Christopher Lasch makes a similar point, arguing that capitalism and
material prosperity inevitably wore away the moral foundations of family life: "Instead of
serving as a counterweight to the market, .. the family was invaded and undermined by the
market" CHRISTOPHER LASCH, ThE REVOLT OF THE ELIrEs AND THE BETRAYAL OF
DEMOCRACY 96 (1995).
67 See WHITEHEAD, supra note 8, at 79.
68 Whitehead observes that expressive divorce split loyalties in the liberal community
ecause it highlighted the "fault line" between women and children: Women's pursuit of
rketplace opportunities and independence from men placed children at risk. See id. at 79-
). Again, Christopher Lasch agrees: Women were forced into the market in order to obtain
uality with men in a system which devalued women's traditional unpaid caretaking work
1 accepted money as the universal measure of value, and children paid the price. See LASCH,
ra note 66, at 96.
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agrarian market, where children do not provide a financial return on parental
investment of time and money, children's dependence necessitates altruistic
behavior such as sacrifice or deferral of parental interests.69 The values
privileged in the postindustrial market-value for value exchanges, timely return
on investments of resources, and individualism-are inappropriate to the family
sphere, and particularly to raising children.
Rather than challenging the definition of work, workplace norms, or
postindustrial market values, conservatives argue that the model of family
relationships should reject the model of relationships offered by the market, so
that the family exists in opposition to the market as a source of competing
values.70 While some conservatives reject the notion that it will be necessary to
return to a "separate spheres" ideology in which men and women are assigned
gendered roles in the market/family spheres, with men assuming the role of
breadwinner and women assuming the role of homemaker, nurturer, and
caretaker, others embrace the idea.71
C. Family Law Reform
1. Liberal Reform Proposals
Liberal reform proposals accept the necessity of divorce in a society
committed to companionate marriage and equality norms, and argue for reforms
69 See WTEHEAD, supra note 8, at 153-54.
70 See id. at 194. Whitehead explains that "precisely because other social bonds are
becoming more undependable and impermanent, the need for strong and lasting family bonds
increases .... This means that there must be a sustained effort to strengthen marriage bonds
and to create a social and cultural environment supportive of the commitment to marriage:' I
at 192.
71 Compare WHITEHEAD, supra note 8, at 133 (defending the nuclear family's ability to
adapt to change, and arguing that marriage need not inevitably be associated with the separate
spheres ideology of Ozzie and Harriet days) with BLANKENHORN, supra note 8, at 65-95
(arguing for a return to traditional gendered roles of father-as-breadwinner and mother-as-
caretaker).
Others suggest that we are already moving in the direction of a return to the traditional
"one paycheck family," as women in increasing numbers leave the paid workforce to bear or
raise young children. See, e.g., Starnes, supra note 6, at 289 (arguing that the full-time
homemaker/primary breadwinner model is not extinct, and may even be making a comeback);
see also Maggie Mahar, A Change ofPlace, BARRON's, Mar. 21, 1994, at 121 (asserting thai
the growth of labor marketparticipation by women appears to be slowing). Finally, some argue
persuasively that the traditional nuclear family is "an ahistorical amalgam of structures, value
and behaviors that never coexisted in the same time and place"; the Cleavers and the Walton
had fundamentally different family structures; domesticity was never an option for slax
women or working-class women. See COONTZ, supra note 19, at 8-11.
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of marital property distribution law and alimony law to more equitably
compensate homemakers for their labor and their investment in caretaking
work.72 While liberals are correct that divorce must be freely available if
marriage is to be a relation of equality rather than dependency, liberal solutions
rarely go far enough in recognizing that the interaction of the waged labor market
and the cultural division of household work along gender lines produces a de
facto dependent status for caretakers-who are typically women.
Martha Fineman has persuasively argued that adherence to the ideal of the
egalitarian marriage, preference for the gender-neutral equality model in the
family law context and reluctance to advocate result-oriented affirmative action
principles significantly disadvantage women at divorce.73 The partnership ideal
of marriage presumes that "marriage is a partnership among equals who share
work and family responsibilities equitably and who have equal opportunities to
structure their private lives, as well as to choose from an equal range of options
in the wage workforce." 74 Equality ideals translated in marital dissolution laws-
equal sharing of assets and liabilities at divorce-fly in the face of the reality that
most wives assume more than a partner's share of the household labor and child
caretaking work, both during marriage and after divorce (since most women
retain primary custody of children after divorce).75
Similarly, the cultural assignment to women of the primary responsibility for
nurturing children and making a home undermines their performance in the
market. The prevailing assumption that "employers are entitled to workers with
limited caregiving responsibilities" ensures that few women will be capable of
functioning as "ideal workers. '76 Women who are not caregivers may be
adversely affected as well, because employers will assume that their attachment
to the waged labor market is secondary.77 Thus, couples have economic
72 See, e.g., Cynthia Stames, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on
Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV.
67, 139 (1993) (arguing that primary caretakers should be compensated at divorce through
alimony awards); Jane Biondi, Note, Who Pays for Guilt: Recent Fault-Based Divorce Reform
Proposals, Cultural Stereotypes and Economic Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 611 (1999)
(arguing that economic reforms of marital property law that promote equal financial outcomes
for men and women after divorce are preferable to fault-based reforms that cloak women's
economic disadvantage in moral rhetoric and privatize dependence).
73 See FINEMAN, supra note 48, at 23-26.
7 4 NANCY E. DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE-PARENT FAMLmS 61 (1997).
7 5 See FINEMAN, supra note 48, at 29.
76 See JOAN WILLLAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICr AND
WHATTO Do ABOUT IT 1, 20 (2000)
77 See ALLEN M. PARKMAN, NO-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? 87 (1992); see
also, e.g., cases cited infra note 186 (reflecting market hostility toward working mothers).
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incentives as well as cultural incentives to accord primacy to the husbands'
careers when the demands of family and work press upon the marriage. While
there are ways to reform family law to protect women's human capital
investment in their husbands' careers and their children's upbringing without
entrenching the gendered division of labor, many risk reifying the gendered
division of caretaking work.78
Most importantly, though, the classic double bind of simultaneous
commitment to the ideology of a breadwinner/homemaker norm and
companionate-romantic marriage in a society committed to sex equality leads
liberals to attribute marital breakdown to the failures of individual marital
partners to live up to the ideal of marriage, rather than questioning the institution
itself or the market context in which it must function.79 Even if spouses were
adequately compensated for caretaking at divorce, the liberal solution does
nothing to reduce marital tension or the likelihood of divorce. Until we look
critically at the norms surrounding the breadwinner/homemaker ideal we are
destined to repeat and reproduce in marriage the sources of gender inequality and
marital discord.80
2. Conservative Reform Proposals
The conservative divorce reform proposals reflect an understanding of
divorce as an expression of individualistic, self-promoting behavior. The
78 For a sampling of feminist proposals along these lines, see June Carbone, Economics,
Feminism and the Reinvention of Alimony: A Reply to Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1463,
1493-95 (1990) (proposing a restitutionary system that would encourage women to work in
the waged labor market while also continuing to bear the primary responsibility for
childrearing and to engage in spousal sharing behavior in support of their husbands' careers);
Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic
Justification for Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2423, 2455 (1994) (arguing that an income-sharing
approach would also encourage husbands to increase their investment in family caretaking
duties); Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J.
2227, 2257-66 (1994) (arguing for income equalization after divorce, during the time there
exist dependent children, in order to protect spousal investments made during marriage in the
other spouse's income-earning potential).
79 See REIsSMAN, supra note 24, at 72.
80 See id. at 72-73. According to Pepper Schwartz, "[t]he linchpin of marital inequality
is ... the provider complex, a combination of roles that give the man the responsibility for
financially supporting the family's life-style and the woman all the auxiliary duties that allow
the man to devote himself to his work." PEPPER SCHWARTZ, PEER MARRIAGE: How LOVE
BETWEEN EQUALS REALLY WoRKs 111 (1994). In a world where marital permanence was the
reality, the provider complex would be more functional, but in a world characterized by
divorce and a commitment to gender equality, "resentments [associated with] the provider
complex.., simply serve to undermine the harmony of the household" Id at 118.
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conservative policy fix for both divorce and resulting poverty is to deter divorce
through the imposition of a marital permanence norm with the force of law.
Conservative and communitarian critics argue that family law should function as
a moral yardstick to enforce communal values, setting a standard that encourages
loyalty to commitments made in marriage vows and discourages, even punishes,
those who seek to renege on them.81 The argument is simply "[w]here there is
fault, there should be consequence." 82
Academics and legislators have responded to this call with proposals to
reform no-fault divorce law, seeking to erect barriers to obtaining a divorce and
to send a moral message about responsibility and duty by making divorce more
costly for those at fault.83 Proponents of such reforms include an unlikely
alliance of men's rights groups (who favor fewer custody battles because they
tend to be resolved in women's favor in the courts),84 some feminists (who
believe that current law favors men financially and assists them in obtaining
quick exits from marriage),8 5 right-wing Christian groups, communitarians, and
81 See Galston, supra note 8, at 22 (describing argument and advocating a five-year
waiting period for nonconsensual, no-fault divorce). While Whitehead stops short of
recommending changes in divorce laws, see WHrrEHEAD, supra note 8, at 192, others have
relied upon her arguments to make the case for legal reforms. See, e.g., GALLAGHER, supra
note 8, at 218, 249-50 (advocating abolishing unilateral divorce; imposing a five- to seven-
year waiting period for contested no-fault divorces in order to give the partner who does not
desire divorce more bargaining power, making the marriage contract more explicit by giving
couples a copy of the marriage contract adopted in their state; requiring state courts to
recognize the validity of other states' marriage contracts and to use them as the basis for
divorce; and affording couples the option of making a permanent marriage contract via a
prenuptial covenant prohibiting divorce altogether or allowing it only for serious cause).
82 See Morse, supra note 48, at 642. See generally Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral
Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225 (1997) (exploring and analyzing concerns
expressed by academic, political, and philosophical writers about the decline of morality in
family law).
83 It is important to distinguish between proposals to reinject fault into divorce
proceedings so as to block unilateral divorce, and proposals to reinject fault into the financial
consequences of a no-fault divorce. While both are grounded in a moral approach, the former
blocks divorce completely while the latter simply makes it more expensive.
84 See Laura Gatland, Putting the Blame on No-Fault, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997, at 50, 52
(quoting Jeffery Leving, a leading men's rights advocate and president of the National Institute
for Fathers and Families in Chicago).
85 See id at 52 (quoting Betty Friedan); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex, Lies, and
Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2530 (1994)
(arguing for the reintroduction of a fault discourse into divorce law narrative to compensate
women); see also Sugarman, supra note 15, at 136-38 (suggesting ways to reintroduce
concepts of culpability into divorce through the use of tort law).
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liberal political philosophers (who seek to combat the societal ethos of
individualism). 86
The most direct way to deter divorce would be to repeal no-fault divorce
laws and substitute laws that block unilateral divorce.87 Such proposals are
politically unpalatable in most states. An ever-increasing number of states are,
however, considering legislative reforms that would make it more difficult or
expensive to divorce and hopefully provide an incentive for couples to stay
together. These bills would legitimize premarital agreements to seek a divorce
only on certain grounds,88 or impose procedural barriers such as predivorce
counseling or waiting periods.89
Since 1995, almost half the states have considered some form of legislation
designed to deter divorce.90 Connecticut, Iowa, and Utah have adopted moderate
legislation designed to stem the flow of divorce, instituting mandatory premarital
86 See Gatland, supra note 84, at 51 (quoting William Galston, former advisor to
President Clinton and presently the Director of the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy at
the University of Maryland).
87 See Hanna Rosin, Separation Anxiety: The Movement to Save Marriage, NEW
REPUBLIC, May 6, 1996 at 14, 14. Some jurisdictions have attempted this. See, e.g., H.B. 1983,
181st Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999), available in Westlaw, Bills Database, 1999 MA
H.B. 1983 (SN) (prohibiting unilateral no-fault divorce); A.B. 807,209th Leg., Reg. Sess. (NJ.
2000), available in Westlaw, Bills Database, 2000 NJ A.B. 807 (SN) (eliminating no-fault
provision in divorce statute and preserving fault grounds).
88 See Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA.
L. REV. 43, 79-91 (1990) (advocating "precommitmene' restrictions in antenuptial contracts
limiting the conditions under which the marriage may be dissolved and conditioning the
divorce decree on economic penalties). Scott's concept of "covenant marriage" was introduced
through bills in Illinois, Washington, and Indiana during 1995 and 1996, and was adopted by
Louisiana in 1997. See DIFONZO, supra note 37, at 175; see infra notes 92-93 and
accompanying text (discussing Louisiana law).
89 See Gatland, supra note 84, at 52; see also H.B. 914, 20th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw.
1999), available in Westlaw, Bills Database, 1999 HI H.B. 914 (SN) (imposing waiting period
after divorce filing for couples with minor children; requires pre-divorce counseling);
DIFONZO, supra note 37, at 177; PARKMAN, supra note 77, at 7-8, 137-40. Still another
approach is to make marriage more difficult by interposing barriers designed to encourage
reflection. See, e.g., H.B. 4631, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1997), available in Westlaw,
Bills-Old Database, 1997 MI H.B. 4631 (SN) (requiring premarital education program or
longer waiting period prior to issuance of license).
90 See Dana Milbank, Blame Game: No-Fault Divorce Law Is Assailed in Michigan, and
Debate Heats Up, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1996, at Al; Dirk Johnson, Attacking No-Fault Notion,
Conservatives Try to Put Blame Back in Divorce, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1996, at A8. An
examination of the Westlaw Bills Database under the terms "family law," "fault," and
"divorce" will reveal a variety of bills, including those just mentioned, designed to deter
divorce.
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or predivorce counseling and requiring participation in educational courses
regarding the effects of divorce on children and family relationships.91
Louisiana has gone the furthest, adopting legislation that requires couples
applying for marriage licenses to choose either the existing no-fault system
permitting divorce upon a six-month separation, or "covenant marriage," 92 an
option that requires couples to undergo premarital counseling regarding the
nature of their obligations to one another in marriage; marital counseling should
problems arise; and that imposes a two-year waiting period prior to divorce (the
existing no-fault regime features a six-month waiting period). 93 Exceptions are
allowed (and immediate divorce made available) to those who establish that their
spouses have committed adultery, abandonment for one year, domestic violence,
child abuse, a felony leading to imprisonment, or continuous separation without
reconciliation for two years, or one year from the date that a judgment of
91 See S.B. 2265, 76th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (Iowa 1996), available in Lexis, States
Library, IA (enacted); S.B. 116, 52d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Utah 1997), available in Westlaw, Bills
Database (enacted); see also Roberta Kirwan, Money Newsline, 25 MONEY (July 1, 1996) at
26, available in 1996 WL 8793000.
92 Couples must sign a declaration of intent for a covenant marriage when they submit
their marriage license application, and attach a notarized affidavit signed by a clergy person or
marriage counselor attesting to the fact that they have received premarital counseling. See
Outlook- A Look At Marriage and Divorce; What the Law Says, WAsH. POST, Aug. 10, 1997,
at C3. The declaration must also include a recitation by the couple, as follows:
We do solemnly declare that marriage is a covenant between a man and a woman who
agree to live together as husband and wife for so long as they both may live. We have
chosen each other carefully and disclosed to one another everydhing which could
adversely affect the decision to enter into this marriage. We have received premarital
counseling on the nature, purposes, and responsibilities of marriage. We have read the
Covenant Marriage Act, and we understand that a Covenant Marriage is for life. If we
experience marital difficulties, we commit ourselves to take all reasonable efforts to
preserve our marriage, including marital counseling.
With full knowledge of what this commitment means, we do hereby declare that our
marriage will be bound by Louisiana law on Covenant Marriages and we promise to love,
honor, and care for one another as husband and wife for the rest of our lives.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:224 et seq. (West 1999). See generally Katherine Shaw Spaht,
Lousiana's Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis and Legal Implications, 59 LA. L. REV. 63
(1998) (analyzing and defending covenant marriage legislation); Amy L. Stewart, Covenant
Marriage: Legislating Family Values, 32 IND. L. REV. 509 (1999) (critiquing covenant
marriage legislation).
9 3 See Covenant Marriage Act, 1997 La. Acts 1380 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:224 to :309 (West 1999)); Stephen Chapman, Editorial; Louisiana to Roll Back Divorce
Revolution, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 21, 1997, at Al1.
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separation from bed and board is assigned.94 Already-married couples may
convert their unions to covenant marriages if they wish.
3. Summary
The fundamental differences in the way liberals and conservatives think
about marriage thus shape their proposals for reform. Accepting divorce as a
necessary byproduct of the quest for companionate marriages predicated on
sexual equality, liberals focus on the aftermath of divorce-particularly its
economic consequences for women and children. Conservatives, by contrast, see
marital breakup itself as the problem to be rectified; preventing divorce
necessarily avoids its consequences. Both place some of the blame on women's
position in the labor market yet neither proposes solutions that reach beyond the
family law arena.
IlI. EMPLOYED WOMEN AND DIVORCE
Liberals and conservatives share a common assumption that ultimately
restricts their vision and circumscribes proposed reforms. That assumption is that
home and market family and work are separate spheres which embody different
sets of values and can be maintained in opposition to one another. Thus,
problems in one sphere are seen as unrelated to those in the other. Historically,
the separation between home and market has been sustained through a rigid
gendered division in which men are assigned characteristics associated with the
market (among them ambition, authority, power, vigor, calculation, and logic)
and women are assigned characteristics associated with the family (sensitivity,
altruism, empathy, submissiveness, and cooperativeness). This yin and yang
vision fosters mutual dependence between the sexes, with women dependent on
men for economic support, and men dependent on women for emotional
sustenance and care. 95 The state sanctions this dependence through marriage.96
As women have crossed the boundary between home and market however,
94 See id. Subsequently, Arizona adopted a more moderate form of covenant marriage
that allows divorce by mutual consent and expands the fault bases for divorce without consent.
See ARiz. REV. STAT. § 25-901-906 (1999). A number of other states have considered
covenant marriage bills, and legislation is still under consideration in Georgia and West
Virginia. See H.B. 1087, 145th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1999); S.B. 191, 113th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Ga. 1999); H.B. 2208,75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2000).
95 See COONTZ, supra note 19, at 58-59.
96 See id. at 59; see also Martha LA. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role
of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2205 (1995) (describing the State's reliance on and
furtherance of the family-sanctified by marriage-as the social institution that bears the
burden of dependency in lieu of the State).
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the line between the two has become increasingly blurred. The erosion of the
dividing line between home and market brings with it shifts in gender roles that
inevitably impact the institution of marriage. In particular, the traditional male
breadwinner/female homemaker norm is fading under the pressure of market
realities.
The divorce rate is undeniably correlated with women's participation in the
waged labor market. Divorce rates are highest for couples where the wife is
employed or has an independent income, and the probability of divorce increases
as the wife's income increases-particularly if her income is high relative to her
husband's. 97 In this Part, I explore various explanations for the impact of
women's paid employment on marital stability, and make explicit the ways in
which they fit together with the liberal and conservative visions of marriage and
divorce.
A. The Demise of the Economic Foundations ofMarriage
One theory explaining the connection between women's labor market
participation and the divorce rate is the common sense observation that unhappy
marriages which might previously have survived are more easily dissoluble
without the glue of economic necessity. As it becomes possible for women to
support themselves economically, continuation of a marriage comes to depend
on the quality of the relationship and on emotional gratification derived in it.98
1. Reduced Specialization ofFamily Labor/Economic Incentives
Building upon this observation, economists have theorized that women's
ability to participate in the paid labor market creates an economic disincentive to
invest in the marriage and may actually function as an incentive to divorce. Since
the gains achieved by marrying and specializing in homemaking and caretaking
have decreased relative to those now available to women in the labor market,
more women will decrease their investment in these skills and roles and choose
to enter the labor market instead.99 Further, because people are less appreciative
of the contributions made by their spouses when they are able to produce these
commodities themselves, marriages in which one spouse does not specialize in
either homemaking or breadwinning tasks are more fragile than those in which
specialization occurs. 100 Thus, the shift away from the efficient bargain that a
97 See GuTrMANN, supra note 13, at 12.
98 See CHERUN, supra note 51, at 52-53; KURz, supra note 16, at 17-18.
99 See CHERLIN, supra note "51, at 99 (citing GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE
FAMiLY (1991)).
100 See PARKMAN, supra note 77, at 36.
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gendered division of labor in the family represents and toward an inefficient
bargain in which men and women share both breadwinning and homemaking
obligations creates an incentive for divorce.10'
The assumption that a gendered division of labor in the family is efficient
has been challenged by many feminists, who have argued that economic analysis
either fails to account for women's comparative disadvantage in the labor force,
or simply assumes it inevitable; women's specialization as caregivers and
homemakers is efficient in large part because women earn less than men do in
the waged labor market and because waged labor is structured in such a fashion
that it is incompatible with homemaking and caretaking obligations. 102 Further,
economic analyses of the family tend to commodify it, creating a risk that reform
proposals will promote market-like transactions within the family, which some
regard as undesirable. 103
Even if a gendered division of labor in the family is the most efficient
strategy, it has consistently been linked with exploitation within the family and
with gender inequality in American society.' 0 4 Notwithstanding economists'
assertions that "[e]fficient outcomes usually are fair" because they are
predictable, and efficient rules "tend to promote equality" because they are
neutral as to gender characteristics,10 5 even economists admit that specialization
has contributed to women's lower earnings. 10 6
101 See id.
10 2 See Marianne A. Ferber & Bonnie G. Bimbaum, The New Home Economics:
Retrospects and Prospects, 4 1 CONSUMER REs. 19, 20-21 (1977); Gillian K. Hadfield,
Households at Work- Beyond Labor Market Policies to Remedy the Gender Gap, 82 GEo. LJ.
89, 97 (1993); Singer, supra note 78, at 2440; Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87
MICH. L. REv. 797, 822-23, 831 (1989).
103 See Ann Lacquer Estin, Can Families Be Efficient? A Feminist Appraisal, 4 NArcH. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 28-30 (1996). But see Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women's
Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 81 (1997) (defending economic discourse on the
subject of law and housework, and arguing that economic understandings of household work
can and should co-exist with emotional or noneconomic conceptions in feminist analyses).
104 See Singer, supra note 78, at 2440-41.
105 See PARKMAN, supra note 77, at 121.
106 The demise of specialization and the availability of no-fault divorce have combined to
reduce the gender wage gap:
[W]ith less security during marriage, married women have increased their labor force
participation. With an increase in women's attachment to the labor force, the ratio of
women's wages to those of men has increased.... With more attachment to the labor
force, women have been willing to invest in the skills necessary to enter higher-paying
fields such as management where on-the-job training is imjortant
Id. at88.
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2. No-Fault Law: Planningfor Divorce
Economic theorists believe that no-fault divorce law plays a significant role
in reducing specialization in household labor, and thus contributes to the higher
incidence of divorce. By deterring divorce and creating enforceable expectations
that marriage would be of long duration, the old fault-based law encouraged
women's investment in homemaking and caretaking activities.107 No-fault law,
on the other hand, tends to discourage investment by women in homemaking and
caretaking work and to encourage women to resist economic dependency. Thus,
some commentators assert that no-fault divorce law itself caused happily married
women to enter the labor market in order to protect themselves against the
adverse financial consequences of unwanted divorces. 108
107 See id. at 31, 32; see also Ira Ellman, The Theory ofAlimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 40-
44 (1989) (arguing that alimony awards provide a deferred return on the wife's early
investments in her husband's earning capacity, her pivotal role in childbearing and rearing, and
domestic services rendered which further her husband's career, none of which have significant
general market value).
108 See PARKMAN, supra note 77, at 96. According to these commentators, some women
forego bearing children and disinvest in marriage and family because they fear divorce,
favoring increased investment in career. Maggie Gallagher refers to this phenomenon as
'defensive' careerism." GALUAGHER, supra note 8, at 183. Some suggest that no-fault divorce
law is responsible for the decreased quality of life enjoyed by married women who now
average more working hours (the total of their paid and unpaid labor) in anticipation of divorce
than they did under the fault-based system. See PARKMAN, supra note 77, at 99-100; see also
Allen M. Parkman, Why Are Married Women Working So Hard?, 18 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
41 (1998) (reporting the results of an empirical study suggesting that the advent of no-fault
divorce has increased the hours worked by married women). While Parkman acknowledges the
impact on women's -work hours of husbands' refusal to assume responsibilities for a larger
percentage of domestic chores, he nevertheless believes that married women who pursue paid
employment as a hedge against the economic effects of no-fault divorce rather than as a part of
a family plan designed to maximize family resources cannot reasonably expect their husbands
to pick up the slack. See PARKMAN, supra note 77, at 100. Parkman explains that since married
women's paid employment is selfishly motivated (functioning as a form of "personal insurance
against the potential costs of divorce") rather than dedicated toward altruistic goals such as
family welfare, other family members are justified in their reluctance to assist with household
work. See Parkman, supra, at 49.
Not surprisingly, these commentators argue for a return to fault-based divorce and for the
preservation of alimony awards in order to reward investments by women in the homemaking-
caretaking role. See Estin, supra note 107, at 13. See generally PARKMAN, supra note 77; Gary
S. B ecker, Finding Fault With No-Fault Divorce, Bus. WK., Dec. 7, 1992, at 22; Lloyd Cohen,
Marriage, Divorce and Quasi Rents; or, "I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life," 16 J. LEGAL
STUD. 267 (1987); Ann Lacquer Estin, Economics and the Problem of Divorce, 2 U. CHTI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 517, 524-29 (1995) (discussing efficiency theories and their application to
divorce policy).
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Some researchers have found that wives who are unhappy in their marriages
are more likely to undertake market work or increase the hours they work in the
market in anticipation of divorce, which further strains their marriages. 0 9 Others
theorize that employed wives who are dissatisfied with their marriages come into
contact with more "spousal alternatives" than those who are not employed in the
market, again contributing to marital instability and encouraging divorce.1 10
Finally, once committed to the paid labor market, women may find that the
benefits there outweigh those of marriage: Married women who enjoy high
earning power and permanent commitment to the labor market are less likely to
stay married than are homemakers.' 11
3. The Declining Male Wage and the Female Competitor
Ample evidence exists that the deteriorating income position of men
contributes to divorce, causing both the increased employment of married
women (necessary to supplement the family income) and marital conflict which
in turn fuels divorce rates.' 12 Some lay the blame for the phenomenon of the
declining male wage squarely on the feminist movement, asserting that the
stagnation of male wages is partly the result of women's entry into the labor
force and their tendency to undercut the male wage."13
4. Economic Incentives Don't Capture the Entire Picture
Clearly, the decline-of-economic-necessity explanation for the rising divorce
rate rests on the reality that marriage is shifting from a relation of economic
dependence to a coequal breadwinner model. Nevertheless, cultural norms of
10 9 See CHERLIN, supra note 51, at 52-53. Arlie Hochschild agrees that work functions-
particularly for women-as a backup system or insurance network for a destabilizing family.
See ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE TINE BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME AND HOME
BECOMES WORK 201 (1997). Women who prepare for divorce by working more hours outside
the home are more likely to find their marriages ending in divorce. See id.
110 See Scott J. South & Kim M. Lloyd, SpousalAlternatives and Marital Dissolution, 60
AM. Soc. REv. 21, 22 (Feb. 1995). In addition, of course, an increase in employed women also
increases married men's access to spousal alternatives and thus may provide men with an
incentive to divorce. See id. at 32-33.
111 See GALLAGHER, supra note 8, at 182.
112 See CHERLIN, supra note 51, at 54 (citing RICHARD A. EASTERLIN, BIRTH AND
FORTUNE: THE IMPACr OF NUMBERS ON PERSONAL WELFARE (1980)); see also GALLAGHER,
supra note 9, at 192-93 (arguing that the decline in male wages is both the cause and a
consequence of the rising divorce rate, because divorced men tend to eam less money than
married men).
113 See GALLAGHER, supra note 8, at 188, 191-92.
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women as caretakers of children and women's disadvantaged position in the
labor market ensure that many women are still de facto economically dependent
on men. Furthermore, even if the marital glue of economic necessity is no longer
as powerful an adhesive as it once was, it still retains some relevance. With the
rising costs of living, declining real wages, and job insecurity associated with a
postindustrial economy, two parental incomes are necessary for most families to
maintain a modest middle-class existence. Thus, the single-parent family
remains at a relative economic disadvantage.
B. The Eroding Breadwinner/Homemaker Model
Alternatively, women's employment may upset the breadwinner/
homemaker ideal that has shaped our vision of marriage, whether by altering the
economic power balance between the partners or by changing men's and
women's perceptions of themselves-and in turn, creating gender role conflict
which leads to divorce.114 At the outset, it is important to observe that the
nuclear family composed of a breadwinner father, a homemaker mother, and
dependent children, is an ideal rather than a reality for most families. This image
has never tracked the lived experience of working class and minority families,
and increasingly it is not representative of the family structures of White middle-
class Americans. 115 Nor was this breadwinner/homemaker ideal indicative of
marital bliss for those families whose structure it did accurately describe.
Domestic violence, including both wife-battering and child abuse, lurked behind
the polished facades of many nuclear families,116 and marital harmony was often
achieved at the expense of wives' happiness and even their sanity.117
Nevertheless, the image of a traditional nuclear family has played a powerful
role in shaping male and female identity in American society. Marriage, in turn,
1 14 See CHERLIN, supra note 51, at 52-53; Theodore N. Greenstein, Gender Ideology,
Marital Disruption, and the Employment of Married Women, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 31, 40
(1995) (finding that employed women with nontraditional gender ideologies react to
inequitable division of labor at home as an injustice).
115 See Judith G. Gonyea & Bradley K. Googins, The Restructuring of Work and Family
in the United States: A New Challenge for American Corporations, in THE WORK-FAMILY
CHALLENGE: REIHINKING EMPLOYMENT 63, 65 (Suzan Lewis & Jeremy Lewis eds., 1996).
Stephanie Coontz observes that the happy, homogenous families that dominated the 1950s
images in popular culture were in part a result of the media's denial of the reality of diversity in
family life. See COONTZ, supra note 19, at 30-31.
116 See COONTZ, supra note 19, at 34-35.
117 See id. at 36; BETrY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 252 (1964) (descibing the
reliance on prescription drugs and alcohol favored by many homemaking women forced to
subordinate their own needs and aspirations to those of their husbands and children).
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is shaped by gender-linked assumptions and expectations. 118 Both women and
men still expect husbands to provide the primary economic support for the
family, and marital discord or divorce often results when reality departs from this
ideal.119 Women fault men for lack of adequate commitment to the breadwinner
role, or lack of ambition, even when the wife's income is sufficient to support the
family.120 Men fault women for being poor housekeepers or for lack of
commitment to their marital and family obligations-often measured by hours
spent away from the home.121
Conflict over gender identity, particularly the threat posed to the male-
breadwinner identity by the presence of a wage-earning wife, is widespread
among married heterosexuals. 122 One study found that the most common reason
given for marital breakdown was conflict over gender roles.12 3 Marriages fail
118 Women socialized into traditional gender roles are steeped in the Cinderella dream of
marrying a man who will support and take care of them; for such women, duty runs to home
and family, while paid work is an option. Men socialized into traditional gender roles see paid
work and providing for their families as their primary duty. See PHILIP BLMSTEIN & PEPPER
SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY, WORK, SEX 117-25 (1983). Marriage seems to
solidify these attitudes. Cohabiting couples and those with less traditional socialization or
attitudes, work experience that altered original perceptions of work, or financial need were
more likely to be committed to an economic partnership in which both are employed. See id at
125-27. Similarly, same-sex couples tend to subscribe to an egalitarian view that both should
be employed in the interests of fairness. See id. at 127.
Interviews with gay men and lesbian women produced some very revealing insights about
the relationship between work, gender identity, and the breadwinner and homemaker roles:
Unlike heterosexual men,... gay men do not feel obligated to support their partners. Only
men in a relationship with a woman accept the duty to provide for their partners and
children. On the contrary, in a gay relationship, each man is expected to work because this
is part of what it means to be a man.
Id. at 129 (footnote omitted).
119 See KURZ, supra note 16, at 47-52 (detailing a study finding that marital tension and
failure was closely correlated with disputes over adherence to conventional gender roles);
REISSMAN, supra note 24, at 51-52.
120 See REISSMAN, supra note 24, at 52.
121 See id. at 54-55.
122 See BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 118, at 31-38.
12 3 See STEVEN L. NOCK, SOCIOLOGYOF THEFAMILY 155 (1987).
According to evolutionary psychologist David Buss, infidelity is actually the most
commonly cited basis for termination of a marriage. See DAVID M. Buss, THE EVOLUTION OF
DESIRE: STRATEGIES OF HUMAN MATING 172-74 (1994). Buss relies for his conclusions on an
extensive cross-cultural study by evolutionary anthropologist Laura Betzig, who analyzed data
from 160 societies and found that infidelity and infertility were the most common grounds of
divorce. See id. at 173 (citing Laura Betzig, Causes of Conjugal Dissolution: A Cross-Cultural
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because wives expect their husbands to fulfill the provider role and the husbands'
performance does not live up to their expectations; some fail because wives seek
to take on some of the responsibility for breadwinning and their husbands resist;
some fail because wives do not perform their traditional nurturing and caretaking
roles adequately in the eyes of their husbands; some fail because husbands do not
carry their share of the emotional and caretaking functions in the marriage. 124
Frequently secondary problems ensue, including violence, substance abuse, and
adultery, which exacerbate the preexisting problems.125 Marital violence in
particular is closely related to perceived failure of women to stay within the
contours of traditional gender roles-to behave subserviently within the
marriage, to perform as homemakers, and to stay out of the waged labor
market.126
Two competing explanations have been advanced for the marital tension
created by the erosion of the male breadwinner/female homemaker image, and
they are closely linked to the liberal and conservative stories of marriage
explored in Section II.
1. Liberal-Equality Idealists
Those who adhere to a vision of marriage as a union of equals in an
Study, 30 CURRENT ANTROPOLOGY 654, 654-76 (1989)). Betzig found that adultery was
cited as a cause of conjugal dissolution in 88 societies, making it the most pervasive single
cause of divorce among 43 categories of causes. See Buss, supra, at 173 (citing Betzig).
Buss explains, however, that those desiring divorce for other reasons may consciously use
infidelity to exit a bad marriage. See Buss, supra, at 174; see also South & Lloyd, supra note
110, at 29 (observing that it is at least as likely that dissatisfaction may lead to the decision to
divorce and to initiate an extramarital relationship as it is that the extramarital relationship itself
leads to marital conflict and divorce); see RIESSMAN, supra note 24, at 33, 50-51 (noting that
infidelity may serve as the catalyst needed for a spouse to take action to end an unhappy
marriage that had ended in an emotional sense long before the affair occurred). Other
researchers' findings support these conclusions. Another study found that while incidence of
extramarital affairs by husbands was an important primary reason for breakup in the eyes of
wives, the underlying cause of extramarital affairs was characterized as either emotional or
sexual incompatibility between the marital partners. See SAMUEL S. JANUS & CYNTHIA L.
JANUS, THE JANUS REPORT ON SEXUAL BEHAvIOR 194-95 (1993). The popularity of adultery
as a stated reason for divorce is likely due to its uniform acceptance as a marital wrong. People
need a socially acceptable justification for marital dissolution, and a violation of the partner's
expectations of fidelity from his or her mate fits this need. See Buss, supra, at 174.
124 See KURz, supra note 16, at 47-52.
125 See id. at 52-62. Higher levels of hard-living (substance abuse) and violence (more
frequent and more serious) were reported by women married to working class and poor men.
See id at 62, 65.
12 6 See id. at 67-68.
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economic and romantic partnership accept the rise in marital tension and increase
in divorce as a necessary evil in a society committed both to gender equality and
romantic marriage. Progress toward sex equality and feminist pressure for
women to enjoy access to the same opportunities that men have traditionally
enjoyed collide head-on with the 1950s-era June and Ward Cleaver image of
marriage. Confusion and discord are the inevitable result. Where gender roles in
marriage were once clear, now they must be constantly negotiated and
renegotiated, which is time-consuming and itself becomes an additional source
of marital tension.127
In addition to containing the potential for greater marital disharmony,
however, shifting gender roles also offer possibilities for constructing more
stable and satisfying marital relations based on equality and a relationship
between peers. 128 Pepper Schwartz's study of peer marriages revealed that
"traditional couples sacrifice the elemental goals of intimacy, deep friendship,
and... mutual respect, goals that peer marriage better serves. ' 129 Peer marriages
offer the potential of more enriching work lives for women and fuller family
lives for men. Employed women enjoy better physical and emotional health and
higher self-esteem than homemakers, and men in dual-earner marriages report
being more closely involved with their children and their children's care. 130
Moreover, dual-earner, peer marriages are better insulated from the ravages
of an unstable economy. They offer economic security, opportunities for career
flexibility and retooling, and protection against unanticipated loss of income. 131
In addition, because they are not necessarily based on gender roles that tie men's
identity solely to work, the relationship itself may be more durable under
economic pressure. By contrast, the close connection between a man's gender
identity and his paycheck in a traditional breadwinner/homemaker marriage
renders such marriages vulnerable to destruction by outside forces acting on the
man's ability to perform in the provider role: A faltering economy with
consequences for wages and job security, an occupational sector which dries up
suddenly, or accident or injury incapacitating the male from breadwinning. 132
Nevertheless, the institutionalization of sex roles in the market and the
powerful provider/caregiver norms that shape couples' expectations in marriage
127 See Kevin Merida & Barbara Vobejda, Battles on the Home Front: Couples in
Conflict over Roles, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1998, at Al.
128 See STEPHANIE COONTZ THE WAY WE REALLY ARE: COMING TO TERMS WITH
AMERiCA'S CHANGING FAMuliES 98 (1997).
129 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 80, at 3.
130 See ROSALIND C. BARNrr & CARYL RIVERS, SHE WORKS, HE WORKS: HOw TWo-
INCOME FAMILIES ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BE-rER-OFF 28-29, 82 (1996).
131 See id. at5.
132 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 80, at 124.
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inherently undermine the potential for equality in marriage and serve to create a
relationship of economic dependence of wives and children upon their husbands
and fathers. 133 Unless paid work is restructured in a more equality-forcing
direction, efforts to attain equality in marital relations will be hobbled.
2. Family Values Crusaders
Family values crusaders also acknowledge that erosion of the
breadwinner/homemaker ideal is directly responsible for increases in marital
tension and high divorce rates. Rather than accepting the byproducts of marital
discord and divorce, however, they press for a return to the 1950s Cleaver ideal
of gender roles in marriage and a resurgence of the marital permanence norm.
They seek to offer men the bargain of revived prestige as breadwinner-providers
and women the security of dependency as homemakers in return for enhanced
commitment to marital permanence. 134 David Blankenhom of the Institute for
American Values is an outspoken proponent of this position. Blankenhom
specifically equates breadwinning with masculinity and male identity:
"especially compared to other parental activities, breadwinning is objective, rule-
oriented, and easily measurable. It is an instrumental, goal-driven activity in
which success derives, at least in part, from aggression." 135 In this view, the
breadwinner role also structures men's experience of parenthood, operating as a
socializing agent for men and holding in check their natural biological tendencies
toward "sexual promiscuity and paternal waywardness."'136 For men,
breadwinning is parenthood, there exists no conflict between work and family
13 3 See id. at 270-71; see also REISSMAN, supra note 24, at 73.
134 See COONTZ, supra note 128, at 63; see also, e.g., BLANKENHORN, supra note 8, at
107-23 (characterizing male breadwinning as "a key organizing principle of our economy and
society," and arguing that the erosion of the breadwinner/homemaker model leads to the
material impoverishment of significant numbers of children and the loss of the civilizing force
of patemal breadwinning which directs male aggression and competitive instincts away from
promiscuity and violence and toward a constructive purpose); GALLAGHER, supra note 8, at
184 (arguing that when husbands are able to act as primary breadwinners, women will have
more options to devote themselves to their families, to building the community, or to less
lucrative but more interesting paid work, and concluding that "[i]t is sex roles that set women
free.").
135 See BLANKENHORN, supra note 8, at 116. A similar perspective on male breadwinning
behavior has been offered by evolutionary psychologist David Buss. Buss reasons that
women's evolutionary preference for a mate who provides resources causes them to terminate
conjugal relationships more readily when men fail to fulfill their primary role as breadwinner;,
additionally, men who are outeamed by their wives perceive a threat to their manhood and feel
great resentment. See BUSS, supra note 123, at 178.
136 BLANKENHORN, supra note 8, at 3, 26-42.
1999] 1907
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
because by meeting their obligations as workers men meet the obligations of
husband and parent.137
In this view, women's entry into the paid labor force is the cause of the rise
in marital tension; the solution is restoration of the breadwinner/homemaker
model and women's retreat from the market sphere.138 Because the
individualistic-competitive ethic of the (male) market is fundamentally
incompatible with the collective, altruistic, and cooperative ethic of the (female)
family, women who cross into the market realm inevitably experience market
work and family as conflicting. 139 In short, work-family conflict and marital
discord caused by shifting gender roles can be avoided by a return to separate
gendered spheres of home and market.
Even if such a solution were politically palatable and the marital contract
were made permanent we could not turn back the clock on the norm of gender
equality. While economic dependence of women on men might slow the divorce
rate, we could very well be left with more troubled marriages. Now that the
equality norm is so widely embraced, even traditional homemakers are likely to
resist domination by their provider-spouses, and marriages will be fraught with
137 Seeid. at 109.
138 See David Blankenhom, American Family Dilemmas, in REBUILDING THE NEST: A
NEW COMMnIMENT TO THE AMERiCAN FAMILY 10-12 (David Blankenhom et al. eds., 1990);
see also COONTz, supra note 19, at 40-41. Blankenhom's analysis is reminiscent of earlier
analyses of women's liberation and paid employment as the cause of family breakdown. See
BRUCE, supra note 62, at 129-36, 141-42 (arguing that wives' entry into the waged labor force
as a part of the growth and spread of capitalism brought market forces to bear on the home and
family, forcing men and women to compete with one another in the struggle for subsistence,
and children to suffer, and substituting values of equality, individualism, and independence for
cooperation, mutual responsibility, and dependency; ultimately, conjugal happiness was
sacrificed). Like modem critics, such writers recommended stricter marriage and divorce laws
in order to address the problem. See id. at 184.
13 9 See BLANKENHORN, supra note 8, at 110.
As Coontz points out, neither Blankenhom nor other conservative commentators
(including Karl Zinsmeister of the American Enterprise Institute, Allan Carlson, president of
the Rockford Institute on the Family, conservative lecturer Connie Marshner, and Allan
Bloom, author of The Closing of the American Mind (1987)) see it as a social problem that
men's ethic should be one of individualism; because their appropriate social role is as
breadwinner, an individualistic ethic is tolerable, even desirable. It is only when the workplace
ethic of individualism spread to women, the historical mediators between individualism-
competition in the market and altruism-cooperation in the family, that family breakdown and
the demise of family values became a crisis. Because these commentators see the problem as
beginning with women's entry into the labor market in significant numbers, it is
understandable that their programs for reform do not challenge market values or individualistic
tendencies in the larger society, but instead seek to return women to the role of compensating
in the family for the individualism that is accepted as the norm in the marketplace. See
COONT, supra note 19, at 40-43.
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discord as a result. Eliminating the obvious sources of discord created by
women's labor market role may simply force the resentment wives feel for lack
of appreciation of their contribution to the marital partnership underground. 140
C. No Family Is an Island: The Impact ofMarket Pressure
While it is certainly true that the erosion of the marital permanence norm,
the advent of no-fault divorce law, increased financial autonomy of women, and
changes in gender roles have facilitated divorce, shifts in the labor market have
also impacted family relationships. In order to address the problem of the rising
divorce rate, would-be reformers must look beyond the contours of the family
and family law and into the arena ofpaid work.
Historically, the separation between market and home was maintained by
excluding women from the market or limiting their participation there through
law; cultural norms and the assignment of the caretaking and nurturing roles to
women have continued the separation to some degree in the modem world. The
historical separation between market and home effectively depended on women
functioning as moral gatekeepers who maintained one set of values in the home
while another prevailed in the market. Marriages were more stable where such an
arrangement prevailed. Marriages in which this was not possible-in which the
wife was forced into the market by economic circumstances-were always less
stable than those where a separation of functions was possible.
The increase in the number of dual-earner marriages thus suggests yet
another explanation for the high divorce rate: Market pressure on the
breadwinner/homemaker ideal. The financial need for both spouses to engage in
paid work structures expectations in modem marriages. 141 While traditionally
the husband's unemployment or underemployment was the most significant
stressor on marriage, modem marriages undergo stress if the wife is unemployed
or underemployed as well. Although men's gender identity may be threatened by
140 See SCi-VARTZ, supra note 80, at 119 (describing tendency of traditional homemakers
to express resentment over their lack of marital power through subterfuge, lying to their
husbands about prices, and their "profits" in private discretionary funds). But see Greenstein,
supra note 114, at 40 (finding support for the hypothesis that employed women who hold
traditional views about gender roles in marriage are less likely than employed women with
nontraditional views to perceive the gender gap in hours spent on housework as inherently
unfair, and therefore less likely to experience marital conflict over the issue).
141 Fifty-seven percent of divorced couples point to financial problems as the cause of
marital failure. See Why Money Is the Leading Cause ofDivorce, JET, Nov. 18, 1996, at 34, 34.
More recently, a survey of 300 couples done by the Washington Post, the Kaiser Family
Foundation, and Harvard University revealed that 52% of women and 49% of men said that
"not having enough money" caused stress "very often" or "somewhat often" in their lives. See
Merida & Vobejda, supra note 127, at Al.
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their wives' employment if their wives usurp the breadwinner role by outearning
them, most men expect their wives to be financial partners who will support
family breadwinning with market work.142
1. Marital Instability and Class Status
The classic illustration of the impact of the labor market on marital harmony
is found in research on working-class families, where dual-provider patterns
have long prevailed. Perhaps not coincidentally, divorce rates have always been
highest among working-class and poor people.143
William Goode was the first researcher to find an inverse correlation
between socioeconomic class and likelihood of divorce; previous researchers had
assumed that divorce was more likely among the upper and middle classes. 144
14 2 See Merida & Vobejda, supra note 127, at Al; see also Joseph H. Pleck, The Work-
Family Role System, in WORK & FAMILY: CHANGING ROLES OF MEN AND WOmEN 8, 15
(Patricia Voydanoffed., 1984).
14 3 See GUTTMANN, supra note 13, at 4, 15-18. When family income drops 25%, divorce
rises by more than 10%. See LILLIAN B. RUBIN, FAMILIES ON THE FAULT LINE: AMERICA'S
WORKING CLASS SPEAKS ABOUT THE FAMILY, THE ECONOMY, RACE, AND EThiCrY 121
(1994).
Divorce rates are particularly high for African Americans, who tend to share with poor
whites problems of unemployment, lack of education and economic insecurity. See CHERLIN,
supra note 51, at 95; GUrMANN, supra note 13, at 24-25; KURZ, supra note 16, at 22. Ten
years after marriage, 47% of Black couples have separated or divorced, while only 28% of
White non-Hispanic couples have separated or divorced. See Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., History
and Current Status of Divorce in the United States, 4 FUTURE CILDREN, Spring 1994, at 29,
32.
Stephanie Coontz suggests that the African-American divorce rate bears witness to the
fact that Black Americans are simply the first of the "postindustrial discards," those who have
been forced to shoulder the brunt of the restructuring of the U.S. economy; what happened to
Black Americans on the frontline of this economic battle will certainly "Irickle up" to all low-
income and working-class Americans. See COONTz, supra note 19, at 253-54; WILLIAM J.
GOODE, THE FAMILY 159 (1982) [hereinafter, GOODE, THE FAMILY] (suggesting that Blacks
have more employment instability during depressions and show a wider fluctuation than
Whites in divorce rates over the economic cycle, and predicting that with the assimilation of
Blacks into White society the divorce patterns of the races will become more similar).
144 See KURZ, supra note 16, at 21-22; Helen J. Raschke, Divorce, in HANDBOOK OF
MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 597, 603 (Marvin B. Sussman & Suzanne Y. Steinmetz eds.,
1987). The erroneous impression that divorce was a problem of the middle and upper class
may have its roots in the historical fact that impediments to divorce in law restricted divorces to
the more privileged classes. See GOODE, TlE FAMILY, supra note 143, at 156-58.
Looking at income for male heads of households as reported in the 1950 census, Goode
found that proneness to divorce decreased as income rose. See WILLIAM J. GOODE, AFrER
DIVORCE 53-55 (1956). In later studies based on the 1970 census data, Goode found similar
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Several explanations for the link between divorce and lower socioeconomic
status emerged. First, lower-status occupations produce less occupational
satisfaction as well as less income, and the resulting dissatisfaction may be
expressed within marriage.' 45 Other studies suggest that income itself-rather
than occupation or level of educational attainment-is associated with marital
stability or instability. 146 Low income is often associated with job instability and
unemployment, as well as health problems and housing difficulties, which
contribute to marital tension and have been causally linked to divorce.147
Additionally, economic disincentives to divorce that exist for more affluent
couples are absent for those in lower socioeconomic positions. Without
significant property to divide or a high-income wage stream at risk of loss (for
the dependent spouse) or reduction (for the wage-earner via child support or
alimony), lower-income couples have less to lose at divorce than middle- or
upper-class couples do.148
patterns by male income and occupation. See GOODE, THE FAMILY, supra note 143, at 156-57.
145 See GOODE, THE FAMILY, supra note 143, at 157; NOCK, supra note 123, at 150.
146 See Phillips Cutwright, Income and Family Events: Marital Stability, 33 J. MARRIAGE
& FAM. 291, 295 (1971). Cutwright explained the correlation between income and marital
stability by reference to gender roles:
It is reasonable to expect that male income will be more important to marital stability than
social status derived from years of education or occupational position because income is
more directly linked to consumption than either of the other two status indicators.
Consumption... provides the wife with a constant empirical monitoring of how well her
husband is doing in his role as breadwinner. A satisfactory level of consumption should
help the wife maintain her own feelings of competence in her role of wife and
homemaker, and should act to reinforce her positive view of her husband. Of course, the
husband's view of himself as an adequate provider may also be directly linked to his
evaluation of his current earnings and prospects for future income growth.
High income couples are more likely than low income couples to be high on feelings
of mutual respect and affection due to the effect of high income in producing a strong
mutual positive evaluation of the husband's role as breadwinner.... This positive
evaluation creates feelings of satisfaction with the marriage, and the satisfied couple will
be more likely to remain together.
Id. at 296.
147 See NOCK, supra note 123, at 150. Several subsequent studies reveal that it is financial
insecurity rather than low income per se that is associated with marital instability; low-income
couples with stable income tend to have more stable marriages than those who suffer economic
upset. See GuTrMANN, supra note 13, at 16; Raschke, supra note 144, at 604.
148 See GOODE, supra note 12, at 331; NOCK, supra note 123, at 150; Cutwright, supra
note 146, at 296.
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2. Gender Roles and Class Status
The connection between marital instability and class status has a distinctly
gendered aspect: Who eams the income is very significant. Overall, there is a
positive relationship between wives' earnings and marital disruption, but the
relationship is mediated by the ratio between husbands' and wives' earnings. The
more the wife's earnings approach, equal or exceed the husband's, the higher the
risk of marital disruption.' 49 Such income parity is more likely to exist in
working-class families than in upper-class families, hence, the higher divorce
rate for working-class couples.
Moreover, it is more difficult for working-class men and women to fulfill the
idealized gender roles of breadwinner and homemaker. Working-class men are
almost by defihition inadequate breadwinners in today's market because they
typically cannot earn enough to support their families single-handedly.150 The
threat to men's gender identity posed by a perceived failure to provide for their
families is exacerbated when their wives enter the labor force or take on
additional jobs to support the family.' 51
Working-class women, too, experience a threat to gender identity posed by
their market work.152 Working-class women pressed into the waged labor
market by economic necessity inevitably fall short of the full-time homemaker
ideal, and must squeeze homemaking duties around the demands of paid
labor.153 Working-class women employed in traditionally male occupations
149 See Raschke, supra note 144, at 604; see also SHARON J. PRICE & PATRICK C.
McKENRY, DIVORCE 30 (1988). One study found that the divorce rate is 50% higher among
couples where the wife outeams the husband than among those where the husband outeams the
wife. See Buss, supra note 123, at 178 (citing ANDREW J. CHRLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE,
REMARRIAGE (1981)). Whether wives' increased income increases the likelihood of divorce
because it makes it possible for them to live independently or whether it increases marital
tension because the wife's income threatens the husband's breadwinner status is unclear. See
LESLIE A. MORGAN, AFER MARRIAGE ENDS: ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR MIDLIFE
WOMEN 32 (1991).
150 See WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 29. Thus, as male income drops, the probability of
divorce rises; as male income rises, the probability of divorce drops. See SUZANNE M. BIANCHI
& DAPHNE SPAIN, AMERICAN WOMEN IN TRANSInON 27-28 (1986).
151 See KURZ, supra note 16, at 22; see also FRANCINE D. BLAU & MARIANNE A.
FERBER, TIE EcoNOmIcs OF WOMEN, MEN, AND WORK 136-37 (1986) (noting that lower-
class men are particularly affected); GOODE, THE FAMILY, supra note 143, at 157; RUBIN,
supra note 143, at 115 (sense of manhood under threat); Pleck, supra note 142, at 15.
I52 SeeKUR~, supra note 16, at 109.
153 See Naomi R. Cahn, Gendered Identities: Women and Household Work 44 VI.l. L.
REV. 525, 534-35 (1999) (explaining that women affirm their femininity by performing
housework and mothering tasks).
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experience significant marital conflict and problems in reconciling their work
roles with their own and their husbands' perceptions of themselves as
feminine.154 Wives who have assumed the role of economic partner have
heightened expectations about their husbands' obligations in the home, and thus
are more likely to resent men's failure to assist with housework.155
Marital instability-as well as a host of problems that contribute to it,
including domestic violence, drug abuse, and alcoholism-is thus highly
correlated with perceived inability to fulfill traditional gender roles in marriage.
As more middle- and upper- class women work full time in occupations similar
to their husbands', the discrepancies between the incomes of middle- and upper-
class women and their husbands will drop, and the divorce rate for these groups
is predicted to rise.156 Thus, it appears that working-class families' work and
family patterns may be predictive across all income levels as more and more
women enter the labor force and the gender wage gap diminishes. 157
3. Dual-Earner Married Couples
Regardless of social class, the divorce rates of dual-earner couples have
outpaced those of single-earner families. 158 One study suggested that time is the
154 See Jean Reith Schroedel, Blue-Collar Women: Paying the Price at Home and on the
Job, in THE EXPER[ENCE AND MEANING OF WORK IN WOMEN'S LIVES, 241, 255-57 (Hildreth
Y. Grossman & Nia Lane Chester eds., 1990).
155 In short:
In the past there was a clear understanding about the obligations and entitlements
each partner took on when they married. He was obligated to work outside the home, she
would take care of life inside. He was entitled to her ministrations, she to his financial
support. But this neat division of labor with its clear-cut separation of rights and
obligations no longer works. Now, women feel obliged to hold up their share of the
family economy-a partnership men welcome. In return, women believe they're entitled
to their husband's full participation in domestic labor.
RUBIN, supra note 143, at 87.
156 See GOODE, supra note 12, at 332-33.
157 Indeed, researchers performing an empirical study of the relationship between class
and the gendered domestic division of labor were surprised to discem that location within the
class structure was not correlated with the amount of household work performed by husbands
in their dual-earner marriages. See Erik Olin Wright et al., The Non-Effects of Class on the
Gender Division of Labor in the Home: A Comparative Study of Sweden and the United States,
6 GENDER& Soc. 252,276 (1992).
158 See Janet Saltzman Chafetz & Jacqueline Hagan, The Gender Division of Labor and




problem: Time spent by wives in market labor increases the likelihood of divorce
because it interferes with the completion of homemaking tasks traditionally
assigned to women, in turn causing marital tension. This is particularly
pioblematic and likely to lead to divorce among couples who lack sufficient
income to purchase household services such as housecleaning and child care. 159
The time crunch created by the shift in women's opportunities for waged
work leads to battles over the division of household labor, which is another
defining aspect of gender identity for many couples. A substantial portion of
marital conflict appears to center around the division of housework when both
partners are in the waged labor market. When husbands do a lot of housework
married couples' conflicts increase; some researchers have concluded that
"[m]arried men's aversion to housework is so intense it can sour their
relationship. '160 Not only are employed women likely to perceive inequity, feel
resentment, and initiate discussions about the unequal division of household
labor between themselves and their husbands, but decreases in marital interaction
time caused by the double shift may further undermine the marital bond.161
Arlie Hochschild's path-breaking research on the division of household
work between men and women confirms the central role that conflicts of gender
ideology play in marital discord. According to Hochschild, when men's
breadwinner-based gender identities are threatened by women's performance of
the financial provider role, men retaliate by refusing to assume the burdens of the
unpaid "second shift,"--the work of keeping a house and caring for children. 162
Husbands, feeling that their wives' higher earnings shame them as men, are
forced to absorb a cultural assault on their manhood occasioned by the fact that
their wives outearn them or are otherwise assuming too large a percentage of the
159 See Glenna Spitze & Scott J. South, Women's Employment, Time Expenditure, and
Divorce, 6 J. FAM. ISSUES 307, 323 (1985). However, the time deficit explanation for marital
tension appears most powerful for middle-income couples; there is a lower con-elation between
wives' hours worked and likelihood of marital disruption for couples with incomes at the
bottom of the income scale than is present at middle-income levels, suggesting that couples
with family incomes at the bottom of the scale are less likely to divorce than those at middle-
income levels, possibly because they cannot afford to divorce and maintain two households.
See id.
160Id. at 146.
161 See id. at 311-12.
162 See ARLE HOCHSCHLD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SmIFT: WORKiTG PARENTS
AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 220-22 (1989). Further support for this is provided by Karen
Pyke's research, which found that husbands who were chronically unemployed or were mired
in low occupational status devalued their wives' market work and perceived it as "a burden
rather than a gift in their marital economy of gratitude." Karen D. Pyke, Women's Employment
as a Gift or Burden? Marital Power Across Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage, 8 GENDER &
Soc. 73,75 (1994).
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traditional male role. They react by expecting gratitude and concessions from
their wives, concessions that are often made on the terrain of the division of
household labor.163 The more money a woman earns relative to her husband, the
more unequal the allocation of household labor seems to be, with the woman
frequently performing a larger share of the household work in order to shore up
her husband's fragile gender identity.164 This dynamic is particularly stark in
situations where the husband is unemployed; these husbands do less housework
the more they depend on their wives for income, apparently because "[r]esisting
'women's work' ... [is] one of the few sources of marital power remaining to
the unemployed husband, and one of the only ways he can define his
masculinity.'1165
Thus, while a rational economic theory of exchange would suggest that the
more paid labor market work a woman performs, the greater her bargaining
power will be within the marriage, and the less nonmarket work she will do,
women who out-earn their husbands actually do more housework than those
whose husbands out-earn them, or who earn an amount roughly equal to that of
their husbands. 166 Hochschild concluded that women who out-earned their
husbands felt the need to do more housework in an effort to restore the gender
power balance to their marriage that had been upset by the shift away from the
traditional male breadwinner/female homemaker norm.167 "Forced to choose
between equality and marriage," most of the women Hochschild studied chose
marriage, repressing their anger and simultaneously paying a price in terms of
workload, exhaustion, and self-knowledge.168
The structure of the labor market functions as a powerful force maintaining
163 See HOCHSCHILD & MACHUNG, supra note 162, at 83-85; Pyke, supra note 162, at
79-81.
16 4 See HOCHsCHnLD & MACHUNG, supra note 162, at 220-22 (explaining the principle
of marital "balancing": If men lose power in the economic aspect of the relationship, women
restore their husbands' lost power by doing more of the second shift work at home).
165 SPAIN & BIANCHI, supra note 56, at 170; see also Julie Brines, Economic
Dependency, Gender, and the Division of Labor at Home, 100 AM. J. SOC. 652, 682 (1994)
(finding that economically dependent husbands do less housework the more they depend on
their wives for support, and that this phenomenon is most pronounced in low-income
households).
166 SeeHOCHSCHLD & MACHUNG, supra note 162, at 221-22.
167 See id. at 222; see also Scott . South & Glenna Spitze, Housework in Marital and
Nonmarital Households, 59 AM. Soc. REV. 327, 344 (1994) (finding that division of
housework between spouses becomes a "symbolic enactment of gender relations" and that the
gender gap in time spent on housework is greatest in married couple households relative to
other households).
168 See HOCHSCHILD & MACHUNG, supra note 162, at 46-57 (describing one woman's
accommodation to her husband's resistance to change).
1999] 1915
OHIO STATE L4 WJOURNAL
the gendered division of labor at home. Men and women are channeled into jobs
segregated by sex, correlated with expectations about whether the person filling
them is likely to be performing a breadwinner role or a caretaker role, and paid
accordingly. 169 Where jobs that correlate with caretaking are systematically
underpaid relative to jobs that correlate with breadwinning, those in the
caretaking-compatible jobs (typically women) are forced into primary caretaking
roles because the larger income source (the breadwinning job) must be protected;
when children are sick or teacher-parent conferences are scheduled in the middle
of the work day, the parent with the caretaking-compatible job attends. Over
time, equal child-care contribution becomes impossible. 170 Thus, the gender
wage gap, the dead-end nature of the jobs available to most women, and the
incompatibility of the conventional work structure with child care
responsibilities combine to render women more economically dependent than
men on marriage, and many women's fear of divorce causes them to stop short
in confrontations with their husbands over the division of household work.171
Hochschild concluded that the single most important indicator of marital
happiness was the husband's willingness to share the second shift 172 To
Hochschild, it appeared that marriage itself might be at stake in the battle over
who will do the unpaid, undervalued work of homemaking and caring for
children. 173 Others have suggested that the adequate socialization, care, and
169 See SCHfWARTZ, supra note 80, at 169-70. Indeed, given the way that some jobs are
currently structured, there may be some occupations (such as doctor, lawyer, or high-ranking
corporate executive) which are incompatible with peer marriages. See id at 130-31. Certainly
there are some jobs that are incompatible with involved parenting. See Sue Shellenbarger,
Woman's Resignation from Top Pepsi Post Rekindles Debates, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 1997, at
B1 (describing readers' reaction to Brenda Barnes' resignation from her post as head of
PepsiCo's North American beverage business to spend more time with her family, and noting
that the move has illuminated the personal costs associated with high-level corporate executive
positions, exposing the extreme separation of work and family or personal life that is required
for success in such positions).
170 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 80, at 170. The gendered nature of the homemaker-
caretaker role means that it is women, rather than men, who typically worry about finding ways
to manage work and family. See id. Even where men take over some family caretaking work,
they typically do not assume responsibility for planning and organizing the child care and
domestic work- it is women who anticipate needs and remember schedules. The conventional
pattern is for the male partner to provide assistance to the female partner, serving as a "back-
up" caretaker rather than as a coequal caretaker. See DOWD, supra note 74, at 57.
171 See HOcHSCHILD & MACHuNG, supra note 162, at 140,249, 253.
172 See id. at 211-12.
173 See iL at 215; see also Chafetz & Hagan, supra note 158, at 210-11 (describing the
relatively unshared "second shiff' worked by employed married women and the marital
conflict that erupts over the issues as a major reason for increased motivation to divorce).
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parenting of children may be at stake as well.174
4. Summary
In short, the most likely explanation for the relationship between women's
labor market participation and the rising divorce rate is a confluence of factors
that revolve around the shift to a postindustrial labor market and the
corresponding alterations in gender roles and cultural norms, including the norm
of marital permanence. 175 As Hochschild has observed, "the gender revolution is
primarily caused by changes in the economy [the decline in the purchasing
power of the male wage, and the rise ofjob opportunities for women], but people
feel it in marriage."'176 Thus, in order to fully address the problem of divorce, we
must look beyond marriage to the market.
IV. HOME AND MARKET: SEPARATE SPHERES BOUNDED BY GENDER
This Part makes the case that the labor market and marital dynamics are
inextricably linked. The shift to a postindustrial economy in which women are
full participants and the accompanying transformation of the gender order have
ripple effects on gender roles within the family. Similarly, the demise of the old
social contract between employers and workers featuring lifelong employment,
and the concomitant shift to a limited term model has inevitably impacted
workers' behavior and the values they internalize. As market values become
centered around self-interest, productivity, efficiency, and achieving short-term
objectives, so do family values. As the employer-worker relationship moves
away from permanence, so do marital relationships.
A. Gender Roles and the Market
In the United States, gender identity has traditionally been closely correlated
with one's place in the market. Paid employment in the industrial era was
17 4 See HE wErr, supra note 20, at 72-85; see also HOCHSCHELD & MACHUNG, supra
note 162, at 197-98, 209-10 (describing strategies of cutting back on child care or minimizing
the emotional needs of the family).
175 See Raschke, supra note 144, at 600-01. Disentangling cause and effect is difficult, if
not impossible. While economic independence for women makes it possible for women to
leave bad marriages, failure to conform to traditional sex roles within a marriage also causes
tension and marital strife. With the demise of social taboos against divorce, divorce becomes a
viable solution to marital strife. See Kristin A. Moore & Isabel V. Sawhill, Implication of
Women's Employment for Home and Family Life, in WORK & FAMILY: CHANGING ROLES OF
MEN AND WOMEN 153, 157-58 (Patricia Voydanoff ed., 1984).
176 HOCHSCHILD & MACHUNG, supra note 162, at 257-58 (emphasis in orginal).
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premised on a male-headed nuclear family in which the division of labor was
gendered, with the husband serving as the breadwinner and the wife performing
homemaking and childcaretaking tasks. 177 Government support for this system
took the form of social insurance programs designed to replace the male wage in
the event of sickness, disability, unemployment, retirement, or death. Public
assistance programs provided means-tested aid to needy families that did not
conform to the male-headed nuclear family model. 178
In industrial society, organized workers struggled to attain the goal of a
"family wage"-one that could be earned by a male breadwinner alone and was
sufficient to support an entire family, so that women might assume the role of
nonwaged homemakers. 179 The "family wage" was thus in effect a male
wage.1 80 The family wage in turn shaped gender identity:
As the family wage held the promise of female homemaking,
[and] ... explicitly incorporated wife and children, [it] excluded the possibility
that female dignity could inhere either in a woman's ability to earn wages or in
her capacity to support a family. Because the living wage idealized a world in
which men had the privilege of caring for women and children, it implicitly
refused women that privilege. And, because it assumed female dependency, to
imagine female independence impugned male roles and male egos.181
Ultimately, the cultural ideal of a breadwinning man earning a family wage
sufficient to support a dependent wife and children came to shape expectations of
what constituted the just and proper social order.182
17 7 See NANCY FRASER, JusTIcE INTERRUPTUS: CRrnCAL REFLECTIONS ON THE
"PosTsocIALsT" CONDmON 41 (1997).
178 See id. at 41-42.
179 See Alice Kessler-Harris, The Wage Conceived: Value and Need as Measures of a
Woman's Worth, in A WOMAN'S WAGE: HISTORICAL MEANINGS AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
6, 8 (1990).
180 See id The family wage had the effect of depressing women's wages, since a
woman's wage "reflected not what was but what ought to be. That men ought to be able to support
wives and daughters implied that women need not engage in such support. They ought to be
performing [unwaged] home duties." Id. at 8, 15.
181 Id. at 10. "Thus, 'a woman's wage' became a term of opprobrium among men. A
male worker could not legitimately be compared with a female worker without violating his
sense of dignity and justice." Alice Kessler-Harris, The Just Price, the Free Market, and the
Value of Women, in A WOMAN'S WAGE: HISTORICAL MEANINGS AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES,
supra note 179, at 113, 122 (1990).
182 See Kessler-Harris, supra note 179, at 9. The family wage "affirmed and supported"
the male-headed nuclear family, ensuring women's attachment and investment in family and
providing men with incentives toward market achievement and upward social mobility. Id at
19.
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With the transition to a postindustrial phase of capitalism and the crumbling
of the old gender order, the family wage ideal no longer describes or fits the vast
majority of households. Few jobs pay a wage sufficient to support a family,
many lack essential benefits such as health insurance, and employment is
increasingly unstable.183 The old forms of support provided by the welfare state
no longer offer protection from the uncertainties of this postindustrial world.
Financial pressures have combined with shifting gender norms to press the vast
majority of women into the market.
Working mothers increasingly resemble the profile of working fathers-
employed full-time, continuing to work through children's summer vacations,
and staying in the workforce rather than moving out of it during childbearing
years. 184 Attempting to divide three full-time jobs between two parents is
183 See FRASER, supra note 177, at 42.
184 See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 109, at 7. Seventy percent of mothers with children
under six work outside the home. See Ruth Sheehan, Why Are Mothers Still at War Over
Work?, RALEIGH NEws & OBSERVER, July 13, 1997, at 23A, 24A. Fifty percent of mothers
with children under a year work outside the home. See id.
The labor market is hostile to mothers with childbearing or childrearing obligations.
Mothers who attempt to cut their hours or reduce their workloads to accommodate the
pressures of childbearing and childrearing increasingly feel pressure to return to full-time work
so that they will not be viewed as marginal, expendable, and therefore vulnerable to layoffs.
See Louis Uchitelle & N.R. Kleinfield, On the Battlefields of Business, Millions of Casualties,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 3, 1996, at A28. Such fears are not exaggerated. See Rhett v. Carnegie Ctr.
Assocs., 129 F.3d 290, 299 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding no violation of Title VII or the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act where employer terminated female workers on maternity leave;
consideration of employee's absence of work attributable to pregnancy in making decisions as
to which positions to eliminate in downsizings is not discriminatory if the employer would not
overlook comparable absences ofnonpregnant employees); Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d
1151 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that pregnant attorney laid off during a corporatewide reduction
in force because she worked part-time to accommodate responsibilities to existing children,
violated neither Title VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, nor the Family and Medical
Leave Act); see also Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 341-42 (8th Cir. 1997)
(finding that demotion of female employee to a position with half the salary that she had earned
in her previous position while she was on maternity leave did not violate the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act or the Missouri Human Rights Act even though she was told that she was
being given a position "for a new mom to handle," since discrimination was related only to
new parent status rather than to pregnancy or to sex; "an individual's choice to care for a child
is not a 'medical condition' related to childbirth or pregnancy... it is a social role chosen by
all new parents who make the decision to raise a child"); Barbara Yuill, In Separate Rulings,
Courts Reject Claims Brought by New Mothers Who Lost Jobs, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
122, at A-1 (June 25, 1997) (citing Lorance v. Daikin Am. Inc., CV-96-S-1521 (D.C. Ala. June
18, 1997) (finding that employer who terminated female finishing operator whose job required
12 hour shifts alternating between day and night hours following the birth of her second child
did not violate the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, or
Alabama tort law when it refused her request for 8-hour shifts during daylight hours and to be
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inevitably stressful. As long as paid employment is premised upon the
assumption that a wage-earner parent is supported by a flow of services from a
homemaker-spouse, even the best-intentioned married couples will confront
problems in fitting their family lives together with their jobs.
The presence of children underscores the poor fit between work and family
obligations for dual-earner couples. Couples who can afford it tend to revert to
traditional breadwinner/homemaker roles following the birth of a child rather
than struggling to parent within jobs whose structure is hostile to caregiving. 185
Dual-earner couples who choose this path experience a decline in marital
satisfaction associated with parenthood: "Women resent the backsliding in
equality, while men are either stressed by their heightened breadwinning
responsibilities or confused by their wives' lack of appreciation for their
resumption of the main provider role."'186
The impact of the poor fit between paid work and caretaking obligations is
greatest on working-class couples, who lack the resources to subcontract their
household duties and caretaking obligations. 187 Ironically, blue-collar jobs are
characterized by the most inflexible schedules, so both parents in a working-class
marriage typically lack the support from their employers that at least some
white-collar workers enjoy.188 Many blue-collar couples cope by utilizing split
placed on light duty work to accommodate medical problems stemming from a hysterectomy
caused by a pregnancy-related medical condition; employer had no obligation to restructure job
to accommodate a new mother) [reported in]; see generally Ruth Colker, Pregnancy,
Parenting, and Capitalism, 58 OHIo ST. L.J. 61, 62-64 (1997) (arguing that the legal
protections afforded to pregnant women in the U.S. are grossly inadequate, in part because the
U.S. market is dominated by the capitalistic discourse of laissez-faire economics, and in part
because U.S. labor and employment policy fails to focus on the real beneficiaries of workplace
accommodations, children and the larger society).
185 See COONTZ, supra note 128, at 71.
186 Id.
187 See HOCHSCHiLD & MACHUNG, supra note 162, at 189.
188 Some of the worst scenarios occur when employers unilaterally switch their blue-
collar workforces to shift schedules that are incompatible with available child care. See Sue
Shellenbarger, Work & Family: Some Employers Find Way to Ease Burden of Changing
Shifts, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1998, at B1.
The problem of inflexible work hours that are incompatible with available child care is
most pronounced for single mothers employed at the bottom end of the occupational hierarchy.
Such jobs are characterized by rigid work schedules and are often nonunion, so that employers
may alter working hours with no prior notice. See Peggy Kahn & Linda M. Blum, Not Just 9
To 5 The Problems of Nonstandard Working Hours, WORKING USA NovJDec. 1998, at 51,
52-53. Even in unionized workplaces where employer actions are constrained by contract or
by a duty to bargain with the union prior to making shift changes, single mothers are
disadvantaged by seniority-based preference systems. Young mothers lacking seniority are
disproportionately assigned to afternoon or night shifts incompatible with existing child care.
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shifts, or juggling child care by working alternating shifts and sacrificing time
together-and often the marriage itself-in the process.18 9
B. Internalizing Market Values
How are dual-earner families negotiating the often-conflicting demands of
paid work and family obligations? How significant a role do existing "family
friendly" employer-initiated work policies play in their lives? And when values
privileged in the market conflict with those historically governing family life,
which do families heed? To answer these questions, sociologist Arlie Hochschild
studied workers at a company with "family-friendly" workplace policies of two
types: (1) policies designed to enable workers to spend more time at work
(including child care, child care for sick children, emergency backup child care,
before- and after-school programs, and referral services for elder care), and (2)
policies designed to assist parents to work more flexible or shorter work days
(including flex-time, options for part-time work, job sharing, and work at home,
paid maternity leave for up to ten weeks surrounding the birth or adoption of a
child, and up to twenty weeks of unpaid family care leave for each child born or
adopted). 190
Hochschild found that despite this range of family-friendly policies, a
management culture that encouraged workers to take advantage of them, a
workforce that was largely composed of persons who were members of two-
earner marriages or had no stay-at-home spouse, and an average full-time
employee work week of forty-seven hours per week, very few workers took
advantage of the policies designed to allow them to cut back on worktime and to
make more time for family, while the programs that allowed parents to spend
more time at work were in high demand. 191 The sole exception to this rule was
See id. at 52.
18 9 See Jeylan T. Mortimer & Jayne London, The Varying Linkages of Work and Family,
in WORK & FAMILY: CHANGING ROLES OF MEN AND WOMEN 20, 29-30 (Patricia Voydanoff
ed., 1984); Sue Shellenbarger, Work & Family: For the Burseks, Best Parent Regimen is Back-
to-Back Shifts, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 1998, at B1. One-third of all dual-earner couples with
children under five work back-to-back shifts in order to ensure that one of them will always be
available to care for the children. See iaL at B1. While such an-angements avoid the necessity of
child care and nurture close parent-child relationships, couples who utilize them are at
substantially higher risk of divorce than other couples due to the lack of time spent together.
See id
190 See HOcHscHILD, supra note 109, at 22-23.
191 See id at 25. Less than 3% of eligible employees with children 13 years of age and
under worked part-time (defined as less than 35 hours per week and carrying either full or
prorated benefits); less than 1% of eligible employees shared a job (a full-time position with
salaries and benefits prorated between 2 people); only 1% of employees took advantage of
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"flextime," a policy which allowed workers to come and go early or late: By
1993 one-quarter of all workers and one-third of all working parents at this
company took advantage of flextime to rearrange work hours-but not to cut
back on them.192 Indeed, Hochschild found that workers with young children
actually worked more hours than those without children---even when they were
salaried workers who were not paid directly for this time.193
Hochschild considered several reasons for this trend. First, perhaps working
parents could not afford to work fewer hours. However, Hochschild found an
inverse relationship between pay levels and interest in part-time work: The
higher their income, the less likely women were to express interest in part-time
work, while lower-income mothers were much more interested in part-time
opportunities; few men at any income level expressed interest in part-time
work.194 Nor were workers at this company afraid of being laid off, working
overtime because they were "working scared."' 195 Even in the few downsized
divisions of the company, overtime hours were no greater than those in the
stable, nondownsized divisions. 196
Second, Hochschild wondered whether workers lacked information about
the family-friendly policies or were blocked from taking advantage of them by
unhelpful supervisors. Yet she found that most workers knew about the family-
friendly policies, or at least knew of them and how to obtain more detailed
information should they wish it, believed the company was sincere in offering
these options, and took advantage of the options nearly equally in departments
with friendly, progressive supervisors and in departments with more resistant
"flexplace" programs (allowing work to be done at home). See id at 26. According to
Hochschild, this low level of employee usage of family-friendly policies in the second category
is typical of other large companies as well. See id. at 27.
192 See id. at 26.
193 See id. at 26-27. Almost half of today's dual-earner families feature at least 2 parent
working more than 40 hours per week. See Phyllis Moen & Donna I. Dempster-McClain,
Employed Parents: Role Strain, Work Time, and Preferences for Working Less, 49 J.
MARRIAGE& FAM. 579,587 (1987).
194 See Hoc-SCHILD, supra note 109, at 28. Hochschild did find some support for this
explanation-as well as the explanations of "working scared" and of hostile or resistant
supervisors blocking workers from taking advantage ofpolicies-among the factory workers in
her study. See id. at 197.
195 See id. at 29. Workers in Hochschild's study denied being fearful of layoffs, and there
were very few layoffs at this company during the time frame in which Hochschild was
studying it. However, in 1995, the company "reengineered" itself and significantly
downsized-in the process effectively eliminating the family-friendly policies that were the
subject of Hochschild's study. See id. at 239-40.
196 See id.
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managers. 197 Alternatively, she theorized that women in male-dominated fields
were attempting to avoid arousing the ire of their male coworkers by taking
advantage of family-friendly policies; women in fields traditionally populated by
women, however, proved no more likely than those in male-dominated
environments to take advantage of the policies. And very few men across all
fields utilized them.198
Hochschild concluded that working parents-particularly working
mothers-preferred working in the labor market to spending time with their
families. 199 For working mothers, home-the traditional sanctuary or haven of
respite for male workers-had become work, and work-traditionally
experienced by male workers as an alienating and inhuman jungle-had become
home.200 Part of this was attributable to the fact that husbands were not
performing their share of the household work, so that women workers were
returning home to a backlog of undone chores, a "second shift' of work for
which they received no recognition and which they were expected to perform in
isolation from other adults. By contrast, their labor market work offered a social
life, an ongoing community of adults performing related work, and feelings of
self-esteem based on the value and appreciation that they received for their
market work.20 1 Working fathers, on the other hand, feared losing their
masculine identities as breadwinners; they confronted a deep taboo in even the
most supportive workplace against revealing that their top priorities were family-
oriented rather than market-oriented, and feared peer disapproval unless they
matched or exceeded their wives' investment of time in market work and
income.2 02 Understandably, then, working parents tended to sjend more time in
the realms where they perceived that their efforts were valued most, where they
felt most competent and in control of their environments, and where they
received the greatest levels of social and emotional support-at work.20 3
The dual-earner couples Hochschild studied had internalized market values
197 See id. at 29-32.
198 See id. at 32-33.
199 If correct, this finding represents a dramatic shift. Ten years ago, over half of mothers
and almost two-thirds of fathers expressed a preference to spend time with their families, even
if reducing work hours would mean foregoing income. See Moen & Dempster-McClain, supra
note 193, at 588.
200 See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 109, at 36-38.
201 See id. at 38-41.
202 See id. at 78-79, 97; see also Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Paternal Leave, 72 Tax.
L. REv. 1046, 1064-79 (1994) (cataloguing reasons why men do not take advantage of
patemal leave when it is available, and emphasizing the power of the cultural role of father as
breadwinner and how it structures mens' as well as women's behavior).
203 See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 109, at 198-201.
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and were applying them to their family lives. For working parents, family time
had taken on an 'industrial' tone," conforming to "a cult of efficiency
previously associated with the workplace."204 Time at home was "Taylorized"--
subjected to principles of scientific management and standards of efficiency, and
recalibrated to maximize productivity in the shortest period of time; "quality
time" replaced quantity of time in a process of emotional downsizing.205
Families engaged in domestic .'outsourcing,"' contracting out to others
functions previously performed in the home by homemaking wives and
mothers-cleaning, cooking, lawn care, education in the form of lessons in
various crafts and skills, summer camp, and psychological counseling.206 In
short, family life had become commodified. Hochschild concluded, "[p]arents
now... speak of time as if it were a threatened form,of personal capital they
have no choice but to manage and invest, capital whose value seems to rise and
fall according to forces beyond their control. '207
Hochschild characterized the phenomenon she identified as the reversal of
the "emotional magnets" between work and home, rather than as a blurting of
the boundaries between work and family or as evidence that the family is
becoming infiltrated by market norms and values.20 8 Yet there is every reason to
204 Id. at 45-46. The intrusion of market values into the home and family life means that
the pace of family life is dictated by the marketplace and that every moment must be made to
count in efficiency terms. See COONTz, supra note 19, at 149.
2 05 See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 109, at 48-50, 211-12, 220-21. This pattern of time
compression and segmentation in turn created a "third shift" for working parents--time
dedicated to noticing, understanding, and coping with children's emotional responses to the
compressed second shift. See id. at 215-18.
20 6 Id. at 49-50. Indeed, entire new industries had prospered offering ready-made goods
and services which substituted for those previously produced within the family, and marketing
them to time-starved working women desperate for time-saving devices. See id. at 229-34.
Such services included mail-order companies offering a week's worth of flash-frozen dinners
and breakfasts, team-housecleaning services such as Merry Maids, a service called Kids in
Motion that transported children from school to after-school activities, Beck and Call, an
errand-running service, handyman services, child playmate-matching services, a 1-900 number
called "Grandma Please!" that put children in touch with an adult who would talk with them,
sing to them, or assist with homework, services that organized children's birthday parties, and
even services that arranged family photos in albums. See id. at 230-32.
207 Id. at51.
208 See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 109, at 44; see also Katharine Silbaugh, The
Polygamous Heart, 1 T"iE GREEN BAG 97, 99 (2d ser. 1998) (reviewing ARLIE RUSSELL
HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME AND HOME BECOMES WORK
(1997)). Although Hochschild intended her book as a critique of capitalism and the devaluation
of parenting, it has been embraced by conservatives precisely because it reinforces the
traditional notions of separation between home and work and between love and labor. See id at
98-99.
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suspect that what Hochschild was really documenting was the erosion of the
gendered boundary between home and market and the intrusion of market values
into the family.209
C. Market Values vs. Family Values: Separate Worlds?
The family has been subject to market influences throughout history. Early
in the 20th century, corporations tended to swallow the family and take over its
functions, co-opting it into serving employment-related goals; as the paternalistic
controllers of family functions as well as social life, employers established
company towns, company housing, and initiated the trading of company scrip for
food, clothing, and other necessaries.210 Corporate welfare programs explicitly
utilized imagery of the company as a family.211 Subsequently, corporations
adopted a different strategy, drawing clear boundaries between work and home
and disclaiming any responsibility for the family lives of workers. Hoping to
neutralize family ties that potentially competed with loyalty to the employer,
employers promoted the ideal that work and family life constituted
nonoverlapping worlds.212 The influx of women into the labor market during
World War II forced employers to acknowledge that family life and employment
were not separable aspects of working parents' lives, and the postwar shift to a
postindustrial society, characterized by less loyal and more mobile workers,
209 The demise of the physical and cultural barriers which once divided the spheres of
home and market has led to refraiming "work-family conflice' as the challenge of work-family
"integration.' See Sue Shellenbarger, Work & Family: Forget Juggling and Forget Walls;
Now, It's Integration, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 1998, at B1. Work-family integration refers to the
gender-neutral process of making work and home seamless, eliminating all boundaries between
the two with the aid of flexible work policies and technology. See id. The integration process is
the logical outgrowth of the incorporation of market values into family life; it is fraught with
peril in a culture that devalues the unwaged work of family caretaking. For example, despite
the superficial appeal of telecommuting arrangements that allow parents to work from home,
pressure on homeworkers to increase productivity in order to justify their physical absence
from the workplace can lead to homeworkers spending more hours on paid work than before.
See Sue Shellenbarger, Work & Family: Families, Communities Can Benefit from Rise in
Home-Based Work, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1998, at BI. Physical presence at home does not
necessarily equate to meaningful family involvement. See id.
2 10 See ROsABErH MOSS KANTER, WORK AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES: A
CRITICAL REVIEw AND AGENDA FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY 11-12 (1977); see also Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,502-03 (1946) (describing a "company town").
211 See KANTER, supra note 210, at 11-12.
2 12 See id. at 8-9.
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placed pressure on corporations to consider family needs and allow them to
shape corporate policy.213
With the demise of post-World War II economic prosperity and the end of
the social contract between government, corporations, and workers, market
values shifted away from permanence and group cohesiveness norms and toward
impermanence and individualism. Instead of analogizing themselves to families
and promising job security, lifetime employment, and retirement benefits in
exchange for employee loyalty, employers encouraged employees to be
independent, shifting the burden of career management onto the individual
employee.214 Employees responded by acting as individuals rather than team
players, performing as entrepreneurial independent contractors and refusing to be
absorbed into the work culture of the particular company.215
Workers' families were not untouched by this shift. The massive economic
restructuring of .the 1980s and 1990s produced "acute job insecurity,"
"unrelenting angst," marital strife, stress-related illness, and divorce.216 Children
raised on the values of loyalty and reciprocity came to see those teachings
teaching as fairy tales after watching their parents suffer layoffs by a corporate
entity that viewed loyalty as one-sided. Those who experienced the effects of
economic upheaval in their families developed an entrepreneurial outlook, seeing
themselves as free agents and accepting impermanence as the norm.217 It should
2 13 See id. at 3; Carol Greenfield & Martha Terry, WorkLife: From a Set of Programs to
a Strategic Way of Management, EMPLOYMENT REL. TODAY, Autumn 1995, at 67, 67-81; see
also SHEILA B. KAMERMAN & ALFRED J. KAHN, THE RESPONSIVE WORKPLACE: EMPLOYERS
AND A CHANGING LABOR FORCE 187 (1987) (exploring whether employment policy and
employer practices are becoming more responsive to the personal and family lives of
employees, and analyzing the types of benefit programs being instituted).
2 14 See N.R Kleinfield, The Company as Family, No More, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1996, at
Al. Another source summarizes employers' agenda during this period:
[E]mployers were singing the praises of the flexible employee, one less interested in
fidelity to an organization than in acquiring the necessary skills to become a free agent on
the open market ... Employers... wanted workers who would remain adaptable, who
did not expect employment guarantees, and who were more "stress hardy."
Tight Labor Markets, Low Unemployment Signal Shift in Employment Paradigm, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 202, at C-1 (Oct. 20,1997) [hereinafter Tight Labor Markets].
215 See Kleinfield, supra note 214, at AS.
216 See Uchitelle & Kleinfield, supra note 184, at A26. Families in which one earner has
lost ajob and does not quickly find an equivalent one suffer a divorce rate 50% higher than the
national average. See id.
217 When the market shifted in the mid-1990s and a tight labor supply produced renewed
employer interest in company loyalty and longevity of employment, employers and workers
alike found it hard to shift gears:
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not surprise us that these same workers accept impermanence in family
relationships, are wary and reluctant to trust, and are more likely to see divorce
as a solution than were the workers who reaped the benefits of the social contract
of permanent, stable employment. 218
While the time crunch is a significant factor for dual-earner working
families, the picture Hochschild presents is incomplete. If the goal is to restore
permanence to marriage and trust and loyalty to family relationships, it will not
Employers are of two minds on today's employees, particularly younger workers. For
example,. . . employers claim they want flexible and adaptable workers, but then wonder
why these employees are so disloyal. Or, ... business leaders want workers to be more
entrepreneurial, but then they say of Generation Xers: "These people don't want to be told
what to do."
7ght Labor Markets, supra note 214, at C-2; see also Kirk Johnson, In the Class of '70,
Wounded Winners, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1996, at Al (describing the evolution of those who
began working in the time when a social contract prevailed between employers and workers
and are now being forced to adapt to a labor market characterized by impermanence); Joann S.
Lublin & Joseph B. White, Dilbert's Revenge: Throwing Off Angst, Workers Are Feeling in
Control of Careers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1997, at Al ('Ten years ago someone with three
jobs was a 'job hopper.' Today, someone who is 30 and has had 10 years with one company,
you ask if they are too conservative").
Employers' search for loyal employees may be misguided. Management professor
Kenneth De Meuse, who defines loyalty as "staying together in good as well as bad times,"
believes that "the best labor and management can ask of each other today is commitment,"
which he defined as follows: "[A]s long as it remains beneficial to you and beneficial to me,
we'll stay together." Tight Labor Markets, supra note 214, at C-2.
2 18 See Rick Bragg, More Than Money, They Miss the Pride a Good Job Brought, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 1996, at A17 (describing the youngest brother in a family of aircraft
manufacturer workers, who has a layoff notice in hand and is willing to move to find work-
"he will chase work wherever it takes him;" married four times, he "has learned not to get
attached to one particular house"); Sara Rimer, A Hometown Feels Less Like Home: In the
Community, Fraying Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1996, at Al (descibing the impact of
economic upheaval upon people's expectations of security and stability, and warning that
children's ability to develop long-term commitments and a sense of community are imperiled).
Perhaps even more significantly, the economic restructuring yielded a legacy of dispirited
citizens who pull back from community involvement in exhaustion or frustration, shun long-
term commitments, and display an individualistic ethos and a lack of connection with those in
their communities. See Uchitelle & Kleinfield, supra note 184. This phenomenon is probably
best captured in Robert Putnam's now famous article Bowling Alone, which describes the
decline in participation and membership in civic groups and social networks that are the critical
foundation for a representative democracy, including religious organizations, labor unions,
parent-teacher associations, fraternal organizations like the Lions, Elks, Shriners, and Jaycees,
and most whimsically, bowling leagues. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's
Declining Social Capital, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 65 (1995) (arguing that the decline in turnout in
national elections over the last three decades is correlated with a decline in the number of
citizens directly engaged in civic involvement beyond politics and government).
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be enough simply to reduce time spent at work and increase time spent in the
"haven" of home. Instead, there must be explicit recognition of the linkage
between the values privileged in paid employment and those that structure family
relationships. In short, it is the values and structure of paid work rather than the
family values and structure of families that should be adjusted so that
employment accommodates the life patterns of workers who are also husbands,
wives, parents, and caregivers.
D. Restructuring Paid Labor to Fit the New Gender Order: A Blueprint
If tensions arising out of work-family conflict and shifting gender roles are
significant contributing factors to marital discord, and if the goal is reduction of
the divorce rate, why not question the failure of law to restructure paid work to
more closely fit the realities of the new dual-earner marriage? Perhaps the
decline in marital permanence exists "not because we've changed too much but
because we haven't changed enough."219
To be sure, there are risks inherent in adjusting the structure of paid work to
accommodate family obligations. Chief among these is the fear that gender roles
will become entrenched if only women take advantage of new workplace
accommodations to family life,220 while at the same time surrendering what little
economic power they presently possess.221 For example, part-time or reduced
work strategies that are primarily pursued by women run the risk of devaluing
the paid work because of who is doing it, as well as risking entrenching the
unequal division of homework and caretaking work between men and
women.222 Gendered patterns of division of household labor persist even when
2 19 COONTZ, supra note 128, at 109.
220 See HOCHSC.ILD & MACHUNG, supra note 162, at 47-48 (describing one woman's
decision to arrange a half-time schedule for her paid work that enabled her to rationalize doing
more of the second shift work at home).
221 See id at 90-91 (describing the ways in which one formerly full-time overachieving
mother was punished by her company when she took advantage of a family-friendly corporate
policy allowing part-time work at part-time pay: Questions about her commitment to her career
were raised, she was effectively demoted, and key benefits were cut).
222 Because most part-time workers today are female, there is a risk that part-time work
itself will be devalued, regardless of the gender of the person who performs it. See generally
CHRIS TILLY, HALF A JOB: BAD AND GOOD PART-TIME JOBS IN A CHANGING LABOR MARKET
(1996) (examining correlation between pay, benefits, and number of hours worked per week).
Further, there is a significant risk that increasing opportunities for reduced work will "reinforce
unequal gender relations rather than challenge them," by entrenching the unequal division of
homework and caretaking work between men and women. CYNTMA NEGREY, GENDER, TIME,
AND REDucED WORK 1-2 (1993); see also JULIEr B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN:
THE UNEXPECnE DECLINE OF LEIsURE 151 (1991) (noting that such solutions nn the risk of
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worktime reduction does occur. Indeed, it might be argued that the gendered
division of labor determines the availability of time, not vice versa.2 23 The little
research done on the subject indicates that where the male earner in a couple is
employed full-time while his female partner is employed part-time, wives use
less-than-full-time market employment to accommodate their household and
caregiving responsibilities, while husbands' less-than-full-time market-
employment does not significantly alter the nature of the gender division of labor
in the household.224 In addition, at existing compensation levels most parents
cannot afford to work part-time unless they are subsidized by a spouse's full-
time income-which renders part-time workers economically dependent upon
spouses and altogether deprives single parents of the opportunity to work part-
time.225
If paid labor is to be restructured in an equality-supporting direction, a more
radical rethinking is necessary. Feminists have proposed three alternative visions
of how paid work might be restructured to support the new gender order. I
present them below in order of increasing desirability.
1. The Universal Breadwinner Model
The "Universal Breadwinner" model seeks to degender the breadwinning
role so that women can support their families through their own waged work.
This is essentially the model that U.S. policy has followed; Western European
nations have pursued it more aggressively. Women's market employment is
affiratively promoted through state provision of caretaking services
traditionally performed by women, such as day care and elder care. Overt
barriers to equal opportunity for women in the market are removed, such as sex
discrimination, pay inequity, and sexual harassment.2 26
Although the Universal Breadwinner model would do much to reduce
poverty and exploitation of women and to narrow the gender wage gap, it is
flawed in its assumption that all domestic labor and carework could (or should)
be transferred to the market and state. The notion that tasks of and for the body
should be isolated from other work and transferred to those who will "specialize"
in such tasks reinforces hierarchies that privilege those who do the work of the
reproducing gender inequality unless women's roles change within the family).
223 See NEGREY, supra note 222, at 10 n.14.
2 24 See id. at 27.
22 5 See id. at 3. Part-time workers earn approximately 60% of the hourly wages of full-
time workers. See id at 43. Seventy-five percent of year-round part-time workers receive no
health insurance, and 88% who work less than a full year have no health insurance. See id.
Fewer than 20% of part-time workers are covered by pension programs. See id. at 44.
226 See FRASER, supra note 177, at 43, 51-52.
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mind over those who do work of and for the body. Who, exactly, will perform
such tasks, and how well will they be compensated? Historically, women of
color have borne the brunt of such work transfers.227 A "Universal" Breadwinner
model that enables only the most economically privileged women to support
themselves and their families is grossly deficient.
Further, the Universal Breadwinner model valorizes paid labor by placing a
premium on breadwinner status which implicitly devalues unpaid caretaking and
homemaking work, providing more incentive to avoid it.228 Yet all carework
could not be transferred out of the family unless we were prepared to accept
collective living arrangements, which seems unlikely.229 Thus, unless men could
be induced to do an equal share of domestic work, employed married women
would still work a second shift. In short, the Universal Breadwinner model is
androcentric: It privileges men's traditional sphere, paid employment, and does
nothing to accord social value to women's traditional work, carework. The
breadwinner in this system is nominally gender-neutral but still implicitly
masculine.230 Ultimately, it would make women's life patterns look more like
those of men.
2. The Caregiver Parity Model
The second feminist-inspired model, the "Caregiver Parity" model aims to
"'make difference costless"' 231 by keeping the bulk of caregiving work in the
family but supporting it with public funds.2 32 It would afford women a choice
between supporting themselves and their families through carework or a
combination of carework and part-time market employment, or through full-time
market employment.233 The model would necessitate governmental caregiver
allowances to compensate childbearing, parenting, and housework at levels
equivalent to a breadwinner wage; mandated pregnancy and family leaves to
facilitate caregivers' exit and re-entry into the labor market without loss of job
security and seniority; mandated flextime; and expansion of social insurance
2 2 7 See ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN
FEMInST THOUGHT 126-28 (1988).
228 See FRASER, supra note 177, at 54.
229 See id. at 53-54. But see ANGELA Y. DAvIs, WOMEN, RACE AND CLASS 222 (1981)
(proposing the incorporation of household tasks into the industrial economy).
230 See FRASER, supra note 177, at 54-55.
23 1 Id. at 55 (quoting Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, in FEMINIST
LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 35, 40 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne
Kennedy eds., 1991)).
232 See id. at 56.
233 See id. at43.
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programs such as health, unemployment, disability, and retirement insurance that
are currently linked to paid employment.2 34
Unlike the Universal Breadwinner model, the Caregiver Parity model
elevates caregiving work to a parity with paid labor, combating
androcentrism. 235 However, caregiver parity runs the risk of institutionalizing a
"mommy track" in employment: By creating a market in flexible, contingent,
low-paying full or part-time jobs, it encourages couples to keep one partner on
the breadwinner track and to relegate the other to the caregiver track, rather than
to alternate or share carework. Such an arrangement institutionalizes the
gendered division of labor. 236 Further, while women could avoid the double shift
by mixing carework and paid labor, the decision to do so would not be costless;
thus, some would choose not to forego the advantages of the breadwinner track,
and would still work a double shift, while those without partners would be
doubly disadvantaged.237 Thus, the effect of this reform would be to leave men's
and women's life patterns relatively unchanged.
3. The Universal Caregiver Model
A third possibility, the "Universal Caregiver" model, would seek to redesign
institutions around women's life patterns so that men as well as women would be
encouraged to combine breadwinning with caregiving.2 38 Paid employment
would be structured around the assumption that workers are caregivers as well as
breadwinners; all would enjoy a shorter work week, and all would have the
support of employment-enabling government services. Carework performed
within the family would be publicly supported.2 39 The goal of the Universal
Caregiver model is to dismantle the dichotomy between breadwinner and
caregiver and degender the roles.240 In this vision, the postindustrial order would
revolve around "a social world in which citizens' lives integrate wage earning,
caregiving, community activism, political participation, and involvement in the
associational life of civil society .... -241
234 See id at 56.
235 See id at 55-56, 58.
2 3 6 See id at 57.
2 3 7 See id at 58.
2 38 See iL at 61.
239 See id
240 See id
241 Id at 62.
Nancy Dowd has argued persuasively for implementation of a Universal Caregiver model
by focusing on the situation of single-parent families. See DowD, supra note 74, at xxii. The




Work law plays a critical role in structuring paid labor and in replicating a
gendered division of labor, which is incompatible with norms of gender equality
and no longer functional in a postindustrial world. Instead of remaining "the
precondition and subordinate appendage of male wage labour" that it has
historically been in industrial society, women's labor in and outside the family
must be accorded value and itself considered productive.242 Thus, a viable
reform should shed the idea that workers need to be relieved of domestic tasks
because these tasks, typically associated with women, are viewed as degrading,
unproductive, and valueless. 243 Instead, we must assume that all waged workers
will also perform necessary domestic and caretaking tasks, and promote a
sharing of such tasks among all persons, inside and outside the home.244
V. RESTRUCTURING PAID EMPLOYMENT
There is a heavy bias in the U.S. labor market in favor of standard work
patterns: full-time, year-round employment. Conforming to such a work
arrangement is seen as evidence of commitment to one's paid work or career. A
central assumption supporting this bias is that quantity of worktime is directly
correlated with quantity and quality of work output.24 5 An additional assumption
that structures standard work arrangements is that work and family must be
maintained as separate domains, with work as the primary commitment for all
full-time employees. Clearly, these assumptions are predicated on the further
assumption that the dominant family structure is a male breadwinner/female
homemaker model.
Researchers have begun to question the continuing validity of these
assumptions, arguing that particularly with regard to the less routinized work
them often reveals gendered norms that are obscured by focusing on a two-parent family. See
id. at xix. A focus on single-parent families need not necessarily entail destabilizing the two-
parent family or undermining the role of fathers, as many conservative commentators seem to
fear. See id.; see generally Blankenhom, supra note 138.
2 4 2 See ANDRE GORz, FAREWELL TO THE WORKING CLASS: AN ESSAY ON POST-
INDUSTRiAL SOCIALiSM 5-6 (Michael Sonenscher trans., 1982).
243 See id. at 6. In situations where it is desirable to contract out some parts of domestic or
caretaking responsibilities, as in elder care and some child care, this type of reform would also
help to insure that those working for wages in such endeavors would not suffer underpayment
because of the lack of value associated with such tasks. See id.
244 See id.
245 See Phyllis Hutton Raabe, Constructing Pluralistic Work and Career Arrangements,
in THE WORK-FAMILY CHALLENGE: RETHINKiNG EMPLOYMENT 128, 131 (Suzan Lewis &
Jeremy Lewis eds., 1996).
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characteristic of a postindustrial economy, quality of worktime and an integrated
work/life approach to work problems are more important to productivity than
quantity of time.246 At the same time, a few commentators have pointed to the
potential of reduced worktime as an issue that might mobilize workers across
class and gender lines and lead to a significant restructuring of work. In this Part,
I present some of the research that challenges the assumptions currently
constraining us to a Universal Breadwinner model, and suggest some possible
reforms that might move us toward a Universal Caregiver model.
A. Worktime
Americans have long subscribed to the Puritan work ethic that working long,
hard hours is essential to a virtuous existence. Despite the steady influx of books
and seminars on time and its relationship to productivity that tell us that it is how
time is allocated and planned rather than sheer volume of time spent that fosters
productivity,247 American employers and employment policy continue to reward
quantity of worktime. In a well-publicized book, Juliet Schor has argued that
American workers' work hours have been steadily increasing since the late
1960s without public acknowledgement or discussion of the fact; the average
American worker now works an additional 163 hours per year, or the equivalent
of an extra month per year over the number of hours worked in 1969.248 This
24 6 See id. at 131-32.
247 See, e.g., STEPHEN R. COVEY, Er AL., FIRST THINGS FIRST: To LIVE, TO LOVE, TO
LEAVE A LEGACY (1994); HYRUM W. SMrrH, THE 10 NATURAL LAWS OF SuccassFuL TIME
AND LIFE MANAGEMENT: PROVEN STRATEGIEs FOR INCREASED PRoDucrvy AND INNER
PEACE (1994).
248 See SCHOR, supra note 222, at 29. Schor reports that the extra weekly hours derive
primarily from employee moonlighting-holding more than one job at a time in order to meet
financial obligations (prevalent among women workers), and working more overtime
(particularly among manufacturing workers). See id. at 31-32. Weekly hours have risen
modestly since Schor's 1989 book, from 43.7 in 1989 to 43.8 hours per week for the average
full-time worker in April 1994. See Juliet B. Schor, Worktime in Contemporary Context:
Amending the Fair Labor Standards Act, 70 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 157, 159 (1994).
Schor's research has not gone unchallenged. In 1997, John Robinson and Geoffrey
Godbey published a book called TIME FOR LIFE, which asserted that Americans were working
2.8 hours less per week or 140 hours less per year (assuming a 50-week work year). See JOHN
P. ROBINSON & GEOFFREY GODBEY, TIME FOR LIFE: THE SURPRISING WAYS AMERICANS USE
THEIR TIME 81 (1997); see also Sue Shellenbarger, Do We Work More or Not? Either Way,
We Feel Frazzled, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1997, at B1. While most economists agree with Schor
that there is a trend toward higher numbers of annual hours worked, Robinson and Godbey
suggest that Schor's analysis misses the fact that personal activities have become more and
more integrated with worktime, so that people are actually working less when they are at work.
See k
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effect is compounded for dual-earner families: The increase in the number of
married women in the labor force means that the average American couple
works ten hours more per week than did the average couple in 1970.249
1. Law and Worktime Norms
a. The Fair Labor Standards Act
Employment law statutes establish norms for full-time work. The Fair Labor
Standards Act's (FLSA) 250 forty-hour work week and eight-hour-per-day norm
validate a culture in which "real" jobs are defined as full-time jobs. Although the
FLSA covers only about sixty percent of all wage and salary workers, its impact
on social norms regarding worktime is reflected in the fact that roughly two-
thirds of those employed full-time report that they work exactly forty hours per
week and almost four-fifths of those employed full-time work a five-day work
week.251
The FLSA was designed to spread available work over a larger number of
workers by establishing a forty-hour work week norm and imposing a financial
penalty on employers who required employees to work more than forty hours per
week: Time and one-half pay at the employee's "regular rate" was owed for
hours worked over forty in a single week. The FLSA's penalty has proven
ineffective as a deterrent to overtime.252 Overtime hours in manufacturing are at
record levels, and employers are increasingly adjusting to market fluctuations by
Still others assert that the length of the average work week has neither increased or
decreased significantly over the last 30 years, but that the percentages of those working both
longer and shorter work weeks than the 40-hour norm has shifted substantially. Thus, the
average work week figure cloaks some important changes. See Jerry A. Jacobs & Kathleen
Gerson, Rethinking Law in the Twenty-First Century Workplace: Toward a Family-Friendly,
Gender-Equitable Work Week, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L. 457,458 (1998).
249 See Jacobs & Gerson, supra note 248, at 459.
250 The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
251 See NEGREY, supra note 225, at 20 (reporting figures from the mid-1980s which were
virtually unchanged since 1973, when the Current Population Survey began monitoring hours
worked on principal jobs). But see Jacobs & Gerson, supra note 248, at 458 (asserting that only
40% of Americans work 40 hours per week).
252 See SCHOR, supra note 222, at 66-67 (arguing that institutional structures in the law
regulating employment tend to encourage the use of overtime rather than additional hiring,
particularly where the cost of fringe benefits represents a significant percentage of the wage
rate). Although the FLSA's "time-and-a-half' rate for overtime was intended to install a 40-
hour week, in reality the financial disincentive that it provided to employers for a longer work
week functioned as an incentive for employees to work as many hours as possible, and leisure
was contracted rather than expanded. See id at 141.
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increasing hours rather than by hiring new workers. 253 Indeed, overtime pay for
employees is often the most cost-effective strategy for employers, avoiding the
need to hire, train, and provide benefits for new employees, and preserving
flexibility for the employer.2 54 Thus, employers have an incentive either to hire
fewer workers and instead work relatively well-paid full-time employees longer
hours, or to eliminate full-time positions to the extent possible and replace them
with a larger number of lower-paid part-time employees (some of whom may
actually log more than forty hours per week but who are paid as part-timers). 255
253 See Daniel J. Roy, Despite Record Overtime Levels Factories Keep Lid on Hiring,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 120, at C-1 (June 23, 1997) (while historically manufacturers have
shifted from the use of overtime to meet increased demand to hiring additional workers once
the need for more man-hours has stabilized, the present economic expansion has not followed
this pattern; despite widespread overtime in manufacturing at the highest levels since World
War II, manufacturers have chosen to continue to utilize overtime rather than expanding their
payrolls); Lonnie Golden, 7uning Is Everything: Potential Economic Repercussions of
Proposed "Flextine" Reforms to the FLSA Overtime Hours Law, 48 LAB. L. 504, 506
(1997); Schor, supra note 248, at 159 (reporting that manufacturing overtime was at its highest
recorded level of 4.8 hours per week in April of 1994).
254 See Christopher L. Martin, et al., The Fair Labor Standards Act and the Fluctuating
Workweek Scheme: Competitive Compensation Strategy or Worker Exploitation?, 44 LAB. L.J.
92, 93 (1993). The costs of training new workers and providing fringe benefits have risen as a
percent of salaries and wages from 17% in 1955 to 36% in 1987. See SCHOR, supra note 222,
at 67. Fringe benefits are paid per-person and attach to full-time jobs rather than being payable
by the hour.
What lawful role the cost of providing benefits may play in an employer's decision to
reorganize work, outsource work, subcontract it, or hire temporary workers to do it remains an
unanswered question. The Supreme Court has intimated that the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) imposes some limits, but the extent of these limits is as yet
undetermined. See Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass'n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 520 U.S. 510, 515-16 (1997) (finding that section 510 of ERISA, which prohibits
employers from firing workers to reduce benefits, applies to nonvested as well as vested
benefits, and reinstating a lawsuit filed on behalf of 200 former employees of Santa Fe
Terminal Services who alleged that the company illegally deprived them of their rights to
pension and other benefits when it contracted out their work).
25 5 See Pam Ginsbach, Use ofPart-time Workers at UPS Underscores Thorny Workplace
Issue, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 153, at B-1, B-2 (Aug. 8, 1997) (exploring incentives for
UPS to utilize a two-tiered employment structure and to increase the percentage of part-time
workers rather than hire new full-time workers, since part-time workers earn a lower per-hour
wage and do not receive full fringe benefits); Douglas A. Blackman, et al., UPS Faces Huge
Rise in Annual Labor Costs, WAIL ST. J., Aug. 20, 1997, at A3, A6 (explaining that the 57%
of the UPS workforce who worked part-time average only slightly more than half the hourly
rate of full-time worker--$l 1 per hour compared to $20.01 per hour-prior to the Teamsters'
strike; the pay differential between the two tiers was reduced in the strike settlement, but only
slightly).
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b. Case Law
The common law has proved equally ineffective in constraining overtime
hours. Overtime requirements need not yield to family obligations at law. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently affinrmed an employee's
termination for refusing to work overtime, even though the refusal was based
upon her need to attend to family caretaking obligations.256 Joanna Upton, a
single mother, was told during her hiring interview in April of 1991 that her
hours of employment would be from 8:15 AM. to 5:30 P.M. with one or two
late nights per month. Upton accepted the job on this condition, and made
arrangements for child care based upon that information. From the beginning,
however, she was required to work until 6:30 or 7:00 P.M. at night, and
sometimes later. In July of 1991, she was told that she would have to work until
9:00 or 10:00 P.M. each evening and all day Saturday for several months. Upton
refused based upon her child caretaking obligations and was discharged two
weeks later.
In Upton's action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, the
court approved a grant of summary judgment in the employer's favor, finding no
state public policy favoring the care and protection of children sufficient to
justify an exception to the at-will employment rule.257 The court rejected
Upton's argument that a state unemployment compensation law providing
compensation to persons whose availability to work is limited by domestic
responsibilities was sufficient proof of public policy to override the at-will
employment rule. The court explained:
There is no clearly established public policy which requires employers to refrain
from demanding that their adult employees work long hours. Nor is any public
policy directly served by an employee's refusal to work long hours .... Nor has
any court to our knowledge allowed recovery against an employer who
terminated an at-will employee who refused to work newly imposed hours due
to an irreconcilable conflict between her new work schedule and the obligations
of parenting .... We sympathize with the difficulties of persons in the position
of the plaintiff who face the challenge of reconciling parental responsibilities
with the demands of employment However, employer liability under common-
law principles is not an appropriate means of addressing the problem in the at-
will context 258
256 Upton v. JWP Businessland, 682 N.E. 2d 1357 (Mass. 1997).
2 57 See id. at 1360.
258 Id at 1359-60. Courts have reached different conclusions in the analogous area of
unemployment compensation. Where an employer alters work hours in such a way that the
employee can no longer fulfill her domestic responsibilities, several courts have found that the
[Vol 60:1877
MARRIAGEAND BREAD W[NNING
2. The Union Role
I-Istorically, unions were the major force advocating shorter work hours for
employees. Demands for shorter hours have characterized the most dynamic
periods in organized labor's history. In the 1780s, unionized male artisans and
craftsmen successfully fought for a ten-hour day, which at the time must have
seemed like an impossible dream z 59 Female textile workers joined the struggle
in the mid-1840s.260 Following the Civil War, organized labor sought an eight-
hour day, and explicitly tied this request to a demand for higher pay and a family
wage.261 By the late 1800s, increasing numbers of women in the paid labor force
and the growth of the first wave of feminism made women the most innovative
worker who quits is entitled to unemployment compensation because the decision to quit is
involuntary. See Zukoski v. Director, Div. of Employment See., 459 N.E.2d 467, 468 (Mass.
1984) (recognizing that plaintiff's domestic responsibilities may permit him to reject some
employment situations 'rendering his termination involuntary and making him eligible for
benefits."); Manias v. Director, Div. of Employment See., 445 N.E. 2d 1068 (Mass. 1983)
(finding that claimant's decision to quit was involuntary where she left work due to a reduction
in hours and conflict with child care demands); Tritt v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of
Review, 589 A. 2d 208, 210 (Pa. 1991) (ruling that claimant's difficulties in finding evening
child care produced "real and substantial pressure" on her to terminate her employment). Some
courts have held in similar cases that employees who quit their jobs were entitled to
unemployment benefits because there was good cause for leaving attributable to the employer.
See Newland v. Job Serv. N.D., 460 N.W. 2d 118, 124 (N.D. 1990) (holding that a "substantial
shift change" which prevents an employee from obtaining child care and forces her to quit
entitles that employee to unemployment benefits because she is "not unemployed through fault
of her own"). However, many courts still adhere to a traditional analysis in which family care
obligations are defined as personal and therefore voluntary reasons for quitting job. See, e.g.,
Beard v. State Dep't of Commerce, 369 So. 2d 382, 385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (holding
that a shift change which prevents an employee from obtaining child care and forces her to quit
does not entitle that employee to unemployment benefits because the shift change "is not good
cause which can be attributable to her employer"); Aladdin Industries, Inc. v. Scott, 407 S.W.
2d 161, 163 (Tenn. 1966) (denying claimant's application for benefits and holding that a shift
change to night hours that prevented the claimant from meeting her child caretaking
obligations and forced her to quit did not constitute "good cause" for termination of her
employment). See generally Deborah Maranville, Feminist Theory and Legal Practice: A Case
Study on Unemployment Compensation Benefits and the Male Norm, 43 HASTINGS L.1 1081,
1081-87 (1992) (arguing that women are disadvantaged in an unemployment insurance system
predicated on the assumption that the typical worker is a male breadwinner without significant
caretaking responsibilities).
2 59 See SCHOR, supra note 222, at 72.
2 60 See id at 72; DAVID R. ROEDIGER & PHILLIP S. FONER, OUR OWN TIME: A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN LABORAND THE WORKING DAY 43-79 (1989).




and committed advocates of shorter hours. 262
The Depression triggered another push for hours reduction. In the 1930s, the
AFL sought a legislated thirty-hour week, relying on arguments that stressed
reducing unemployment by sharing available work and increasing
productivity.2 63 Business resisted this proposal strenuously on the basis that it
was unconstitutional and impractical. Business owners worried that full
employment would deprive them of their market leverage over workers and
increase labor costs.264 The proposal ultimately failed. Instead, the Fair Labor
Standards Act was passed in 1938, setting minimum wages and promoting a
forty-hour work week through overtime penalty provisions for hours worked in
excess of forty per week.265
Subsequently, labor abandoned the fight, in part because it lacked a positive,
compelling rationale for the hours reduction (because it was predicated on a
defensive "spread-the-jobs" justification, the support for the thirty-hour work
week faded when the labor market recovered during World War I1)366 As labor
increasingly accepted the capitalistic system and adopted an economic agenda
that sought to obtain a larger part of the spoils for union members, it became less
and less interested in obtaining a shorter work week and more interested in
obtaining higher overtime premiums and better hourly wages.2 67 Thus, within
the labor movement, the historical goal of shorter hours has receded in priority.
Concerns about preserving jobs and income, as well as securing regulated and
predictable allocation of hours, have risen to the forefront.2 68
262 See ROEDIGER & FoNER, supra note 262, at 145. Unfortunately, the AFL's resistance
to organizing women and its commitment to a traditional gender order in which women did not
compete with men in the waged labor market undermined the potential for a feminist-labor
coalition and hobbled the AFL in its struggle for reduced hours. See id. at 145, 163-65; see
also Marion Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage Labor,
89 MICH. L. REv. 1155, 1161-66 (1991) (examining AFL reluctance to organize working
women).
2 63 See ROEDIGER & FONER, supra note 260, at 245-47.
2 64 See SCHOR, supra note 222, at 74-75; ROEDIGER & FONER, supra note 260, at 248-
49.
265 See ROEDIGE& & FONER, supra note 260, at 255-56.
266 See SCHOR, supra note 222, at 77-78.
267 See id. at 78. Schor observes that these priorities were supported by male unionists.
Female unionists placed shorter work hours at the top of their agenda, but their voices were
drowned out in the male-dominated labor movement. See id.
268 See Golden, supra note 253, at 507 n.15. Recently, however, unions have shown
significant interest in the issue of "mandatory overtime." One labor consultant predicted that
mandatory overtime would become one of the "'hottest button issues"' in 1999, as unions
begin to resist such employer practices at the bargaining table. See Michelle Amber &
Elizabeth Walpole-Hofirneister, Rising Health Costs, Competition Seen Influencing 1999
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As union influence has declined, wages have failed to keep pace with
inflation. The frequent use of overtime functions as an incentive for employers to
effectively reduce base wages in order to accommodate predicted labor costs that
include overtime at premium rates.269 Employers simultaneously raise the prices
of their products without increasing the wages of their workers proportionately,
in turn increasing the pressure on employees to work extra hours in order to
maintain the standard of living that they enjoyed in the past. 270 Lacking both "a
culture of resistance to long hours or a political movement to press for
government reforms," nonunion workers are powerless to block these incursions
on their time, and they are likely to continue.271
3. The Case for Reducing Worktime
The aspect of rising work hours that has been most visible to public view has
been occasioned by women's growing participation in the waged labor force.
Because of women's traditional responsibility for homemaking and family care,
rising work hours have created "role overload" or "work-family conflict" that is
Bargaining, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 250, at C-1 (Dec. 31, 1998). That prediction proved to
be accurate: Mandatory overtime was an important issue for workers because it deprived them
of control over their lives and prevented them from spending time with their families. See Jeff
Florian, Reduction, Elimination of Mandatory Overtime Gains Prominence as Negotiating
Issue, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 143, at C-1 (July 27, 1999). In recent years, unions have
successfully organized and mobilized workers in widely disparate occupations around the issue
of overtime work. See Michael L. Smith, Mandatory Overtime and Quality of Life in the
1990s, 21 IOWA J. CORP. L. 599, 601 (1996) (describing worker discontent and strikes over
excessive overtime requirements at a number of manufacturers' plants); CWA Strikes US West
in 14 States over Complaints of 'Forced' Overtime, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 159, at AA-1
(Aug. 18, 1998) (describing union strike over mandatory overtime); Leah Samuel, Workers at
SONY Compact Disc Plant Tired of 10-Hour Days with No Overtime Pay, LAB. NOTES, July
1997, at 4 (describing impetus for union organizing drive at a manufacturing plant as deriving
in part from workers' desire for shorter work days); Peter T. Kilbom, Overtime Is Money, But
GM Assembly Workers Say They've Had Enough, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1994, at A16
(reporting that GM requires its workers to work 10 hours per week beyond the conventional
40, and strongly encourages them to work even more overtime voluntarily; ultimately, the
workers' anger at the amount of overtime demanded by the company and the company's
refisal to hire new workers resulted in a vote to strike); Erin Small, Movie Workers Demand
14-Hour Limit on Work Days, LAB. NOTES, July 1997, at 7 (discussing union campaign to
limit the work day for motion picture workers that was prompted by the tragic death of a crew
worker who fell asleep while driving home following a 19-hour day).
2 69 See Schor, supra note 248, at 164.
2 70 See supra notes 253-255 and accompanying text. Schor found that production and
nonsupervisory employees (who comprise 80% of the workforce) must now work 245 more
hours per year to maintain their 1973 standard of living. See SCHOR, supra note 222, at 81.
271 See SCHOR, supra note 222, at 81.
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typically characterized as a women's issue.272
In fact, however, it is the increase in the number of dual-earner couples and
the demise of the male breadwinner/female homemaker marriage that are
responsible for the time pressure that most American workers experience.273
Schor makes a cogent argument that rising work hours are a concern for all
workers in capitalist economies, because their incentive structures contain biases
toward long working hours. Leisure exists in spite of capitalism and is reined in
only by active efforts of trade unions and social reformers.2 74 Increased work
hour requirements are associated with increased unemployment,
underemployment, and a growth in income disparity.275
A variety of social problems can be traced to work overload. Stress and
illness affect overtired persons more dramatically than they affect those who are
well-rested, and there has been a corresponding rise in stress-related accidents
and illnesses at work, and workers' compensation claims related to stress.276
Many workers complain of sleep deficits, particularly women employed in the
labor market with children at home.277 This stress has slopped over into the
marital realm, causing a reduction in marital satisfaction and conflicts over the
272 See ScHoR, supra note 222, at 5. Schor's data suggests, however, that men as well as
women are putting in longer hours on the job, and this includes parents of young children:
Thirty percent of fathers with children under 14 work 50 or more hours per week, and the same
percentage work regularly on weekends. See id at 21; see also Jacobs & Gerson, supra note
248, at 458 (reporting that 25.2% of men and 10.8% of women work at least 50 hours per
week).
273 See Jacobs & Gerson, supra note 248, at 459-60.
274 See SCHOR, supra note 222, at 7, 39. Similarly, French social critic Andre Gorz asserts
that the rise in worktime has occurred not because workers have preferred more money to more
time, but because employers have fiercely resisted the reduction of working hours, preferring
higher unemployment to broader employment with more leisure because high unemployment
rates function as a disciplinary force, reserving scarce jobs for the most hard-working and
compliant. See GORZ, supra note 242, at 134-36. Others argue that the increase in work hours
is the result of sophisticated advertising and marketing campaigns that stimulate demand and
lead workers voluntarily to work longer hours. See David George, Working Longer Hours:
Pressure from the Boss or Pressurefrom the Marketers?, 15 REV. Soc. ECON. 33 (1997).
275 See SCHOR, supra note 222, at 39-40.
276 See id at 11; Kilbom, supra note 268, at A16.
277 See HOCHSCHILD & MACHUNG, supra note 162, at 9; SCHOR, supra note 222, at 11.
Hochschild described the women in her study as obsessed with the topic of sleep, talking about
sleep and their need for it "the way a hungry person talks about food." Id. Sleep deprivation
costs Americans billions of dollars in lost productivity, absenteeism, and accidental injuries at
work. See Simon J. Nadel, National Sleep Foundation Releases Study on $1 Billion Sleep
Deprivation Problem, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 58, at A-5 (Mar. 26, 1998).
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division of household labor that are exacerbated by time scarcity.278 Further, lack
of time inevitably creates a "parenting deficit' as parents spend less time with
their children and are more tired when they are available to be with their
children.279
Reducing worktime would thus alleviate work-family conflict to some
degree and reduce the impact of the deficit of adequate day care. Further,
restructuring paid work to normalize reduced market work could also assist in
solving social problems stemming from labor market structure, such as worker
displacement and unemployment while simultaneously increasing civic
engagement and community involvement. 280 Burgeoning social problems that
require attention from Americans through unpaid or volunteer work in the home
and in the community-including involvement in our children's' educational
process, re-education and retraining of ourselves to take advantage of new
technology, and charity work-all militate for a reduction in paid work hours.281
Once done by women, much of the unpaid social labor that benefits society-
volunteering in civic community groups, caring for the sick, and the elderly-
now simply goes undone.282
Moreover, there is some evidence that shorter work weeks raise productivity
because they enhance morale and output resulting in a higher pace of work,
fewer sick days, lower absenteeism, and less personal business conducted on
company time.283 Indeed, the American historical experience is that reduction in
278 See BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 118, at 146-50 (tension over the division of
labor in a household is a contributing source of marital conflict); HOCHSCHILD & MACHUNG,
supra note 162, at 212; SCHOR, supra note 222, at 12.
279 See SCHOR, supra note 222, at 12-13.
280 See NEGREY, supra note 222, at 10-11.
281 See NEGREY, supra note 222, at 121. Fred Best has argued that the current linear and
inflexible life-stage progression structure of work is ill-suited to a postindustrial society.
Traditionally, we have divided life into three time segments: youth for education, maturity for
work and child-rearing, and older age for retirement. This structure is poorly suited to a
postindustrial society featuring increased life expectancy, changing pattems of family life
(more women in the workforce), and multiple jobs or even careers over each person's lifespan.
Best suggests that a linear progression in which work is compressed into mid-life years impairs
productivity as well as undermining parenting: He proposes reducing worktime in mid-life in
order to spread jobs and accommodate parenting obligations. See FRED BEST, FLEXIBLE LIFE
SCHEDULING: BREAKING THE EDUCATION-WORK-RErEMENTLOCKSTEP 8-10 (1980).
2 82 See Arlene K. Daniels, The Hidden Work of Constructing Class and Community:
Women Volunteer Leaders in Social Philanthropy, in FAMILIES AND WoRK 220, 221 (Naomi
Gerstel & Harriet Engel Gross eds., 1987) (describing "hidden work' done by women who
volunteer in their communities); Schor, supra note 248, at 165-66
2 83 See SCHOR, supra note 222, at 154-55; Schor, supra note 248, at 167.
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the work day and work week have been accompanied by increased
productivity.2 84
Currently, however, reduced work hours are perceived as illegitimate
because male workers' breadwinner life patterns still set the norm for work. The
"ideal worker" is employed full-time, works overtime when necessary, and has
limited responsibility for family work.285 "Reduced work hours" is defined
differently in each employment setting; in some occupations, a part-time job
means forty hours per week. The one common theme in defining part-time work
is that it is less than full-time work, which is defined as the amount of time that
men ordinarily work.286 Women working part-time, particularly in male-
dominated fields where full-time work is the norm, find themselves marginalized
in their workplaces, reporting that they tend to be excluded from organizational
activities, interpersonal interactions, and skill or occupational development
opportunities. 287 Although women who work part-time report greater job
satisfaction and happiness with their work than full-time women, role overload
and role conflict are ameliorated only if the women work in female-dominated
professions; occupational norms in male-dominated professions place a high
value on full-time work as evidence of commitment to one's career or market
work.288
Finally, a reduction in working hours is consistent with feminist demands
that men and women share caretaking and household responsibilities equally.289
Although obviously not a complete answer to the problem of gender inequity in
the second shift at home, reduced worktime is a necessary component of
promoting equality in the family, both because it normalizes caregiver work
patterns and because it provides more time to perform caregiving tasks.
Several commentators have issued modem calls for reduced worktime.2 90
2 84 See SCHOR, supra note 222, at 154-55.
285 See WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 1, 20.
286 See iaL at 71-73 (describing the meaning and significance of "part-time" in the
executive and professional context).
2 87 See Kathleen Barker, Changing Assumptions and Contingent Solutions: The Costs
and Benefits of Women Working Full- and Part-Time, 28 SEX ROLES 47, 63--64 (1993).
2 88 See id at 66.
2 8 9 See RHONA MAHONEY, KIDDING OURsELvES: BREADWINNING, BABIES, AND
BARGAINING POWER 4-5 (1995) (arguing that if real gender equality is to be achieved, men
must do fully half the work of raising children and women will have to give up their roles as
primary parents; this shift entails "a revolution in people's attitudes toward the sexual division
of labor in the home!' and the eradication of entrenched gender role stereotypes); ROEDIGER &
FONER, supra note 260, at 276
290 See, e.g., Hochschild, supra note 109, at 245-58; Jacobs & Gerson, supra note 248, at
468-69; Schor, supra note 248, at 167-70.
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Schor recommends a phased-in reduction of the forty-hour standard work week
to a thirty-two hour standard, and elimination of premium overtime pay in favor
of comp time at a rate of time and a half.291 This would effectively allow
workers to "save up" or "bank" their overtime hours and eventually permit a
worker to shift to part-time work at full-time pay.292 Schor correctly predicts the
existence of union opposition to her proposal, since at current wage rates many
hourly employees would not earn a living wage without the benefit of overtime
wages.293 Schor points out, however, that employers who utilize overtime work
extensively recover or "undo" some of the overtime premium by resisting hourly
wage raises; thus, hourly wages might actually rise in response to the elimination
of overtime.294
Hochschild argues that a shorter-work-hours movement has radical potential
to mobilize workers across gender and class lines. The increased presence of
women in the labor force, the growing number of dual-earner families, and the
need that children have for parental supervision and time combine to create a
basis for common cause around the issue of reduced worktime.
295
Moreover, unlike demands for higher wages, the shorter hours issue has
potential to unite workers across lines of craft skill, race, sex, ethnicity, and age,
something that would greatly benefit organized labor in its struggle to revitalize
itself.296 It is far more difficult for employers to divide workers against one
another when the demand is shorter hours than when it centers around the higher
wage rates that have been the linchpin of industrial unionism and have tended to
promote line-drawing and exclusion of less deserving workers, however they are
defined. 297 Further, the shorter hours struggle has historically politicized labor's
efforts and prompted legislative reforms limiting the hours of all workers, not
291 See Schor, supra note 248, at 167-70. Jerry Jacobs and Kathleen Gerson propose a
35-hour work week as "an expected standard to help articulate the ideals, values, and norms of
our society." Jacobs & Gerson, supra note 248, at 468. Fred Best suggests amending the FLSA
to limit worktime on a per-year basis rather than on a per-week basis, with appropriate
protections for employees against abuse of worker rights. See BEST, supra note 281, at 171-72.
292 See SCHOR, supra note 222, at 143.
29 3 See infra notes 308-12 and accompanying text
294 See SCHOR, supra note 222, at 144-45. Union leaders acknowledge this reality. See
Roy, supra note 253, at C-1, C-2 (June 23, 1997) (noting AFL-CIO Director of Public Policy's
observations that the high level of overtime is part of what is holding down regular hourly
wages).
295 See HOCHSCH-LD, supra note 109, at 245-58; accord Jacobs & Gerson, supra note
248, at 470.
29 6 See Stanley Aronowitz & Jonathan Cutler, Can Unions Find a Strategy for Labor
Market Strength?, WORKING USA, May/June 1998 at 62,62-63.
297 See ROEDIGER & FONER, supra note 260, at vii-viii.
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just the organized.298 And finally, the hours issue directly addresses the struggle
for control by workers over their work lives, and indirectly, their control over
leisure time, intellectual development, and time dedicated to political
activities. 299
A reduced work week at full-time pay is not as farfetched as it might at first
appear. As part of an effort to combat high unemployment rates, the French
Parliament has adopted legislation reducing the current thirty-nine hour work
week to a mandatory thirty-five hour work week with no reduction in pay,
effective January 1, 2000.300 The government hopes to encourage employers
wishing to maintain production rates at current levels to hire additional workers.
Toward that end, employers who reduce the work week while simultaneously
increasing employment by at least six percent will receive a tax credit calculated
on a per-worker basis; those employers who further reduce the work week to
thirty-two hours while increasing employment by at least nine percent will
receive an additional tax credit.301 The Italian Prime Minister has pledged to
follow suit with a law that would reduce the legal work week to thirty-five hours
by the year 2001.302
4. Legislative Fixes
Marketwide reforms are key to meeting employers' objections that reducing
worktime to accommodate family caregiving will disadvantage them relative to
their market competitors. The U.S. government could level the playing field by
establishing minimum standards that require all employers of a certain size to
adopt such policies as a condition of doing business in the United States. 303
Limiting hours of work and requiring employers to allow workers to bank hours
or trade income for time could be mandated by a revised FLSA and encouraged
through tax incentives 04
Congress last gave serious consideration to a reduction in the standard work
298 See id at viii.
299 See id. at viii-ix.
300 See Barbara Casassus, French Parliament Passes Law to Reduce Workweek to 35
Hours, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 101, at A-8 (May 27, 1998).
301 See Lawrence J. Speer, French Government Announces Plans to Mandate 35-Hour
Workweek by 2000, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 198, at A-12 (Oct. 14, 1997); Lawrence .
Speer, French Government Announces Financial Aid for Companies Enacting 35-Hour
Workweek, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 203, at A-3 (Oct 21, 1997).
302 See French Government Announces Financial Aid for Companies Enacting 35-Hour
Workweek, supra note 301, at A-3.
303 See CooNTZ, supra note 128, at 73.
304 See Schor, supra note 248, at 168-69.
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week at the federal level in the late 1970s, when Representative John Conyers
introduced a proposal to amend the FLSA to reduce the standard work week to
thirty-five hours, increasing premium pay for overtime as a disincentive to
employers to utilize workers in excess of thirty-five hours, and eliminating
mandatory overtime. Proponents of that bill sought to decrease unemployment,
relieve stress on the job, improve employee morale and productivity, decrease
absenteeism, enhance quality of life off the job, and conserve energy expended in
commuting.305 Opponents argued that a generalized worktime reduction would
increase labor costs, feed inflation, and cause a drop in productivity, as well as
increasing multiple job holding. The bill never got out of committee.30 6
Since 1995, Congress has been confronted with numerous bills proposing
changes to the FLSA. These bills are intended either to relieve employers from
the constraints of the forty-hour work week and overtime pay requirements or to
give workers some flexibility to choose between time off and overtime pay.30 7
While these proposals are promising because they signal Congressional
willingness to rethink worktime norms established by the FLSA, they are also
troubling because they have the potential to move us in the opposite direction-
toward less family-friendly workplace policies regarding worktime.3 08
Recently, for example, Congress considered legislative measures that would
have permitted workers effectively to bank hours in a limited fashion so that they
could, in some weeks, work reduced hours in exchange for full time pay.309
305 See NEGREY, supra note 222, at 119-120.
306 See id. at 120.
307 See generally Nicholas Clark, Fair Labor Standards Act Reform-It's Not Broke, So
Don't Fix It, 11 THE LABOR LAWYER 343 (1995) (summarizing and describing five bills
proposed by employer lobbying groups during the 1995 legislative session).
308 See David J. Walsh, The FLSA Comp Yime Controversy: Fostering Flexibility or
Diminishing Worker Rights?, 20 BERKELEY J. EMwLOYMENT & LAB. L. 74, 137 (1999)
(analyzing proposed reforms of FLSA since 1997 and concluding that comp time reforms
threaten worker entitlement to overtime pay and are more in the interests of employers than of
workers).
309 Republican Cass Ballenger introduced The Working Families Flexibility Act on
January 7, 1997. Pamela M. Prah & Court Gifford, GOP Workplace Proposals Awaiting
Completion When Congress Returns, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 166, at C-1, C-8 (Aug. 27,
1997). In March of 1997, the House approved the bill, which would have amended the Fair
Labor Standards Act to give hourly workers the option of receiving either overtime pay or
compensatory time at a time-and-one-half rate for overtime work. See 143 CONG. REC. HI 115,
H1115-56 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997). It was passed by the House in 1997 as HJ. 1, The
Working Families Flexibility Act. The bill had been introduced in 1995 as H.R. 2391, and was
re-introduced and subsequently passed in 1996 in substantially similar form. See 142 CONG.
REC. H8776, H8776-91 (daily ed. July 30, 1996).
Pursuant to the bill, the choice to take compensatory time in lieu of overtime pay must be
voluntary, and the employee must request it in a written or verifiable statement See id. at
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Republican sponsors defended their bills on the grounds that many workers,
particularly women, seek flexibility in their work hours to accommodate family
caretaking obligations, and the new legislation would allow them to choose how
they are compensated for overtime worked-with time off or money.310
The measures were strongly resisted by Democrats, the President, women's
groups and organized labor on the basis that they would undermine the forty-
hour work week, that they did not give employees adequate control over when
the comp time was taken, and that they left employees vulnerable to employer
H8787. The bill prohibited employers from intimidating, threatening or coercing employees
into requesting compensatory time in lieu of overtime pay, or vice versa, and also prohibited
employers from requiring employees to use compensatory time. See id at H8787-88.
Employees could accumulate up to 240 hours of compensatory time in a 12-month period, and
employers would-be required to either compensate them for time not used within that period or
permitted them to use it; employers could refuse requests to use comp time made within a
reasonable period if the use of the comp time would unduly disrupt the operations of the
employer. See id. at H8788. The "unduly disrupf' standard has been in force in the public
sector for years and is also present in the Family and Medical Leave Act.
Senator John Ashcroft sponsored an even more expansive version in the Senate, entitled
The Family Friendly Workplace Act, that called for voluntary flex time as well as comp time;
this measure did not gamer enough Republican support to override a Democratic filibuster. See
GOP Workplace Proposals Awaiting Completion When Congress Returns, supra, at C-1
(discussing S 4). The Family Friendly Workplace Act, originally introduced January 21, 1997,
would have amended the FLSA to extend to private sector employees several benefits already
available to public sector employees, including time-and-a-half compensatory time off, bi-
weekly work programs, and flexible credit hour programs. The bill also sought to clarify the
provisions relating to exemptions from coverage of certain professionals by the minimum wage
and overtime provisions of the FLSA. See id. at C-8. The bill was reintroduced by Senator
Ashcroft on June 17, 1999, with several changes designed to make it more palatable to its
opponents (including a limit of 50 hours per week for employees on a bi-weekly work
schedule, a requirement that employers pay employees at year-end for any comp time not
taken, and a threshold requirement that employees have been at their jobs for one year before
becoming eligible for flexible scheduling). See Ashcrof Introduces Comp-Time Bill; Cites
Parents' Need for Flexible Scheduling, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 117, at A-5 (June 18,
1999).
310A poll conducted by the Employment Policy Foundation, an employer-funded
research group, had revealed that 75% of the respondents preferred a comp time option to the
premium pay for overtime rule. See Sana Siwolop, Overtime vs. Time Off. A Debate over a
Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1996, § 3, at 10. Federal, state, and local government employees
have had the comp-time-in-lieu-of-overtime-pay option since 1985, and some private sector
unions have negotiated such arrangements in their collective bargaining agreements. See Comp
Time in Lieu of Overtime Pay for Hourly Workers: Before the Subcomm. on Worlgbrce
Protections of the Comm. on Education & the Worlforce Regarding HR. 1 The Working
Faamilies Flexibility, Act, 105th Cong. (1997) available in 1997 WL 44984 (statement of Bob
Weisman) [hereinafter Hearings on HR. 1]; Siwolop, supra.
1946 [Vol. 60:1877
MARRAGE AND BREAD WiNING947
abuse.311 Opponents' primary concerns were that the choice given to employees
by the legislation would prove illusory because employers would attempt to
coerce employees into taking comp time even if they would have preferred
overtime pay, since the bills lacked effective enforcement provisions and funding
for the predicted increase in education and enforcement costs associated with
it.3 12
While opponents to the bills raised valid criticisms and were ultimately
successful in defeating the bills, their resistance to the alteration of the forty-
hour-per-week norm is instructive. Organized labor, in particular, opposed any
deviation from the forty-hour-per-week norm and overtime pay requirements of
311 See Hearings on H.R. 1, supra note 310 (statement of Karen Nussbaum, Director,
Working Women's Dep't, AFL-CIO), available in 1997 WL 44975 (arguing that the need to
make up for declining wages is the major force creating time pressure for families to spend
more and more hours in the paid workforce, and that flextime which provides flexibility to the
employer without affording the employee the right to control hours worked is no solution to the
problem of the work/family time squeeze, and advocating expansion of the Family and
Medical Leave Act to cover more employers and to provide time off for a greater variety of
family needs instead); iad (Testimony of Helen L. Norton, Director, Equal Opportunity
Programs, Women's Legal Defense Fund) available in 1997 WL 44998 (expressing concerns
about employees' lack of control over when the comp time is taken, likelihood that employees
will be pressured by employers to choose time over money, and the risks that comp time rights
will disappear in industries where employers close up shop while owing comp time to
employees, and pointing out that the bills do not relieve employees from mandatory overtime);
GOP Workplace Proposals Awaiting Completion WHen Congress Returns, supra note 309, at
C-1 (discussing H.R. 1).
The Family Friendly Workplace Act was vehemently opposed by labor and women's
groups, primarily because in addition to comp-time-in-lieu-of-overtime-pay options similar to
those featured in the Working Families Flexibility Act, it contained a "biweekly work
program" provision which would have allowed employers the flexibility to spread 80 hours'
worth of work per employee over a two-week period in the manner most advantageous to
employers. Thus, employers would have been able to require employees to work 60 hours in
one week and 20 in the next without paying overtime, and to vary this from one two-week
period to the next, an arrangement which workers with child care needs would find difficult if
not impossible to accommodate. See Court Gifford, Comp Time Bill Faces Test in Senate,
Another Cloture Vote Scheduled for June 4, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 106 at A-5, (June 3,
1997); Ellen Goodman, Working Families Flex Act Is Highway Robbeiy, FLA. TODAY, Apr. 1,
1997, at 7A. Women's groups opposing the bill included 9 To 5 The National Association of
Working Women; The American Nurses' Association; Business and Professional Women
USA; the National Council of Jewish Women; the National Women's Law Center, and the
Women's Legal Defense Fund.
3 12 See Hearings on H.P, 1, supra note 310 (statement of Karen Nussbaum, Director of
Working Women's Dep't, AFL-CIO); id (Testimony of Helen L. Norton, Director, Equal
Opportunity Programs, Women's Legal Defense Fund)
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the FLSA.313 Democrats responded instead with legislation designed to preserve
the forty-hour work week while allowing hourly workers more choice as to when
they can use time off, and barring discrimination against workers who choose
overtime pay rather than comp pay.314 Democrats also introduced the Family
and Medical Leave Enhancement Act, and proposed further expansion of the
Family and Medical Leave Act.315
5. Summary
Reduced worktime is an essential element of any effort to restructure paid
work so that it is more compatible with caregiving. The FLSA's forty-hour-per-
week standard has become a floor, rather than a ceiling, and overtime hours are
the norm. Rigid mandatory work hours and the expectation of continuous,
uninterrupted employment combine with the length of the work week to squeeze
out caregiving and family time, leading to marital tension and a parenting deficit
In addition to impacting marital harmony and parenting, work overload
hampers productivity in paid work and diminishes civic and community
involvement. Reduced worktime thus potentially benefits both individual
families and the larger society. To be truly effective and to avoid replicating
gendered patterns of division of labor, however, reduced worktime must be
implemented at amacro level through legislative changes to the worktime norms
313 See Goodman, supra note 311, at 7A (explaining that organized labor resisted comp
time legislation out of a desire to protect overtime pay); Walsh, supra note 308, at 132
(observing that the most vigorous opposition to FLSA comp time amendments has come from
organized labor).
3 14 See Gifford, supra note 311 (discussing H.R. 1302 and S. 1009). More forward-
thinking commentators have suggested legislative amendments that would allow employees to
borrow time up front as well as to lend time to their employers, bank hours, cash out of comp
time credits at any time, and move freely between comp time and overtime pay status, impose a
ban on mandatory overtime, install a shorter work week and impose statutory upper boundaries
on hours in any given week, allocate more resources for FLSA enforcement divisions to
prevent increases in abuse or noncompliance, and legislate a high standard of proof for "undue
business disruption." See, e.g., Golden, supra note 253, at 508.
3 15 See GOP Workplace Proposals Awaiting Completion When Congress Returns, supra
note 309, at C-1. In 1997, Democrats introduced three bills to amend the FMLA. The Family
and Medical Leave Improvements Act, introduced January 7, 1997 by Representative Clay,
would amend the FMLA to allow the use of 24 hours of unpaid leave a year for school-related
purposes, and would lower the threshold for coverage to employers of 25 employees. The
Family and Medical Leave Fairness Act, introduced January 22, 1997 by Senator Dodd, would
have amended the FMLA to lower the threshold for coverage to employers of 25 employees.
The Time for Schools Act was introduced February 5, 1997 by Senator Murray, and sought to
amend the FMLA to allow the use of 24 hours of leave per year for school-related purposes.
See id at C-7, C-8.
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articulated in the FLSA. Such changes are not an impossible dream: Other
countries have pursued such a course, the issue has potential broad-based
support, and Congress has indicated that it is willing to rethink the standards
expressed in the FLSA.3 16
While reduced work can produce the time necessary for balanced lives, it
can do so only if the work schedule is sufficiently predictable or under workers'
control, if pay is adequate to enable workers to live at accepted standards of
living, and if job security is present so that workers feel comfortable investing
leisure time in child care, family activities, and community activities rather than
making themselves constantly available for work. Only under these types of
conditions will reduced work likely further achievement of such a balance rather
than frustrate it.317
B. Worksite-Specific Strategies: Relinking Paid Work and Family Life
Reduced worktime represents only half a solution. In order for both
employees and employers to reap the maximum benefits of restructuring paid
work, paid work must be integrated with family life and the values of the market
altered to foster rather than block caregiving. This means demolishing the rigid
separation between home and market that characterized the industrial economy;
casting aside the no-longer-serviceable notion that long hours and "face time"
necessarily equate with productivity and finding other ways to measure
productivity; and asking workers what programs they need from employers in
order to foster productivity and alleviate family pressures.
Recently, the Ford Foundation undertook research partnerships with
Coming, Xerox, and Tandem Computers to investigate assumptions structuring
standard work arrangements to determine what relationship these assumptions
have to productivity. The authors produced a report entitled "Relinking Life and
Work" that concluded that the profound separation of work and family in
American work culture undermines both work efficiency and family life;
because many of the same assumptions that block work-family integration also
lead to inefficient or unproductive work practices, challenging old assumptions
provides a strategic opportunity for restructuring work to produce win-win
results for both employees and employers. 318 This Section collects ideas
316 At least one commentator believes that "given political realities, it is likely that some
form of comp time legislation will be enacted in the foreseeable future." See Walsh, supra note
308, at 128. Unions could certainly use this as a "springboard for advancing a broader agenda
focusing on attaining greater control over work hours," whether before the legislature or in
collective bargaining with employers. See id. at 132.
3 17 See NEGREY, supra note 222, at 123-25.
3 18 RHONDA RAPOPORT & LorrE BAILYN, FORD FOUND. REPORT, at Executive Summary
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articulated in their report as well as other productivity-enhancing measures that
integrate home and work, while simultaneously challenging gendered
assumptions about work and family, offering them as illustrations of worksite-
specific reforms that could be initiated even without legislative changes.
1. Where We Are
Employment policy, work practices, and employer expectations continue to
reflect a strict separation between work and home, a belief that work and family
are inherently in competition with one another, and an expectation that workers
should display a primary commitment to work and behave as if home obligations
do not exist.319 Researchers engaged in the Ford Foundation project found that:
[T]he dominant societal image of the ideal worker as "career-primary," the
person who is able and willing to put work first and for whom work time is
infinitely expandable .... translated into work practices that as is typical now in
corporations, include dawn meetings, planning sessions that run into the
evening, often ending with the suggestion to "continue this over dinner," and
training programs requiring long absences from home. Commitment is
measured by what one manager proudly declared as his definition of a star
engineer "someone who doesn't know enough to go home at night" At lower
(1995) available in <http://www.fordfound.org> (visited Mar. 20, 2000); see also LOTIE
BAILYN, BREAKING THE MOLD: WOMEN, MEN, AND TIME IN THE NEW CORPORATE WORLD
125-33 (1993) (discussing new facilitating assumptions which must replace old constraining
assumptions, including a norm of discontintfity in employment rather than an expectation of
continuous commitment, managerial styles which assume that employees are trustworthy and
make them accountable for results rather than controlling them through continuous surveillance
and reporting requirements, and openness to learning from the diversity of the employees'
experience rather than selecting employees who are homogenous in outlooks and values).
Among the constraining assumptions identified by the researchers were the following:
Time is an indicator of commitment, productivity and results; part-time workers aren't as
committed as full-time workers; single people have more time to devote to work; most men
have stay-at-home wives. See Barbara E. Miller, Rescue Your Work/Life Program,
WORKFORCE MAG., June 1997, at 84, 86. Thus, employees who work more hours are
considered most committed and valuable to the enterprise regardless of output when in fact
another worker may simply be making more efficient use of time. If company policy is to
reward and promote those who work long hours, employees will soon learn that long hours
rather than output are rewarded, and the company policy may actually end up rewarding
inefficiency and lack of production! See id. at 88. Similarly, informal office "face time"
requirements may end up inhibiting productivity if work tasks require uninterrupted, focused
time. If work could be done more efficiently with quiet time at home than it could in the office,
perhaps the solution is to allow the employee charged with such tasks to work at home one or
two days per week, saving the commute time for the employee and garnering for the employer
enhanced productivity during the hours actually worked. See id. at 90.
3 19 See RAPOPORT & BAILYN, supra note 318 at pt.2.
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levels in the organization, the belief in the dominance of work translated into
tight controls over worker time and flexibility.320
Employees adapt to the system by hiding or denying their personal lives at
work, dissembling about why they need to leave work early and acting as if they
do not have families. 32 ' This is a gendered construct: For men, family
responsibilities have traditionally enhanced career opportunities and upward
mobility because the male provider role has been understood in its narrowest
economic terms; for women, family responsibilities have been viewed as
conflicting with career advancement because of women's presumed contribution
as homemakers and caregivers. 3 22 Thus, women are especially likely to
downplay their family lives because of the risk that they will be seen as
uncommitted to their careers.323
320 Id.
321 One company discovered to its surprise that an astonishingly large number of its
managers admitted in an anonymous survey to having faked being sick in order to attend a
child's event See Gillian Flynn, Making A Business Case for Balance, WORKFORCE MAG.,
Mar. 1997, at 70.
322 Employment in our society is structured on the premise that workers have wives who
will assume primary responsibility for family caretaking. See Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing
Gender, supra note 102, at 822-23. This is particularly true for male-dominated jobs that tend
to be higher-paying. Joan Williams has made a persuasive case that seemingly objective
gender-neutral work requirements shaped by this premise violate Title VII because they
disproportionately impact women and economically marginalize them. See WILLIAMS, supra
note 76, at 104-10 (describing how Title VII disparate impact litigation could be used to
challenge jobs designed around masculine social and physical norms ranging from the
nonavailability of part-time work in some occupations to cockpits sized for men's bodies); see
also Deborah J. Vagins, Note, Occupational Segregation and the Male-Worker Norm:
Challenging Objective Work Requirements Under Title VII, 18 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 79,
82-86 (1996). Such gendered constructs impact especially harshly on single parent families,
who now constitute 26% of all families with minor children and represent the most rapidly-
growing family form in the United States. See Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single Parents, 18
HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 21-22, 68-69 (1995) (explaining how the structure of employment
and the law regulating it are oriented toward the male breadwinner rather than the caretaking
parent).
323 See RAPOPORT & BAILYN, supra note 318 at pt.2. Employed women are caught in a
classic double-bind, because expectations that they are or should be "family-primary" taint
them as unfit for the labor market, while women who step outside ofprescnbed gender roles by
failing to display a family-primary attitude may be punished as well. In short, "[t]he work
culture mandates that they subordinate caring for their families but punishes them for doing
so." Id.
Men who step outside prescribed gender roles are also punished if their family
responsibilities appear to be long-term rather than brief and time-limited in nature. See id
Employer hostility to men's requests for work accommodations to family caregiving
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In an effort both to accommodate their own needs for flexibility in staffing
and to attract and retain workers who have developed an entrepreneurial attitude
toward work, employers have begun to tinker with the structure of work. Many
published articles tout the rise of telecommuting, flexplace, flextime, part-time,
and job-sharing in today's marketplace. 324 These changes alter the way work is
done as well as when and where it is done, and offer significant potential for
breaking down the artificial barriers between work and family life, between
public and private space and time.
A recent poll indicates that work-family balance issues are a pressing
concern for the vast majority of employees. 325 Nearly all major businesses now
acknowledge the significance of their employees' need to balance work and
family obligations and the difficulties of doing so for a dual-earning couple.326 A
1991 study surveyed 188 of the largest companies in thirty industries, and found
that 100% offer maternity leave, 88% offer part-time work, 77% offer flextime
(typically with a 1 to 2 hour band on either end of the day), 48% have job-
sharing arrangements (usually informally negotiated), and 68% are developing or
considering new programs.327 The fact that some 40% percent of large
responsibilities is well-documented. See Malin, supra note 202, at 1077-78; see also Michael
Selmi, The Limited Vision of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 44 VILL. L. REV. 395, 397
(1999) (urging reforms in the Family and Medical Leave Act designed to encourage men to
"begin to act more like women in the workplace" by taking on family care obligations).
324 See, e.g., Lisa Stansky, Changing Shifls, A.B.A. J., June 1997, at 55.
325 See Spending More Time With Family Top Concern of Workers, Survey Says, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 53, at A-9 (Mar. 19, 1999).
32 6 One author summarized the evidence of business interest in the topic as follows:
[l]ndicators [of business interest in the subject of work and family benefits and their
relation to productivity] are that the Wall Street Journal now runs a weekly column on
work/family and recently published a special supplement on the theme (June 21, 1993),
Business Week (June 28, 1993) devoted a cover article to the topic, Human Resource
Management devoted a special issue of the journal to it, and Working Women magazine
[sic] publishes an annual issue on the most family-friendly companies. In addition, the
Bureau of National Affairs organizes an annual conference on work/family, and the
Conference Board has established a center devoted to the issue. Finally, a number of
consulting firms, including Work/Family Directions, Catalyst, and the Families and Work
Institute, have been created that provide services to firms as well as engage in research and
advocacy on the topic.
Osterman, supra note 2, at 682.
32 7 Charlene Marmer Solomon, Work/Family's Failing Grade: Why Today's Initiatives
Aren't Enough, PERSONNEL J., May 1994, at 72, 76. At least one study, however, has
concluded that much of the attention amounts to lip-service, and that work/family programs-
especially those featuring costly benefits--are not particularly widespread. See Osterman,
supra note 2, at 688, 689 (reporting the results of a national survey of private sector employers
1952 [Vol. 60:1877
MARRJAGE AND BREAD WINNING
companies surveyed offer the same core set of work/life programs and related
policies and benefits suggests that "the bar is being raised": Employers who wish
to compete for talent in today's labor market will need to offer work/life benefit
programs in order to attract and retain employees.328
Nevertheless, work/family programs have tended to remain on the periphery
of employers' range of concerns. Researchers have posited various reasons for
this. First, work/family is still perceived as a corporate welfare program, rather
than as a business strategy: employers institute family-friendly programs against
the historical backdrop in which employers were expected to bear some
responsibility for workers and their dependents, rather than because such
programs are understood as enhancing business productivity.329 Thus, employers
may be interested only in creating the illusion of community and support, while
simultaneously cutting other benefits (for example, health insurance coverage) in
order to finance the new and more visible work/family benefits.330 Only if
work/family programs are seen as "strategic tools for competitive advantage"
and linked to issues of employee recruitment and retention, performance, and
enhanced productivity, will corporations place them at center stage.3 31
which revealed that only 15% of employers have a full-time employee charged with handling
work/family issues, relatively few employers have on-site or even off-site subsidized day care
programs, and the least costly work/family benefits are the most prevalent, and concluding that
only a minority of employers-those who are seeking to implement high-performance, high-
commitment, innovative work systems-are likely to invest in work/family benefit programs
that potentially empower employees and produce high levels of employee commitment to the
firm).
328 See Greenfield & Terry, supra note 213, at 68. Tight labor markets where talent is in
limited supply and turnover is high have prompted competition between those seeking to be
known as the most family-fliendly employers. See Sue Shellenbarger, Work & Family:
Accounting Firms Battle to Be Known as Best Worlkplaces, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1998, at B1.
The core set or "baseline" work/life programs offered by these employers include: unpaid
personal leaves of absence, employee assistance programs, dependent care spending accounts,
personal days, vacation day carryover, gradual return to work following disability or parental
leaves, flextime, tuition reimbursement for nonbusiness-related courses, assistance with
financial planning, child care resource and referral, enhanced health insurance coverage, and
prorated benefits for part-time workers. See Greenfield & Terry, supra note 216, at 69, fig.l.
32 9 See Gonyea & Googins, supra note 115, at 69-70.
330 See Osterman, supra note 2, at 697. Osterman points out that employer initiatives in
the work/family benefits arena are strikingly reminiscent of historical welfare capitalism, in
which companies provided previously unknown benefits-life insurance, company housing,
social work, and recreational programs-in an effort to tie the individual employee to the firm
and fend off unionization. See id; see also supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
331 See Gonyea & Googins, supra note 115, at 71; see also Osterman, supra note 2, at
698 (suggesting that the performance gains achieved by high-commitment workforces and the
centrality and prevalence of work/family benefits in those firms may help to ensure that
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Second, work/family programs tend to focus on parenting issues and to
ignore the wider spectrum of life interests that contribute to a healthy balance
between work and leisure, including involvement in politics, civic affairs,
community volunteer organizations, church, education, personal growth, and
hobbies. Thus, they are seen as benefiting only working parents, rather than
benefiting all employees.332 This perception poses a substantial risk that
childless workers will become resentful at the prospect of shouldering an extra
workload when parents take advantage of leave or flexible work
an-angements. 333 A related problem stems from the fact that work/family
programs are viewed as disproportionately beneficial to women. This perception
tends to divide the workforce along gender lines and to deter men and women
from taking advantage of them because of the stigma traditionally associated
with appearing to be less committed to career than to family.334
In order for work/family programs to assume center stage in workplace
policy, a new social contract must be forged between employers and workers that
is predicated on the common interests of both in flexibility and productivity.
Companies that recognize employees' need for flexible scheduling, in order to
maintain equilibrium between work and home life, will reap the reward of
employees who are psychologically engaged in their jobs because they bring
their "full" selves to work-including their identities as women, African
Americans, Latinos (and Latinas), gays or lesbians, caregivers, parents, and
church or community volunteers.335 A growing body of research implies that
workers who feel personally supported by their employers are more likely to
think innovatively on the job, make important contributions at work, and feel
work/family programs have a robust fiture and are not just a passing fad).
332 Gonyea & Googins, supra note 115, at 69. This is particularly shortsighted in light of
the universal problems faced by adult workers with responsibility for the care of aging parents.
333 See RAPOPORT & BAiLYN, supra note 318 at pt.2.
334 See id.; Gonyea & Googins, supra note 115, at 70 (describing stigma connected with
'mommy track" benefits).
335 See Gonyea & Googins, supra note 115, at 73-74 (citing VA. Parker & D.T. Hall,
Workplace Flexibility: Faddish or Fundamental, in BUILDING THE CoMPETrmvE WORKFORCE
122-55 (P.H. Miruis ed., 1993)). The Ford Foundation researchers found that "integrated"
workers-those who linked the spheres of their life in the way they worked-drew on skills
and values associated with the family sphere such as collaboration, sharing, empathy, and
nurturing, as well as those associated with the public work sphere, such as rationality, linear
thinking, assertiveness, and competition. See RAPOPORT & BAMLYN, supra note 318 at pt.2.
Integrated workers (many of whom were women) did more behind-the-scenes work to smooth
interactions between people so that the work project would not be disrupted; took time to teach
others or to pass on key information to other groups; and routinely affirmed and acknowledged
the contributions of others, building on them rather than attacking them. Id
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more attached and loyal to the organization.336 Further, such workers are likely
to be happier with their home lives and less distracted by worries about unmet
family caretaking obligations, which in turn further enhances the likelihood of
stability and productivity at work.337
336 See Robert Eisenberger, et al., Perceived Organization Support and Employee
Diligence, Commitment, and Innovation, 75 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 51, 55, 57 (1990); Gonyea &
Googins, supra note 115, at 74.
Some benefits offered by firms seeking to boost employee morale and enhance
productivity and firm loyalty target links between work and family or community ties. Fel-Pro,
an Illinois-based designer, manufacturer, and marketer of automotive gaskets and engine
sealants, boasts increased productivity, employee suggestions for improvements that generated
$9.6 million in the first 10 months of 1996, and an employee turnover rate ofjust over 10%-
an exceptional rate of retention in a tight market for unskilled labor. See Vicki Gerson, Pinning
Down the Value of Premier Benefits, Bus. & HEALTH, Feb. 1997, at 31. Researchers at the
University of Chicago who studied Fel-Pro looking for connections between its family-friendly
policies and employee morale and work behavior found that employees who took advantage of
Fel-Pro's cradle-to-grave family benefits identified closely with the firm, helped coworkers,
and showed initiative in submitting product improvement suggestions. See id at 38. Fel-Pro
attributes its employees' high morale and commitment to its comprehensive benefits package
and overall attitude toward employees. The package includes a wedding gift of $1,000;
enrollment in a prenatal program called Healthy Start; breast pumps provided for new mothers
to use during lunch or breaks; a new baby $1,000 savings bond; adoption assistance; an on-site
day care center featuring computer classes; summer day camp; high school graduation gifts;
free counseling to assist with college applications and selection; a scholarship program that
provides each child of every full-time employee with up to $3,500 per year tuition for college
or post-secondary trade school; the same levels of tuition reimbursement for workers
themselves; payroll advances to fund the purchase of a computer (Fel-Pro's operation is
increasingly computerized, and Fel-Pro has an interest in helping employees become computer
literate); an on-site fitness center featuring workshops on personal development; matching
funds for employee charitable donations; birthday and anniversary bonuses; elder care referral
services; a death benefit of $250; a vacation-purchase program allowing employees with less
than four weeks' annual vacation to trade five days' pay for extra time off; profit sharing,
Christmas bonuses, and a pay scale in the 75th percentile of that offered by local employers.
See id at 34-35. See also Vivienne Walt, The Cutting Edge: Some Companies Do a Lot More
Than Just TalkAbout Being Family-Friendly, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1997, at B 14, available in
1997 WL 2415012 (illustrating a Fel-Pro employee's use of the company's summer camp).
3 37 See Gonyea & Googins, supra note 115, at 74; see Company-Sponsored Efforts Yield
Benefits, Significant Savings for Employers, Workers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at A-3
(Jan. 14, 1998) (discussing report concluding that employers receive a 3-1 return on monies
they spend on establishing work/family programs and investments they make in the
community, through the benefits of improved recruitment and enhanced company image,




2. fIlustrative Strategies for Reforming Work and Enhancing Productivity
The Ford Foundation researchers found that the best way to link work and
family, rendering changes in work form, business issues, and work/family
accommodations, was to ask the following three questions: (1) How is work
done here? (2) What are employees' personal stories of work-family integration?
and (3) What is it about the way work is done here that makes it difficult (or
easy) to juggle work and personal life so that neither one suffers?338 What
follows is a sampling of answers that have emerged when employers asked these
questions.
a. Control and Flexibility
Control over work scheduling and work location is probably the key benefit
prized by employees. Control is typically achieved through flexible work
programs. The appeal of flexible work is universal across workers of all ages,
which is important since thirty-six percent of the workforce is single and has no
children under age eighteen.339 Flexibility can be utilized to accommodate a
wide range of activities, including attendance at children's events, caring for
older relatives, waiting for deliveries of furniture or repair persons, making a
difficult commute, participating in sports or other recreational or community
activities, and pursuing educational goals.340
Flexibility comes in various forms. A 1993 survey of 480 large employers
found that 71% allow flexible scheduling within a narrow time band (still
requiring 8 hours per day), while others offer still more flexibility-including
flexibility in the length of the week (fewer but longer days or shorter days in 6-
day weeks), reduced time options (part-time and job sharing) and flexibility in
place (telecommuting, branch offices).341 Employers that instituted flexible
scheduling typically did so because it enhanced productivity. For example, First
Tennessee Bank in Memphis restructured work schedules in its accounts-
reconcilement department to include longer days at the beginning of the month
and time off later in the month when its workload was lighter. The department's
productivity improved significantly as a result.342 First Tennessee's work/life
338 See RAPoPORT & BAILYN, supra note 318 at pt.2.
339 See Sameera Khan, 'Family' Perks of No Benefit to Many Employees, Bus. INS., July
25, 1994, at 3, 4 (quoting the 36% figure, and attributing it to the Bureau of Labor Statistics).
340 See Deborah Shalowitz Cowans, New Work Options Increase Flexibility, Bus. INS.,
July 25, 1994, at 3, 4.
341 See id. (quoting the Coopers & Lybrand 1993 study); see also Charlene Marner
Solomon, Flexibility Comes Out of Flux, PERSONNEL J., June 1996, at 34,36.
342 See generally Walt, supra note 336.
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strategy and programs-which also include options to work at home a few days
per week, part-time schedules with full benefits, and two hours per week of
flexible time available for 'Juggling" to acconmmodate family obligations and
doctor's appointments-allowed it to retain its employees twice as long as the
bank average. This increased employee retention saved more than $3 million in
turnover costs. First Tennessee also experienced higher customer retention rates
that in turn yielded substantial profits: The Bank estimated a 55% profit gain of
$106 million between 1994 and 1995. 343 Key to the program's success,
according to Bank officials, was the fact that employees themselves designed the
new policy in conjunction with their managers. 344
b. Bringing Family to Work
The Family and Medical Leave Act's requirement of a twelve-week unpaid
leave345 has prompted some unusual employer initiatives. San Jose National
Bank features a unique plan called "Babies in the Workplace," under which
pregnant workers agree to take only eight weeks of unpaid leave surrounding
childbirth (rather than the twelve allowed by the FMLA) and in exchange may
return to work with their babies, bringing them to the workplace until the
children turn six months old or begin to crawl.346 The arrangement saves the
company approximately $60,000 per worker by avoiding turnover and the
associated training costs. So far, the arrangement has yielded an impressive one
hundred percent retention rate for new mothers.347
343 See Flynn, supra note 321, at 68,69,71,72.
344 See id at 70, 71.
Similarly, an upstate-New York-based photographic products company called Optimation
Technology, Inc. found that flexible work rules for employees yielded big payoffs. Optimation
offers totally flexible hours with no need to seek prior approval as long as each employee
completes forty hours per week (allowing parents to adjust their schedules day-to-day to fit
their children's routines and ferry them to after-school activities), subsidized child care in the
building, and no time clocks, making it one of the most popular employers in the area. See
Walt, supra note 336, at B 14.
34 5 See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6, codified
at29 U.S.C. § 2612(aX1) (1994).
346 San Jose National Bank President Jim Kenney announced the plan to his staff on the
date the FMLA took effect. See Marilyn Gardner, When Offices Double as Nurseries,
CRSTAN SC. MoNrrOR, Apr. 7, 1994, at 13, 13.
347 Still another employer, a marketing company called TC3 located in Austin, Texas, set
up a building adjacent to the main office for new mothers who retum to work with their babies
until the babies are old enough to crawl-at which point most are ready to make child-care
arrangements. See Shu Costa, The Business of Bringing Up Baby: Firms Set Up Place for
Mons and Tots to Work Play Side by Side, DALLAS MORNnG NEws, May 1, 1996, at 5C,
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Subsidized on-site day care hasproved an increasingly popular drawing card
for other employers. One recent survey found that twelve percent of employers
had an on-site facility, an additional eight percent had arranged for care at a
nearby center, and five percent belonged to a consortium of employers that
sponsored a facility.348 The payoff for employers includes substantially reduced
employee turnover rates, the ability to recruit and retain experienced staff,
reduced absenteeism (emergency care for sick children may be made available
on-site even for children who are not enrolled in the day-care program), and
improved employee focus in the absence of worries about where children are and
how they are doing.349 Recent state and federal legislative action suggests that
additional employer incentives may soon be forthcoming in the form of tax
benefits.3 50
A "family" issue that is increasingly intruding on the workplace is domestic
violence. Domestic violence affects its victims' workplace productivity, causes
absenteeism, and leads to increased health care costs; moreover, it follows
victims into the workplace, endangering other workers and impairing their
productivity. The Bureau of National Affairs estimates that the price tag for
corporate America is between $3 billion and $5 billion annually.351 Many
employers now provide Employee Assistance Programs designed to provide
counseling and referrals for those with substance abuse and family problems
such as marital discord or domestic violence; some employers sponsor
workshops and seminars on domestic violence, offer employee support groups
and make donations to battered women's shelters, or accommodate women who
need time off to seek safe housing, attend court appearances, or take leaves of
absence.352
3. Risks and Pitfalls
It is important not to take so-called "family friendly" programs at face value.
In some cases, while a company offers a state-of-the-art menu of family-friendly
policies, employees are still judged based on whether they have put in sufficient
"face time," rather than by output or merit: As Hochschild's research suggested,
available in 1996 WL 2119258.
• 
34 8 See On-Site Child Care Centers Increasingly Pique Employer Interest, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at C-1 (Mar. 3, 1999).
349 See Walt, supra note 336, at B14.
350 See generally On-Site Child Care Centers Increasingly Pique Employer Interest,
supra note 348.
351 See Charlene Mariner Solomon, Talking Frankly About Domestic Violence,
PERSONNEL J., Apr. 1995, at 62, 64.
3 5 2 See id at 65.
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even employers with liberal formal policies favoring flextime and job sharing
may communicate infomally that adherence to the traditional face time
mentality is required.353
Flexibility, for example, is as much a matter of firm philosophy as it is a
question of which benefits are available. Some policies that are touted as family-
friendly, such as compressed work weeks or flextime schedules that still require
8 hours per day but shift the hours from 8-4 to 7-3, actually inject further
rigidity into work scheduling. By contrast most employees say they need
flexibility to control and adjust their own schedules. For example, in a 1995
study, employees gave top priority to a "paid time-off bank" that would afford
them the option to choose how and when to use their accrued time.354 Similarly,
even highly visible benefits like on-site child care may not be preferable from
employees' standpoint to assistance in locating child care close to home, back-up
child care in the event of illness of the child or unavailability of the caretaker, or
dependent-care flexible-spending accounts.355
353 See Ellen C. Banked & Bradley K Googins, Family-Friendl--Says Who?, ACROSS
THE BOARD, July/Aug. 1996, at 45, 48 (stating that corporations are maintaining their
traditional "face time" mentality even though implementing formal policies of flextime and
job-sharing).
354 See id at 48. Leave banks work best in conjunction with generous vacation and leave
policies. Employees at the Bureau of National Affairs, a publishing company in Washington,
D.C., enjoy a leave bank into which employees may donate unused paid vacation days, to be
pooled and used by employees who need them. In light of the company's substantial vacation
benefits (2 weeks of paid vacation upon hire, scaling up to 5 weeks after 14 years), many
employees find themselves donating unused time; requests to borrow from the bank have come
from women with high-risk pregnancies or employees suffering serious illnesses who need
recuperation time. See Michele Weldon, Banking on Balance: Need More Time OJ? Borrow
Some, CmH. TRIB., Aug. 25, 1996, at 7.
355 See Banker & Googins, supra note 353, at 48. While some benefits may gamer
favorable publicity and generate short-term goodwill among employees, those that fall short of
challenging fundamental assumptions about work and family as separate spheres and that fail
to provide workers with control over their schedules provide little of lasting benefit. See, e.g.,
Leslie Faught,At Eddie Bauer You Can Work and Have a Life, WORKFORCE MAG., Apr. 1997,
at 83, 84, 89, 90 (detailing how "small touches yield big profits" in employee morale at Eddie
Bauer, Inc., and giving examples such as calling employees "associates," allowing them one
"Balance Day" per year when they may "call in well" to schedule an absence, instituting a
casual dress code, adopting a compressed work week, offering an "outdoor experience
allowance" subsidizing outdoor activities such as golf, mountain climbing, and skiing, and
initiating a health benefits wellness package that pays for itself in lowering health care costs).
This is not to say that such programs are of no value. Clearly, such benefits as emergency child
care services, paid parental leave, and a child and elder care referral service-which Eddie
Bauer also offers-are of significant value to many employees. The point is that one must look
beneath the surface of such programs, asking whether they challenge the fundamental
assumption that work and family life are separate spheres.
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The key is that employees, not the employer, are likely to know best what
they need; employers who are limited by their own assumptions about employee
needs and interests or who conduct rigid surveys are not likely to discover what
the employees actually desire.356 Benefits that are not useful to employees, or
that employees know they will be punished for claiming, do not deliver the same
sense of employee commitment and loyalty to the company. Employees who
utilize and value company benefits are far more likely to participate
wholeheartedly in their work and to manifest the benefits of improved work
performance and morale.357
Ironically, the initiatives that produce the biggest productivity gains and best
promote employee retention are often those that cost the least: flexible
scheduling, job sharing, and part-time options cost little to implement but seem
to have the biggest payoffs, while big-ticket projects like on-site child care serve
a small percentage of the company's employees and cost the most to
implement.358 Nevertheless, the type of benefit that is most likely to enhance
productivity and morale varies from industry to industry depending upon
workforce composition and locale. For example, Marriott discovered that the
most valued benefits for its predominantly immigrant, low-waged workforce
included a hotline featuring bilingual social workers who provided workers with
information on housing, transportation, and legal and domestic violence
problems, and child and elder care referral services; the hotline reduced
employee turnover significantly, increased productivity and reduced absenteeism
and tardiness.359
On the other hand, Lancaster Laboratories, an analytical testing lab in
Lancaster, Pennsylvania, found that an on-site child care center reduced turnover
so significantly that the program, although costly, saves the company money.
Before the center opened, 50% of workers who went on maternity leave did not
return. After the center opened, 94% of new mothers returned. Since the cost of
replacing one employee is between $10,000 and $15,000, and 10 to 15 women
typically take maternity leave each year, the company saves at least twice as
much as the $50,000 per year that it spends on the center.360 Still other
356 See Bankert & Googins, supra note 353, at 49.
357 See Solomon, supra note 327, at 78.
358 See Julia Lawlor, The Bottom Line on Work-Family Programs, WORKING WOMAN,
July-Aug. 1996, at 54, 56; see also Sue Shellenbarger, Employers Are Finding It Doesn't Cost
Much to Make a Staff Happy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1997, at BI (allowing employees to
choose their own shifts, providing flexibility in work hours, improving worker morale through
communication, and rewarding longevity proved cheaper and more successful for most
employers than raises and signing bonuses in reducing employee turnover).
359 See Lawlor, supra note 358, at 55.
360 See id at 56, 58.
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employers find that the most pressing unmet need is emergency back-up child
care centers for parents whose child care arrangements break down at the last
minute and for those whose children are ill and therefore cannot be taken to their
regular day care centers. The 700 employee law firm of Arnold & Porter in
Washington, D.C., estimates that it saved at least $800,000 in 1993 through
reduced absenteeism by providing such a backup care center for its attomeys. 361
Class bias presents another pitfall. Most work/life programs are focused
toward a relatively high income group of workers.3 62 Work/family benefits of
greatest value to lower-income workers may be very different, including
primarily resource and referral services, employee assistance programs, and child
care.363 The business justification for providing services to lower-level
employees differs from that which persuades businesses to offer such services to
higher-waged workers. Rather than cost justifications based on the need to retain
workers whose education or training makes them difficult to replace, the
business justification for supporting low-waged workers typically involves
customer satisfaction: Employers want service workers in hotels and restaurants
to feel commitment and loyalty to the company, and so deliver quality
service.364
Imposing new programs on old systems in which fundamental corporate
values and societal values remain unchallenged is a recipe for failure. 65 In order
to be effective, work/life programs must assume that workers are also
caregivers-whether for their children, their spouses, their parents, or their
communities-and must support them in these endeavors.
4. What Do Unions Have to Do with It?
Organized labor can be an effective force in restructuring work at a local
level through collective bargaining as well as at the political level of lobbying for
legislative reform. Labor unions can, and have, made family issues union issues.
Fifty-five percent of unionized workers (as opposed to thirty percent of nonunion
workers) had the right to job-protected parental leave of eight weeks or more
prior to passage of the FMLA.3 66 Unions were instrumental in lobbying for the
361 See id at 58.
362 See Study Reports Low-Wage Employees Benefit Less from Work-Family Programs,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 57, at A-4 (Mar. 25, 1998) (describing survey that found that the
rigid schedules and direct contact with people or products required of many low-waged
workers made the majority of work/family programs useless to them).
363 See ia
364 See Solomon, supra note 327, at 78.
365 See id at 74-75.
366 LEA GRUNDY & NETsY FIRSTEIN, WoRK, FAMILY, AND THE LABOR MoveMENT 10
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FMLA's passage, and many unions now use collective bargaining to extend the
reach of the FMLA to employees who are not covered by its terms, to increase
leave time, to provide paid family leave, and to obtain other related benefits for
workers who are covered. 367
Unions' original gendered focus on the family wage has evolved into an
effort to obtain "living wages" for all workers, and family issues have risen in
priority on union bargaining agendas. 368 In 1968, the AFL-CIO was instrumental
in amending the Taft-Hartley Act to lift the ban against union bargaining for
child care benefits.369 Some of the most successful union efforts since then have
involved obtaining employer-subsidized child care through collective
bargaining.370 Some unions have also been effective in bargaining for elder care
benefits, leave for victims of domestic violence, flextime, compressed work
weeks, and part-time returns to work following parental leave.371
Unions also bring into the picture an essential ingredient for success:
employee voice. The groundbreaking Saturn experiment in labor-management
cooperation produced a labor agreement epitomizing this; it featured work/life
benefits tailored to the needs of Saturn employees who moved from all over the
country to the Spring Hill, Tennessee plant including relocation assistance and
child care that met the high standards that Saturn employees were accustomed to
elsewhere and which remained open 22 hours per day to accommodate shift
schedules. 372
Nevertheless, unions' response to the FLSA amendments considered by
Congress over the past few years reveals the continuing primacy of industrial
unionism: the cautious strategy of preserving jobs and relatively high wages for
labor's own membership and maintaining labor market "tightness" through
policies of exclusion.373 If organized labor is to be a significant player on this
field, it must consider a shorter-hours struggle and an effort to break down
home/market barriers that would unite workers across gender and class lines and
tighten the labor market for all workers.
(Radcliffe Public Policy Institute Changing Work in America Series, 1997).
367 Seeid. at 13.
368 See id. at 11; see generally Lea Grundy & Netsy Firestein, Bargaining for Families,
NEWLABOR FORtM, Spring 1998, at 19,20.
369 See Grundy & Firestein, supra note 368, at 21.
370 See GRuNDY & FIRESTEN, supra note 366, at 14-15 (describing child care benefit
programs established by various unions through collective bargaining).
371 See id. at 15-18.
372 See John Herzfeld, Employee-Supportive Efforts Integrated into Saturn Experiment,
Conference Told, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 60, at A-1I (Mar. 30, 1998).
373 See Aronowitz & Cutler, supra note 296, at 56-63.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Nostalgia for vanishing "cowboys," gender-role-bound marriages and
marital permanence is widespread. While the high divorce rate and its
consequences for children and adults alike is a serious social problem, the
primacy of the liberal vision of romantic marriage between equals, social
commitment to sex equality, and a postindustrial economy in which two incomes
are essential, make it unlikely that we will retreat to the breadwinner/homemaker
model of marriage anytime soon. Must a spiraling divorce rate be the inevitable
byproduct of our commitment to gender equality and romantic marriage?
I have argued here that divorce, parenting deficits, and family breakdown are
closely linked to the structure of market work and the values that it privileges.
Paid employment in our postindustrial economy features an employer-worker
relationship that eschews the permanent 'mtil death do we part" model in favor
of "serial monogamy."374 We should not be surprised when our family structures
and values mirror the structure and values of our postindustrial economy.
Marital strife, divorce, and the "time bind" need not be our future if we are
willing to expand our vision and restructure paid employment to support co-
provider marriages predicated on assumptions of gender equality. The blueprint
for reform should be a Universal Caregiver model of employment. Two themes
must be primary: reduced worktime, and the integration of paid work and family
so that they support one another rather than existing in conflict
Whether those seeking reduced worktime and integrated market and family
lives are "pioneers forging the way to a new society" in the "vanguard of a post-
industrial, post-employment revolution," or simply "misfits in a culture that
values full-time wage work," remains to be seen. 375 This much, however, is
clear: Rhetoric-whether about gender equality or strengthening family values-
is not particularly helpful when our social institutions reinforce certain values
and extinguish others. Concrete changes are needed. This Article has sought to
canvass some of the possible reforms we might implement.
374 See Michael Bologna, Labor Relations Scholars Analyze Shift in Employer-Employee
Relationships, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 76, at A-5 (Apr. 21, 1999).
375 See NEGREY, supra note 222, at 117.
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